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ABSTRACT

FAMILY RESEMBLANCE: A STUDY OF LINGUISTIC CONFORMITY
WITHIN FAMILY SYSTEMS
DECEMBER 1991
REBECCA LEE GARNE'IT, B.Mus., UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI
M. A. , UNIVERSITY OF M'ASSACHUSETI'S
AT BOSTON
Directed by:

Professor John R. Murray

This thesis reports the results of an empirical study designed to test
two hypotheses from the early psychiatric work of C.G. Jung:

first,

the existence of a "family disposition" toward the word association
test (WAT), and second, the theory that there is interference between
the "thinking" and the "feeling" functions in an individual's cognitive
processing.

The experiment involved 52 normal subjects from 15

families, ranging in age from 12 to 65.

Subjects were tested using an

association instrument adapted from the WAT developed by Jung (Jung,
1973).

Response commonality was examined along several dimensions:

identical verbal response, identical category response, -and identical
reaction type.

Subjects were found t o have 20% verbal commonality and

34-38% categorial connnonality within family units.

Comparison of

relatives' responses to those of non-related individuals, using a
Spearman rank order correlation test on classified responses, yielded
an average correlation figure of .29 for related and .25 for unrelated
pairs of individuals; this difference seemed too small to support the
hypothesis, but no formal test of significance was performed.

Sample

size proved too small to test the significance of response pattern
redundancy within families.

In the second part of the experiment, 38

subjects completed the deductive logic section of the Ross Test of

vi
Higher Cognitive Processes, and their error rate was compared with
their rate of predicative responses on the WAT.

A Pearson Product

Moment Correlation was .57, indicating a moderately strong correlation
between preference for predication, a characteristic of the "feeling"
function, and difficulty with deductive logic, a process of the
"thinking" function.

A theoretical chapter traces the evolution of

Jung's cognitive theories from his early word association experiments
(Jung, 1973) to the development of his functional system of psychological typology (Jung, 1971).

37 tables, 12 figures.
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Although the word is shared,
people live as though thinking were a private possession.

--Heraclitus

INTRODUCTION
OF ASSOCIATIVE, PREDICATIVE, AND DEDUCTIVE LOGIC

In 1883, Sir Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin and one of
the founders of modern word association theory, published the first
edition of a book containing family portraits created through a
technique he had invented, composite photography.

By

superimposing the

image of one individual on that of another, he was able to create the
portrait of a "family face," an image in which the similarities of form
and structure among individuals were reinforced through repetition, and
the differences distinguishing each individual from the others smoothed
away.

The resultant likeness, though representing no one in particular,

did represent the "family resemblance," the prototypical face in which
1
all the individual members had a share.
A generation later, Dr. C.G. Jung uncovered a curious phenomenon
while giving the word association test to a group of normal subjects at
the psychiatric clinic of the University of Zurich.

Aroclng the first

thirty-eight people he tested were eight women who were connected by
family ties, two groups of rnothers with two daughters, and a motherdaughter pair.

In each of these three groups, there was a remarkable

similarity among reactions to the stimulus words of the test, not only
in terms of the actual response words uttered, but in terms of the type
of response, the reaction style, adopted by each of the women.

It was

as though each famil y group shared a specific attitude, a manner of
approaching the words of the test, and the concepts they represented,
that showed an underlying unity of thought and of orientation toward the
world.

2
Was it mere coincidence?

Clearly, Jung didn't think so, and he was

quick to organize an experiment on family associations which was carried
out by one of his students at the Burgholzli Clinic, Dr.

Errrna

Furst.

The results, published by Dr. Furst in 1907 and subsequently reported by
Jung in his 1909 lectures at Clark University, seemed to point to the
existence of a family reaction-type, a distinct style of associative
thinking pervading the responses of family members.2

Individual

patterns of relationship between stimulus and response, when graphed and
superimposed on one another, yielded the same sort of prototypical form
as Galton had produced with his composite photographic images.
A passionate interest in image and symbol formation diverted Jung's
attention from any further exploration of the linguistic phenomenon he
and Furst had observed in families, and the focus of analytical
psychology, as he was to define it over the next decade, turned to the
deep autonomous processes which all individuals share--the functions of
the collective unconscious.

Association theory itself followed much the

same path, shifting its emphasis from t he introspective exploration of
individuals' thoughts and reminiscences, which had characterized the
work of Galton, Wundt, and the Zurich researchers, to the generalized,
mass approach of Kent and Rosanoff, Woodrow and Lowell, Thorndike,
Palerm:), Russell and Jenkins, in experiments designed to yield the most
coltlOC)n, nost average, most typical associations across vast populations
of adults and schoolchildren, responses that can be statistically
predicted on the basis of frequency tables, word pairs that seem so
natural in their occurrence as to be somehow embedded in the language of
everyday usage.

3

In both of these approaches--the Jungian and the statistical--what
has dropped out of the equation is the intermediating system between the
individual and the collective.

It is through the family that the

collective structure of meaning in society--its language--is introduced
to each of us; it is by means of family interaction that category,
opinion, bias, prejudice, and inhibition slip in and permeate the logic
of everyday discourse, molding our attitudes to conformity with those of
the group with which we live.

And it is out of the matrix of that

interaction that we emerge into the collective as full participants in
its linguistic order, holding in conman many of its meanings, but
bearing with us as well the unseen tokens of a private understanding
shared only with those who taught us the use of words.
Cognitive psychology and systems theory have recently turned their
attention to the role of the family in language acquisition and
conceptual development, and the influence of family corrmunication style
in the etiology of functional thought disorders, including the syndrome
diagnosed as schizophrenia.

Jung himself had undertaken his original

association experiment in order to establish a normative baseline
against which the reactions of psychotic speech could be compared.

As a

working psychiatrist on the staff of one of the most progressive mental
hospitals of its day, his primary concern was to be able to shed some
light on the hopelessly obscure utterances of his inpatients.

But what

emerged from his results had powerful implications for the development
of a theory of cognition embracing both pathological and "normal"
thought processes, a theory that leads, by way of the linguistic
patterns in a household, from simple associative reaction to the full
panoply of attributes and characteristics comprising personality.

4

In a conception that long antedates the current view of "multiple
intelligences," or "multiple frames of reference," Jung described the
qualities of a number of different cognitive styles which he had
observed in tests of verbal association, each of which represented a
different way of perceiving, processing, and relating to the data of
material reality.

When set on a continuum, these styles could be seen

to progress systematically from the logical to the pathological; when
compared among themselves, they showed antithetical and complementary
features that allowed them to be organized in terms of opposing
cognitive functions--thinking and feeling, sensation and intuition, as
they came to be called in his 1921 monograph, Psychological Types.
Ever since Freud proposed the exi stence of two modes of cognition,
primary and secondary process t hinking, t he dichotomy between syncretic
and analytical thought, bet ween the associative and the rational, has
come to be taken for granted, and yet l i ttle attention has been paid to
the conditions by wh ich "thi nki ng" comes t o be differentiated as the
prefered mode of cognition in advanced societies.

An

implicit

assumption that rational thought is a universal phenomenon pervades the
educational system.

Piaget suggests that logic is the culminating stage

of a child's natural cogniti ve development; some psycholinguistic and
cognitive theorists would go even f urther, and locate the discriminative
function of thought in some sort of i nborn structure of the mind,
coexistent with innate "hardwiring" for language and information
processing.
If it were possible to rely on innate disposition-- natural
function, hardware, the universal architecture of cognition--to reach
its predestined potential in the process of rational thought, there

5
would be little market for the courses in "critical thinking" that have
become :[X)pular on the contemporary American educational scene.

But the

fact is that for many individuals, the ability to think critically is a
painful, artificial, hard-won acquisition in the struggle against
natural dis:[X)sition and the forces of the environment; it is achieved at
tremendous personal risk in a battle waged with received wisdom, public
opinion, family mores, religious authority, peer pressure and the line
of least resistance.

For some, the fight may hardly be worth the

trouble, if it means the loss of comfort, the relinquishment of safe
conformity, alienation from friends and family.

Rational thinking is

work, and there is very little to make it attractive, too little to
offset the danger it entails.
Arrong the leading factors inhibiting the development of critical
thought is dis:[X)sitional bias, which figures in the discussion of such
theorists of thinking as Jonathan Baron.

It is an argument, again,

foreshadowed in the work of Jung, who in 1921 proposed the idea that a
cognitive habit based on the feeling function could not acconmodate the
operation of the thinking function.

The two processes were mutually

opposed, in his conception; yet both were "rational" processes, and both
operated systematically to reach conclusions--thinking by a rigorous,
linear, sequential discrimination amohg facts, and feeling by means of
evaluative judgment, the sole criterion of which was to accept or reject
any given pro:[X)sition.
The process of evaluative judgment, the hallmark of the feeling
function, was first observed by Jung in the associative behavior of
subjects who tended to respond to stimulus-words with predicates, rather
than with synonyms, superordinates, contrasts, or other linguistic

6

forms.

The predicative relationship, in itself, carries qualification;

it is that which describes, which indicates the surface characteristics
of a substance, and the way in which an action is performed.

Predicates

value, and evaluate, their arguments; they form the basic syntagmatic
unit of thought, the simplest statements of fact, and, according to at
least one cognitive theorist, Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky, provide
the essential structure of the purely egocentric, "inner" speech of
silent thought.3
A person whose associative thought runs in predicative channels is
likely to construe the world in relationships based on value, on
objective comparison and qualification, or on subjective judgment and
opinion.

Such a habit of thought might be less amenable to instruction

in the rigors of critical reasoning than, for example, a style which
grasps the substantive, hierarchical relationsh ips among things, a style
which reflects the orderly syntax of Western ontology and the logic
implicit in the structure of Inda-European grammar.

This latter

approach turns on analysis, discrimination, dissection, separation, the
creation of an array of substances through division and subdivision
which are then to be assembled i n categorical conceptualizations; such
is the essence of rational thought.

The other, the predicative style,

analyses as well, but into one of two categories: this specific thing,
which by predication becomes that much more specific, and everything
else.

Thinking builds structure through abstraction; predication

concretizes the single instance; thinking ascends to the irrmaterial
realm of concepts, predication remains with the object in all its
grounded sensory manifestations; thinking classifies, predication
labels--and may impose, along with the label, a set of attitudes and

7

values that work underground, as it were, to subvert the move toward
dispassionate, rational discourse.
By

some coincidence--or was it?--the majority of those identified

as "predicate reaction types" by Jung in his first experiment were the
members of his family groups, women of his educated sample.

Furst, who

reported her test results from nine Zurich families of the uneducated
class, found the predicate reaction-type pervasive among adult members
of both sexes in eight of them.

These findings would seem to suggest

that predication, as a reaction style, transcends the categories of
gender, age and education, and when present at all in a family unit,
tends to dominate the responses of its members.
It was to examine that suggestion that the present study was
undertaken.

Do

family members resemble each other in tenns of their

associative reaction style?

Is predication a dominant force in the

linguistic patterns of those family groups where it occurs?

Is there a

demonstrable level of conformity, or congruity, in linguistic patterns
produced by family members in response to a given set of words?

That

much could be determined from a replication of the original word
association experiment among family groups.

But what about the deeper

implications of the nature of predicative thought itself?

Is there any

evidence to suggest that a cognitive process which manifests itself in
predication--the basic unit of "feeling" cognition--would have
difficulty when asked to switch to the "thinking" skill required in
formal logic?

To answer that question, a comparison was made between

individuals' reaction styles and their answers on a standardized test of
deductive reasoning.

8

Like Jung and his coauthor Franz Riklin, and like Errma Furst, I was
primarily concerned in this research to establish an initial set of
norms against which more dysfunctional responses might be compared.

My

involvement with the subject of family associations, an outgrowth of
three semesters' work with the material of Jung's article "The
Associations of Normal subjects," takes its real impetus from a deep
personal concern for the kind of dynamics that can lead to pathological
conformity among family members, conformity of language, of behavior,
and of thought.4 My ultimate interest, like Jung's, is therapeutic,
not intellectual; I intend to take this work further, into the realm
where the processes of identification, unconscious role-play, and
empathic enmeshment operate beneath the level of language to annihilate
the individual personality.

In such a nightmarish system, an over-close

conformity in verbal response might be the sign of deeper contamination
of one being by another, indeed perhaps the only sign, a silent cry for
help from a troubled soul whose hope of detection lies in the family
resemblance, the linguistic camouflage by which his entrapment is meant
to be concealed.

This work is dedicated to the meroc>ry of Soviet psychiatrist Sabina
Spielrein, whose devotion to word association research began in her
teens, when she was asked by earl Jung to assist him in his experiments
at the hospital where he was treating her for schizophrenia.

Later a

member of Freud's Vienna circle, a collaborator of Saussure's student
Charles Bally, and the analyst of Jean Piaget, this extraordinary woman
returned to the Soviet Union in 1923, bringing Jungian and Freudian
ideas into an intellectual milieu that included Vygotsky and a very
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young Alexander Luria.5

Her spirit and inspiration have been an

ever-present force in the conception and development of this project.
There are many among the living who have given me encouragement in
this work as well, and they have my most heartfelt thanks.

Among those

whose help was of special significance is Ann Bikales, of the C.G. Jung
Institute of Boston, who at the moment when I strayed across the
threshold of analytical psychology set me the task of completing a
master's degree; I hope that what I have done over the last two years
fulfills the adventure in the spirit of her mandate.

Thanks also are

due to Jacqueline Schectman, LICSW, IAAP, whose year-long program in
Child Therapy Studies at the Boston Jung Institute served as my
practicum in the Graduate Program in Critical and Creative Thinking at
the University of Massachusetts at Boston, and set the stage upon which
I was destined to meet my mentor in a moment of despair when I believed
I was the only one in all the world who really cared al::,out Jung's early
word association work.
My

friends and former colleagues, who served as subjects of my

experiment and were so caught by the excitement of word association--the
same extraordinary excitement which fired the staff of the Burgholzli
Hospital for nearly a decade and made it one of the most desirable sites
for aspiring young psychiatrists from all over the world--that they
wanted to go out and test the families of their own friends and
acquaintances, you too have my thanks.

You know who you are; I hope you

understand that to thank you all by name would compromise the privacy in
which I promised to hold your participation.
well.

This work is yours as

CHAP T E R

I

THE STRUCI'URE OF ASSOCIATIVE COONITION

C.G. Jung made his reputation in the international psychiatric
comnunity at the age of thirty-one with the publication of his
experimental research into the psychology and psychopathology of word
association.

His observation of the processes of cognition focused on

patterns of associative response, the relationship between stimulus and
response that revealed conceptual and episodic information stored in
his subjects' meroc>ries.

These patterns, or complexes of associations,

gave him insight not only into the past of those with whom he worked,
but also into the underlying system of their thought, the structural
organization of meaning and of mind.
Jung's work on the systemic dimension of associative cognition
went beyond an interest in individual process, however.

At the same

time as he developed his theory of complexes, he was also engaged in an
exploration of external systems, and the effect of dynamic interaction
on the verbal behavior of group members.

The associations of family

members, studied under his supervision at the BUrgholzli Clinic, led
him to an appreciation of the decisive role of the family in shaping an
individual's preferred information-processing style.

Furthermore, the

reaction patterns he observed among members of families provided
important evidence for the development of his theory of the collective
unconscious, a theory in which the structural dimension of language
plays a critical, but little recognized, part.I
The present chapter, and the one which follows, are intended
to provide a brief overview of a structuralist approach to the
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processes of verbal association, and to language as a structure for
both associative and conceptual thought.

It is in context of this

theoretical framework that Jung's ideas can be brought within the
paradigm of modern cognitive science.
Association:

Structure and Process

The ability of the human mind to make spontaneous meaning-based
associations between words has been recognized at least since the time
of Plato and Aristotle, but does not seem to have been studied
empirically until Galton, Wundt and Ebbinghaus began their
investigations in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.2
The basic elements of a coherent structuralist approach to association
came not from the experimental laboratory, however, but from the world
of clinical psychotherapy, in the cognitive model advanced by Sigmund
Freud in his revolutionary study of thought, The Interpretation of
Dreams.
In the final chapter of this work , Freud detailed his conception
of the mind as a vast network of interconnected associat ive pathways,
responding to the displacement of energy set off by the stinrulus of a
subliminal "directing idea."

A quantity of excitation, which he called

"cathectic energy," flows like an electrical charge through the network
of associations, activating those selected by the directing idea.

If

the energy reaches sufficient intensity, the thought can spark across
the threshold of consciousness; on the other hand, if it fails to
"attract the attention of consciousness," the thought "diffuses its
energy through all the association paths emanating from it, and throws
the entire chain of thoughts into a state of excitation, which
continues for a while, and then subsides" (Freud, 1950, p. 446).
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Under certain conditions, Freud suggests, the energy of a thought

may be sufficient
to pass from one idea to another, so that individual ideas
are formed which are endowed with great intensity. Through
the repeated occurrence of this process, the intensity of
an entire train of thought may ultimately be concentrated
in a single conceptual unit (1950, p. 447).3
The nodal connections of the associative network are formed not
only around ideas, but also around the data of sensory perception,
discrete impressions which become permanently bound to one another in
memory through the operation of the classical laws of association,
simultaneity, contiguity, or similarity.

In an earlier work, one of

the case histories included in Studies on Hysteria (1895), Freud had
described these associative concentrations as "complexes of ideas," and
had suggested that they exert their effect on an individual's thought
and behavior through the "compulsion to associate" (Breuer and Freud,
1955, p. 69 n. 1).
Freud's concept of a densely networked associative system,
responding to and diffusing the energy of thought, was studied in the
mid-twentieth century by a number of clinical and experimental
psychologists, among them David Rapaport, who cast the idea into a
self-consciously structuralist form.

According to his colleague Fred

Schwartz, Rapaport called the connections described by Freud
"'associative relationship structures,' by which he meant that just as
words may be conceptualized as structures, so the relationships between
words may be conceptualized as structures, i.e. quasi-permanent
organizations of experience" (Schwartz and Rouse, 1961, p. 1).

The

subliminal influence of Freud's "purposive idea" on the constellation
of thoughts through which it passes on its way to consciousness was
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renamed "associative priming," or "preactivation," and its effect on
free association and on paired associate recall was derronstrated in a
variety of empirical tests carried out by Rapaport, Gill, Schafer,
Rouse and Schwartz (Schwartz and Rouse, 1961).
These studies identified two distinct phases in the response
process, an "analytic" phase, during which the stimulus word activates
a variety of associations related by sound, contiguity, meaning,
conceptual similarity, or "secondary" or indirect, association," a
connection made outside the central associative network with another
network interlinked by one or more overlapping meanings; and a
"synthetic" phase, marked by the selection of one association and its
referral to consciousness.

Recovery of the associate word in the

synthetic phase was found to be affected by the subject's verbal
fluency and motivation, as well as such strategic factors as his sense
of what is appropriate or acceptable in the social context, and his
desire to minimize personal discomfort in the process of recall.
Many of these experiments used t he stimulus-response pairs
established in the Kent-Rosanoff experiment of 1910, which had
established a set of normative response f requencies in a sample of
1,000 normal American adults.

Howard Pollio (1966) linked the

phenomenon of associative frequency to the idea of a hierarchical
organization anong words, with a rank ordering provided by the relative
probability of a word's appearance as a response to a given stimulus.
Those words which occur most frequently in the language were shown to
form larger hierarchies than low-frequency words, due to the greater
variety of context in which they are found in colloquial expression.
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Affective considerations--the pleasantness or unpleasantness of a
word's connotation--were also found to affect hierarchy size.
A closer examination of associative hierarchies undertaken by
James Deese (1962) revealed that the hierarchy of a single word is
organized around smaller units which he- called "clusters," stable
groups of words which tend to evoke each other as associates.

The

associative "meaning" of any stimulus word is to be found in the
distribution of responses to it, and the content of the entire
constellation of clusters surrounding a stimulus defines the dimensions
of the "associative concept" it entails.

Mapping the semantic

interrelationships within and between clusters gives an indication of
the terrain of what Pollio (1966) calls "semantic space," an overall
"verbal-cognitive structure" within which the associative process
operates.
Deese's work (1962, 1965) demonstrated that clustering is not
merely a consequence of the frequency of words within the language, or
of semantic and conceptual relationships established by cormon consent.
An

individual's attitudes and values are also a powerful factor in the

organization of verbal clusters, and Deese suggests that a simple test
of word association can function as an effective and reliable tool for
the exposure of this personal dimension of cognitive processing.
Psycholinguistic theory of the 1960's contributed to the
structural approach a yet more rigorous analysis of the relations which
underlie associative connections.

The manifest phenomenon of the word

became secondary; the operant unit of thought in this model is the
proposition, a structure which encodes in non-verbal form the quality
of a relationship between items, actions, or concepts.

The information
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propositional form; likewise, the retrieval of information from a
proposition, or propositional node, requires a process of
reconstitution, according to the operation of a set of transformational
rules, in order to return the thought to verbal form.
Classical information-processing theory as described by Howard
(1983) and Stillings (1987) conceives of memory as a powerful network
comprised of a myriad of such propositional nodes, the basic units of
the "architecture of cognition."

The informational essence of each

proposition is a predicate, an abstraction of the relationship
obtaining between the elements, or arguments, connected within the
node.

Networks of propositions are created as predicates pertaining to

a single argument link it with others in an outwardly expanding system
of interrelationship.

The complexity and richness of the networks that

form over time can be revealed in the patterns of response evoked on a
test of verbal association.
Like the Freudian model at the beginning of the century, a number
of cognitive theories developed since in the late 1960's by Quillian,
Anderson, and others (Howard, 1983) describe associative thought in
terms of a process of spreading activation, or diffusion of attentive
energy, along the pathways of a propositional network, making
connections between a bit of input information, the stinn.ilus, and the
finite number of possible responses to it.

Because the links in a

propositional chain become strengthened through repeated activation,
the argument with the strongest link to the stinn.ilus word is most
likely to channel the activation, and receive a sufficiently high
"charge" to send it into consciousness as the selected response.4
The entire process of activation and retrieval can, in fact, function
as an indicator of "associative relevancy" (Anderson, 1983).
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The information encoded within a proposition is arranged in a
hierarchical fashion, allowing for the establishment of stable
categories into which the components of declarative knowledge can be
classified.

Arguments are conceived as subsets, or subordinates, of

the class of elements represented by the predicate, according to the
information prcx:essing theory developed by John Anderson (1976, 1983)
under the name "Adaptive Control of Thought," or ACT.

Relation-

argument structures function not only to represent verbal knowledge, or
information presented in verbal form; an event or episode is also
subject to the same sort of analysis as is an item of declarative or
semantic information.

Any incident or activity can be dissolved into

predicates in such a way as to preserve information about the
relationships among actors and objects, as well as information as to
time, place, condition, quality, and attitude.5
Predication, then, proves adequate for the abstraction and
representation of complex semantic, conceptual, and episodic
information.

The networking of predicates creates a unified field

containing the totality of an individual's knowledge about the world,
and, through the process of spreading activation, serves to make that
knowledge accessible to consciousness at the stimulus of a single word.
The Family and the Development of Categories and Attitudes
Theorists of language have long recognized that interaction with
adults is essential for normal linguistic development in children.

The

language a child hears from his parents not only determines the verbal
patterns in which he makes his own attempts at expression, but also
serves to transmit a set of values, affects and attitudes appropriate
to the parents' scx:ial class and educational level (Deese, 1970).
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Studies of vocabulary acquisition in children have traced the
development of successive classification systems, which are transformed
and restructured under the impact of increasing experience and
additional information.

The words that name things are first

encountered in a specific context, and they function as designations of
a field of connotative associations, with links to particular concrete
objects rather than to other words (Pollio, 1966).

The act of naming

is itself an act of association, with two distinct dimensions:
connections are made between the sound of the word and the physical
entity to which it refers, and also between the entity and the
environment in which it is encountered.

A child's internal categories

are built around these syncretic units of information, which must be
broken down and reformulated as the child begins to separate what is
constant in a word's meaning from what is subject to change.
Roger Brown (1958a, 1958b) found that the naming practices of
adults are designed to anticipate the functional structure of the
child's perspective.

Words which are thought to have utility in the

child's world are chosen as the names given to the child to learn;
often, these terms convey some intermediate degree of specificity,
being neither the most concrete term possible for the item named, nor
the term for an inclusive conceptual category.

Children evidently do

form abstract classes with the items of their experience, but they tend
to refer to their abstractions with the only words they have to use,
those terms which an adult would find applicable to some individual
member of the intended class.6
As

the utility of this limited system of nomenclature is outgrown,

the child is introduced to the appropriate terms for the inclusive
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concept, or the more finely-discriminated example, and gradually gains
proficiency in going up and down the hierarchy of subordinations and
superordinations which these terms represent.

Jeremy Anglin (1977) has

seen this readjustment of nomenclature as an integral step in the
child's conceptual development.
Anglin remarks that the acquisition of a name for a thing comes
comparatively late in a child's experience.

Prior to the attachment of

the arbitrary verbal label to the object, the child has developed, from
personal observation, an operant "concept" of the object, a concept
which carries such practical bits of information as how the object
behaves, what it does, what purpose it serves, and how one ought to
behave with respect to it.

These irrminently concrete relationships and

attributes are subsumed directly into the child's definition of the
word, once it has been introduced by an adult, and collectively serve
the child as the "meaning" of that word.

What a child "means" by a

word thus may be a very different matter from the significance the
adult attribut es to it, although the same word may be used by both to
make an identical objective reference.
Children's definitions, then, tend to be expressed in terms of
non-essential attributes, descriptive or behavioral qualifications and
value judgments, all of which are formal predications with strong links
to sensory experience or to parental instruction.

The categories which

collect these predications cut horizontally across the vertical
structure of ontological classes, the categorical hierarchy of being
into which individuals are sorted as the child's understanding of the
world shifts from an associative to a conceptual base.

An item with

one established place in a conceptual hierarchy can, at the same time,
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enjoy membership in a vast number of predicative categories, by virtue
of attributes it shares in cornnon with other, conceptually unrelated,
items.
Frank Keil's work in the development of children's ontological
knowledge (1979) indicates that predicates come to be used in a much
more restricted manner as the child's conceptual organization begins to
reflect the categorical differentiations of adult ontology.

Meaning,

in the lexical sense, becomes detached from context and begins to
involve the logical distinctions between things which are more
characteristic of an adult perspective.7

Likewise, Anglin (1977)

also considers the ability to abstract predicative attributes as
crucial to the process of concept attainment.
Abstraction is, in essence, the discovery of some corrmon quality
pervading a number of differentiated items.

Brown (1958b) suggests

that this ability, which characterizes adult cognition, is
qualitatively different from the generalizing approach taken by the
child, who applies an attribute perceived in a single item to objects
which have not previously been differentiated.

Generalization, then,

occurs as a result of two distinct and in some respects antithetical
processes, conceptual abstraction, and failure to discriminate.

To the

extent that words tend to function in the child's language as category
terms, any predicative attributions the child hears made by adults are
susceptible of inappropriate generalization, and may lead, especially
if they are introduced in emotionally-loaded contexts, to the
development of prejudicial attitudes which are as difficult to adjust
as are inmature conceptual formulations.
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Like Brown, Anglin (1977) also suggests that attitudes and values
can be transmitted

within the family as a part of the language

acquisition process.

The selection of terms, and the context in which

they are taught, implies a set of beliefs about appropriate action,
affect and orientation that go far beyond the strictly lexical, or
conceptual, meaning of the given words.

What Anglin calls "behavioral

equivalence" is one of the earliest categories established by parents
for their children, grouping together objects toward which the child
should behave in a similar manner.

The injunctions contained in these

early naming practices invest the child's linguistic habits with
parental attitudes, a process which presumably extends through his
later development of abstract concepts and a semantic structure which
is increasingly independent of concrete experience.

Predicate, Paradigm, and Associative Development

The theorists of children's language acquisition have generally
worked with instruments other than the word association test, and in
studies where association tests were administered, the purpose has been
to examine the comparative developmental level of the child's
linguistic structure, and not the relationship of the child's language
to that of his parents.

The developmental approach does, however,

point out some systematic features which distinguish children's
associations from those of mature adults; in particular, the role of
the predicative response assumes significance as an indicator of
linguistic maturation.
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The earliest verbal language of children consists of words
embedded in syntactical context.

Individual words attain the

significance of sentences, or perhaps more accurately, commands, and
conversely, entire phrases are apprehended as single indivisible words.
Until the unitary structure of these verbal packages has been broken
down, any one word from the phrase will evoke the rest of it in a word
association exercise (Entwisle, 1966).
A sentence-constructing operation predominates in a child's
associative process, until such time as he has attained an
understanding of formal grammatical relations.

A child's response will

"complete" the stimulus word, by attaching a verb to a given noun, or a
noun to an adjective.

From the standpoint of associative

relationships, both responses qualify as predications, but Doris
Entwisle, who studied the associations of more than a thousand American
schoolchildren in the early 1960's, preferred to call them "syntagrnatic
responses."
Once the child has developed a coherent sense of the granmatical
organization of language, associative responses begin to be drawn from
the same form class as the stimulus word, nouns being given in response
to nouns, and adjectives to other ad j ectives.

This shift to

"paradigmatic responses" is completed by the age ten or twelve, and is
then maintained until at college age, there is, among some individuals,
a return to the earlier pattern of syntagmatic association.8

such a

systematic modification in the associative pattern, from predicative to
paradigmatic responses, can be seen as a reflection of the child's
appreciation of the functional structure of language, derived from
formalized instruction in the acquisition of literacy.
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Nouns predominate in the vocabulary of young children, although as
Brown (1958b) suggests, this fact does not necessarily mean that
children think rrore concretely than do adults, but simply that the
terminology they are given to use by adults is rrore concrete than that
the adult might prefer.

There is at least one qualitative difference

between the nouns produced by children and adults, however:

adult

associations tend to create categorical hierarchies of sulx>rdinate,
coordinate and superordinate terms, while children's nominal responses
tend to express contiguity or coexistence; children produce far fewer
coordinating responses than do adults, and almost no abstract
conceptual terms.
The rrost cormnon paradigmatic responses of children tend to be made
in the form of antonyms or contrasts.

Antonyms have been found in

responses of children as young as four years old, far younger than the
age at which the paradigmatic shift begins, and the tendency to respond
with opposites increases until the age of fourth grade.

Entwisle

(1966) found girls more likely to respond with opposites than boys, and
attributed this phenomenon to a heightened reactivity on the part of
girls toward what they perceived as the "pressure" of the testing
situation.

For both genders, response cormnonality, the production of a

word with a high level of statistical frequency in the language,
increased with age, a measure both of increasing familiarity with
lexical rneanings of words and a higher degree of socialization.
The acoustical properties of a stimulus word seem to dominate the
associations of very young children, an indication that the semantic
content of the word is not yet adequately comprehended.

On

the other

hand, sound-based responses virtually disappear from the associations
of rrore linguistically mature subjects.
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Entwisle found an orderly pattern of development in children's
associations, shaped by the factors of function and context within
which words are encountered and exchanged.

As

the child's linguistic

ability matures, a stimulus word characteristically elicits first a
noun, then a syntactic reaction of some kind, next a paradigmatic
response, and finally a secondary, or "late syntactic" response,
representative of the elaborate and flexible predication which
distinguishes an adult's verbal expression.
Socioeconomic factors were found to play a significant role in the
development of a child's associative system.

In Entwisle's study,

children of high socioeconomic status exhibited more response
corrmonality, at an earlier age, than children of IOC>re depressed family
backgrounds.

Regular exposure to adult verbal interaction, associated

with higher-status families, accelerated a child's acquisition of
mature vocabulary and syntactic fluency; conversely, isolation and lack
of opportunity for meaningful interaction with adults was seen as a
factor inhibiting a child's development of linguistic skill.
Deese (1970) went further in his analysis of the cultural
influences on language acquisition patterns.

Citing the research of

Bernstein (1961) in Great Britain, he suggests that for members of the
higher social class, language functions as an instrument for
description and for analysis; formal speech, for individuals of this
class, is highly structured, and the activity of speech tends to be
treated as an intellectual game, offering opportunities for advanced
semantic and conceptual formulations.

Among the lower classes,

however, language serves only the purposes of description, and as a
consequence, it is more difficult to propose analytic arguments within
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the limitations of its style.

Furthenrore, D:!ese suggests that

different attitudes toward the expression of affect among members of
differing social classes may also have an impact on the patterns of
linguistic development i n children, and on the related process of their
cognitive development as well.

The studies mentioned in this chapter have focused on aspects of
language and information processing which are assumed to be universal
in scope, part of the structure of the cognitive system coimOn to all
individuals.

The chapter which follows will treat the work of a number

of theorists, contemporaries of Freud and Jung, for whom language
itself was the supraordinate structure, operating with its own set of
constraints on the development of individual thought and expression.

CHAP T E R

I I

LANGUAGE AS THE STRUCTURE OF PERSPECTIVE

The current cognitivist focus on the relational structures of
thought is a perspective that was shared by a number of researchers in
the structure and psychology of language whose work began in the first
decades of the twentieth century.

Of these pioneers in the science of

language and cognition, two, Lev Semyonovich Vygotsky and Alexander
Romanovich Luria, are well known and highly respected within cognitive
and developmental circles.

Two others, Ferdinand de Saussure and

Benjamin Lee Wharf, are perhaps better known in the fields of
semiotics, linguistics, and anthropology, yet their ideas contribute
substantially to an understanding of the external context within which
the psychological process of associative thought takes place.
All four of these students of cognitive processes shared a belief
in the influence of language on thought, and t he primacy of its social
or collective dimension in shaping an individual's expression and his
world-view.

But to Saussure, in parti cular, can be credited the

original insights into language as a system that gave rise to the
structuralist method of analysis, and an i ntellectual revolution to
which cognitive science is one among many heirs.
The first portion of this chapter will offer a sumnary of some of
the thoughts of these four men on language in its relation to
associative cognition.

Part two will discuss the mediating role of the

family, as described by systems theorists Gregory Bateson and R.D.
Laing, in creating the individual's linguistic practices, and
transmitting collective values and attitudes.
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Language and Associative Cognition
In 1907, the year after the publication of C.G. Jung's first
volume of Diagnostic Association Studies, his compatriot, Ferdinand de
Saussure, professor of linguistics at the university of Geneva, began a
course of lectures which revolutionized the academic approach to
language.

Rejecting the historical and comparative traditions of

linguistics, with their focus on the evolutionary development of words
in isolation from each other, Saussure offered instead a vision of
language as an integrated system of relations existing complete at any
moment in time, and represented by conceptually-invested sound
patterns, which he called "signs."

In his view, the study of relations

by means of signs might well transcend the boundaries of linguistic
science, and apply to any realm of human existence which was structured
in terms of formal interactions; out of this perspective emerged the
science of semiology, and the analytic movement known as structuralism.
Language as a system of relations.

The sign is itself the expression

of a relationship between sound and concept.

In Saussure's conception,

it is an arbitrary union; there is no natural or inevitable connection
between a word and the object it signifies.

Nor is the word a mere

name, set within a formalized nomenclature.

The essential function of

a word is not the indication of a specific object, but rather the set
of relations in which that object is located, its existential and
determinate context.
Language, for Saussure, is the comprehensive structure which gives
order to the expression of these relative relationships.

Language is

both a repository of linguistic signs, meaningful sound patterns which
are the synthetic creations of social convention, and a system of
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classification, arising from the mind's innate capacity for association
and coordination.

The dynamic interplay between the individual and the

societal dimensions is what gives rise to language as a structural
system.
In a passage which predates by more than half a century one of the
•
tenets of cognitive linguistic theory, Saussure remarks:
A language, as a collective phenomenon, takes the form of
a totality of imprints in everyone's brain, rather like a
dictionary of which each individual has an identical copy.
Thus it is something which is in each individual, but is
none the less common to all (Saussure, 1972, p. 19).
This lexicon of structural relations gives formal coherence to the
individual's associative process.

Because it is a social construct, it

differs in its particulars from one linguistic corrmunity to another,
but what does not vary is the structure itself, and the operation of a
systematic cognitive process based ultimately on the perception of
difference.
"The mechanism of a language," Saussure says, "turns entirely on
identities and differences" (1972, p. 107), on an analysis of the
psychological contrasts between sounds.

There are no concrete,

independent, positive entities in language, but only contrasts, sets of
values defined in relation to one another.

Word and concept, signal

and signification, are completely context-dependent.

The content of a

word, or of the concept to which it refers, "is determined in the final
analysis not by what it contains, but what exists outside it" (1972,
p. 114).

Meaning exists by virtue of the relations between signs, and

the contrast between each sign and all others which are contained in
the same system.

"In the language itself," Saussure says, "there are

only differences" (1972, p. 118).
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This system of oppositions and contrasts inevitably constrains the
conmunication of thought into certain channels.

"Any difference in

ideas distinguished by the mind will seek expression in different
linguistic signals," Saussure suggests; "whereas two ideas the mind no
longer differentiates will tend to find expression in the same signal"
(1972, p. 119).

Language is formally organized in such a way as to

permit a systematic and regular process of comparison and substitution
among its constitutent signals, and the function of discrimination
underlies and facilitates the process of corranunication between
individuals.

outside the bounds of social discourse, however, it is

not difference, but identity, which dominates an individual's
linguistic organization.

The perception of identity, or of similarity

among the elements of language, allows for the creation of complexes of
associations, the structures in which language is stored in memory.
Language as a social instrument, as a means of conmunication, is
linear, sequential, constructive, "syntagrnatic."

As

a network of

associative complexes, on the other hand, it is simultaneous,
unlimited, "paradigmatic."

In syntagrnatic configurations, Saussure

says, "any unit acquires its value simply in opposition to what
precedes, or what follows, or ooth" (1972, p. 121) ; but within
associative clusters, each element takes its place on the basis of the
coit10C>nality it shares with other units in the rrmernonic group.

The

inclusion of a set of relations in an associative series may be based
on similarity at the conceptual level, or it may reflect similarities
of form or of sound between two linguistic elements.

"Any word,"

Saussure remarks, "can evoke in the mind whatever is capable of being
associated with it in some way or other" (1972, p. 124); likewise, any

29

word can stand at the center of its own complex of associations,
surrounded by an indefinite number of other words, linked with it in an
indeterminate order.I
Thus, Saussure says,
the whole set of phonetic and conceptual differences which
constitute a language are . • . the product of two kinds of
comparison, associative and syntagrnatic. Groups of both kinds
are in large measure established by the language. This set of
of habitual relations is what constitutes linguistic structure
and determines how the language functions (1972, p. 126).
Syntagma and association are mutually interdependent.

The relations

which are defined in the linear context of discourse become codified in
paradigmatic complexes; and when the purposes of communication call for
the construction of a syntagrn, the associative groups provide a choice
of terms.

As

this dynamic process unfolds, the concept, or its sign,

evokes not just one form but a whole latent system, through
which the oppositions involved in the constitution of that
sign are made available . . . In this process, which involves
eliminating mentally everyth ing wh ich does not lead to the
desired differentiation at the point required, associative
groupings and syntagrnatic types are both involved (1972, p. 129).
Both syntagrnatic and associative processes ultimately depend on
the same cognitive function, the perception of t he relations obtaining
between the units of each order, and

a

classification system based on

the discrimination among those relations, their respective values.

The

use each individual makes of these relative values Saussure called
"speech;" the system itself, the codification of values assigned
collectively by society, was called the "linguistic structure."
Habitual speech practice by individuals over time supplies the content
of the code, but once the system has been fixed, it imposes its
conventional forms and structures on the expression of each individual

30

who shares the language.

Although it may appear, Saussure says, that

there is considerable choice in the selection of a word in relation to
the concept it represents, "the signal is imposed rather than freely
chosen . . • What can be chosen is already determined in advance" (1972,
p. 71).

Furthermore, in Saussure's theory, language is a closed system.
Definition and explanation take place within its confines, referring
the unknown element to terms already known; "to explain a word is to
relate it to other words: for there are no necessary relations between
sound and meaning" (1972, p. 188).

Words become enriched through

contact with other words, but attain their precise values only by
contrast with similar terms.

"No word has a value that can be

identified independently of what else there is in its vicinity,"
Saussure says.

"There are languages, for example, in which it is

impossible to say the equivalent of 'to sit in the sun'" (1972, p.
114).

But even within that inflexible system of evaluative relations,
the shared tradition of a given linguistic community, a deeply radical
relativism is still possible.

In speaking of the shift in perspective

which had allowed him to break with the whole of linguistic science
before him, Saussure rernarks that a given field may be seen to present
quite different things, depending on the viewpoint
adopted . . . The object is not given in advance of the
viewpoint: far from it. Rather, one might say that
it is the viewpoint adopted which creates the object
(1972, p. 8) .
The conceptual reframing of linguistics accomplished by Saussure
at the beginning of the century has been described by psychologist Paul
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Kugler (1982) as a "paradigm shift" comparable to the change in focus
from substance to structures in contemporary physics.

But it remained

for another linguistic scholar, Benjamin Lee Whorf, to work out the
implications of Saussure's ideas on the delimiting function of the
structures of language.
Linguistic Structure and the Boundaries of Cognition
Saussure's conception of language as a system of patterned
relationships is the launching-point for the radical and still highly
controversial reformulation of linguistic theory proposed in the 1930's
by American language scholar Benjamin Lee Whorf.

In a statement which

embodied Saussure's philosophy, Whorf asserted his position in his
essay, "A Linguistic Consideration of Thinking in Primitive
Corrmunities:"

"Sense or meaning does not result from words or

morphemes, but from patterned relations between words and morphemes
Any scientific grammar is necessarily a deep analysis into relations"
(Wharf, 1956, p. 67-68).

out of his study of relational systems, Whorf

developed, in concert with his mentor Edward Sapir, the hypothesis of
"linguistic relativity," and the belief that an understanding of
linguistic structure is fundamental to any comprehensive theory of
human cognition.
Wharf's painstaking research into the patterns of expression in
aboriginal languages of the Western hemisphere convinced him that the
familiar occidental categories of reality--space, time, and matter,
form and substance, being and becoming--which are assumed by Westerners
to be universal in nature are, in fact, artificial constructs rooted in
Inda-European language, reflective of the structures of that language,

- --
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and, far from universally accepted, are held only in the corrmunities
that hold that linguistic system in coITl!lOn.

Other, non-Western

societies have developed radically different views of the universe, no
less valid than the one to which our language predisposes us, and
equally reflective of the relational system encoded in their particular
linguistic tradition.
The philosophical abstractions and psychological realities of any
culture, Wharf believed, are implicit in the syntax of that culture's
language, which not only serves to organize expression, but actually
imposes its own order on human perception and thought.

Perspective is

nothing IlDre or less than a derivative of language, a consequence of
the linguistic classification of the data of sensory experience; and
thinking itself, the formulation of ideas, is inextricably linked to
the system of relationships which is codified in the structure of a
particular language.
The process of cognition, according to this theory, is a search
for meaning within the limits of external constraints, a search
confined to the relational patterns fi xed within a given language
system.

Words convey no meaning in isolation; the content, the

reference of an individual word, is insufficient in itself to carry
meaning.

Rather, it is the "rapport" between words, the "factors of

linkage between words and IlDrphernes, which make the categories and
patterns in which linguistic meaning dwells" (1956, p. 66).

The

process of thought, what Whorf calls "silent thinking," is no less
dependent on this matrix of patterned connections than is the overt
speech by which the formulations of individual thought can be expressed
to others.

It is rapport, systematic relationship, which coordinates
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words into the semantic units with which thinking operates, and by this
means serves to constitute what Whorf considers to be the real essence
of thought.
The form that an individual's thought can take, Whorf says, is
controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is
unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate
systematizations of his own language . . . every language is a
vast pattern-system, different from others, in which are
culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the
personality not only connnunicates, but also analyses nature,
notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena,
channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his
consciousness (1956, p. 252).
Rational thinking, as we know it, is in Wharf's view a purely
ethnocentric phenomenon, the outcome of a relation between formal
expression and linguistic patterning discovered in classical Greece and
India.

The propositional logic of predication and deduction which

resulted from this ancient insight is not a universally shared
cognitive process, but rather a specialized type of syntax, an
operation within grammatical structur es latent in the language, what
Whorf calls "the background linguis tic system" (1956, p. 212).
But even less formal modes of t h ink ing, the apparently
unstructured associative connect ion of concepts and ideas, are no less
influenced by the patterns available to the thinker, patterns of which
he is entirely unaware.

Just as the formal relationship of logical

propositions forces to certain inevitable conclusions, so the
underlying structural system of a language leads to the formulation of
ideas which may be taken as universally valid and necessary by the
participants in the linguistic order, but which may be completely
invalid in another.

Strict objectivity, in this model, is impossible:
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perspective is never absent from the equation of thought.

And like

Saussure, Whorf believed that the individual "is constrained to certain
modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free" (1956,
p. 213).

The automatic and involuntary patterns of language, in Wharf's
view, are a result of collective consensus within a society, and serve
as the means by which a coherent world-view is represented.

"Fashions

of speaking" crystallize in idiomatic form a society's habitual modes
of analysing and classifying the data of experience; these patterns,
in turn, contain and transmit the system of thought which has
developed within the confines of linguistic structure.
Furthermore, language patterns, Whorf believed, not only channel
thought into specific forms, but also enforce "resistances to widely
divergent points of view" (1956, p. 247).

Concepts from one system

which cannot be easily formulated in other language systems will meet
with intellectual rejection.

This language-based relativity operates

for Wharf not only at the structural level, between language systems,
but also within language systems, between groups and individuals who
share the same overall structure but operate with different habits of
speaking.

In some of his work, Wharf found that language patterns may

conduce to specific behavioral patterns, as well as habits of thinking,
both in the collective context of society as a whole, and perhaps more
importantly, within the sphere of individual action.
"An accepted pattern of using words," Whorf wrote in an essay on
"The Relation of Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language," "is often
prior to certain lines of thinking and forms of behavior" (1956, p.
134).

Automatized connections between concepts and the phenomena out
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of which they are constructed seem to condition or influence an
individual's reactions.

Often, Wharf says, the "cue to a certain line

of behavior is . . . given by the analogies of the linguistic formula in
which the situation is spoken of" (1956, p. 137); in other words, the
terms which are used by people to speak about things are connected with
interpretations of situations in which those objects appear, and, in
Whorf's view, carry implications as to the standard of behavior to be
adopted with respect to the things so named.

Linguistic patterns thus

materialize in the form of behavioral patterns. Inappropriate
terminology used with respect to a hazardous situation, for example,
can lead to careless behavior which may cause an accident; pejoritive
or prejudicial labels applied to individuals may become self-fulfilling
prophecies.

"OUr behavior," Whorf asserted, "can be seen to be

coordinated in many ways to the linguistically conditioned microcosm
. . . people act about situations in ways which are like the ways they
talk about them" (1956, p. 148).
Language, then, is for Wharf the means by which we create our own
versions of reality, and in turn, react to our creations, both as
individuals and as members of a collective linguistic union. · So
interconnected are the phenomena of language, thought and behavior that
some cognitive and behavioral disorders can be directly traced to the
linguistic patterns in which an individual's thought has become
entrapped.2

But even those whose thinking is not apparently abnormal

still operate within the bounds of systematic patterning, and have a
great deal to gain through an expansion of their awareness of the
underlying structure of relation by which language influences thought.
Although apparently a strict determinist, Wharf, like Saussure, allowed
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for the possibility of perspectival change:

something as simple as a

change in the habits of our language, he suggests, "can transform our
appreciation of the Cosmos" (1956, p. 263).
The principle of linguistic relativity, as embodied in the work of
Wharf's mentor, Edward Sapir, in combination with the methodological
approach of Saussure's structural analysis of language, entered into
the intellectual framework of cognitive science through the work of
Soviet psychologist Lev Vygotsky, for whom language is preeminently the
instrument for the organization of thought and action.3

Vygotsky's

developmental work on the stages in which associative cognition is
transformed into abstract or conceptual thinking, although the subject
of an ongoing intellectual critique, provides one framework for the
understanding of qualitative differences between the processes of
predicative and deductive thought.
The Logic of Complex and Concept
For Vygotsky, language is ultimately social.

As a system of

semantic elements, language provides the means through which private
experience can be generalized, made sufficiently abstract, to be
communicated to and comprehended by others.

Its communicative and

expressive function operates long before it assumes its role as
organizer of internal thought.

The process of language learning takes

place in a social context, and thought itself develops out of the
externally directed habits of childhood speech.
The earliest language of the child, Vygotsky says, is
essentially social. At first it is global and multifunctional; later its functions become differentiated.
At a certain age the social speech of the child is
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quite sharply divided into egocentric speech and
conmunicative speech • . • Egocentric speech emerges
when the child transfers social, collaborative forms
of behavior to the sphere of inner-personal psychic
functions (1986, p. 35).
Egocentric speech, Vygotsky found, plays an important transitional
role in the development of thought from overt social expression to
inner cognitive process.

Far from indicating a detachment from real

activity, as Piaget and other students of psychoanalytic theory had
previously asserted, egocentric speech is actually an integral
component of social behavior.

This kind of speech, Vygotsky observed,

"becomes gradually intellectualized and starts serving as a mediator in
purposive activity and in planning complex actions" (1986, p. 39).
At an early stage of development, Vygotsky says, the child uses
words as though they were properties of the things they designate; "for
a long period of time the child is unaware of the symbolic role of
language and uses words as simple attributes of things" (1986, p. 93).
As

it develops in the direction of internalization, the child's

verbalization retains this essentially predicative quality, and his
thought becomes structured in complexes of associations which coalesce
around connections made between objects by way of their perceived
attributes.
Vygotsky distinguishes five separate stages in the development of
thought, from the level of vague and purely subjective association to
that of true concept fonnation, according to his definition.

The

cognitive process at work in all these stages he calls "thinking in
complexes."

In a complex, he says, "individual objects are united in

the child's mind not only by his subjective impressions by also by
bonds actually existing between these objects" (1986, p. 112).

The
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process of thinking in complexes is both objective and coherent, but
differs qualitatively from conceptual thought in that the bonds uniting
elements in a complex are "concrete and factual, rather than abstract
and logical" (1986, p. 113).4

It is as if, Vygotsky suggests, the

child organizes the discrete elements and objects of the universe into
"family groups," the individual members of which belong together in
point of actual fact, and not by virtue of logical classification.
The earliest complexes to constellate in a child's thinking are,
in Vygotsky's term, the "associative type."

Associative complexes are

based on any kind of objective connection perceived arrong objects at
hand, not simply shared qualities, but the accidental attributes of
contiguity or spatial coexistence as well.

At this stage of cognitive

development, a word "ceases to be the 'proper name' of an individual
object; it becomes the family name of a group of objects related to one
another in many kinds of ways" (1986, p. 114).
This level is superseded by one in which associative complexes are
formed on the principle of contrast, arrong objects which differ and
complement one another.

This sort of arrangement is the "collection

complex . . . a grouping of objects on the bas is of their participation
in the same practical operation--of their functional cooperation"
(1986, p. 115).

It reflects the child's practical experience with

objects in the world, a learned awareness of the fact that unlike
objects are often taken together to form a complementary set of things.
These basic complexes, the associative and the collective, differ
from the succeeding types, called the "chain complex" and the "diffuse
complex," in that in the latter, there is no evident principle of
consistency in the manner of complex formation.

The chain complex, in
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particular, Vygotsky says, "has no nucleus" (1986, p. 117); no single
trait can be abstracted from all its members, but each element is
connected to others through differing attributes or qualities.

Two

items may have nothing in common with each other, but join in the
structure of a chain by sharing one trait in corrmon with some
intermediating third element.

Diffuse complexes are even less

apparently coherent, but are internally organized around some sort of
indefinite inner generalization, personal and idiosyncratic to a high
degree.
The most highly-evolved type of complex thinking is called by
Vygotsky "the pseudoconcept" (1986, p. 119) by virtue of its apparent
similarity to the mature cognitive process of concept formation.

At

this level, complex and concept are functionally equivalent, but
represent distinctly different mental operations.

The resemblance

between them is en.hanced by a superficial similarity in the language
used to express them.
The material in which the child forms his thoughts, his words, are
taken from the language of adults, as Vygotsky points out.
complexes corresponding to word meanings are not
spontaneously developed by the child: The lines along
which a complex develops are predetermined by the meaning
a given word already has in the ianguage of adults . . .
The linguistic milieu, with its stable, permanent word
rneanings, charts the way that the child's generalizations
will take. But, constrained as it is, the child's thinking
proceeds along this preordained path in the manner
characteristic of the child's own stage of intellectual
development (1986, p. 120).
The adult, through verbal interaction with the child, can demonstrate
the process of conceptual thinking, Vygotsky says, but
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carmot pass on to the child his mode of thinking. He
merely supplies the ready-made meanings of the words,
around which the child builds complexes. such complexes
are nothing but pseudoconcepts. They are similar to
concepts in their appearance, but differ substantially
in their essence (1986, p. 120).
Vygotsky believed that conceptual thinking would not develop
spontaneously out of the associative processes underlying the formation
of complexes.

As

an earlier researcher, Narziss Ach, had demonstrated,

the mere existence of associations, "however numerous and strong,
between verbal symbols and objects is not in itself sufficient for
concept formation" (1986, p. 99).

Although a pseudoconcept may contain

all the necessary elements from which a concept might be fashioned,
what is required is a mental operation which transcends the concrete
and perceptual links which unite the disparate members of a complex.
Conceptualization is thus conceived as the product of abstraction.
The essential function of a complex, Vygotsky says, is
to establish bonds and relations. Complex thinking begins
the unification of scattered impressions; by organ1z1ng
discrete elements of experience into groups, it creates a
basis for later generalizations.
But the advanced concept presupposes more than unification. To form such a concept it is also necessary to abstract,
to single out elements, and to view the abstracted elements
apart from the totality of the concrete experience in which
they are embedded. In genuine concept formation, it is equally
important to unite and to separate: Synthesis and analysis
presuppose each other as inhalation presupposes exhalation
(1986, p. 135-136).
The inherent difference between complex and conceptual thinking
in the Vygotskyan schema can be traced to the differing functions of
the word in each operation.

At the stage which precedes the awareness

of abstract relations, Vygotsky says, the structure of meaning is
essentially predicative.

When confronted with the task of defining a
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word, the child (or adult in the preconceptual stage of cognitive
development) is incapable of a semantic or lexical analysis, and
instead offers lists of qualitative or functional attributes.

Once an

individual has made the transition from generalization to abstraction,
and has developed the ability to analyse and coordinate concepts within
a coherent and hierarchical system of thought, the shift may be
reflected only in his social speech.

His inner speech, the transform

of early egocentric verbalization, still retains its original structure
as predication.
Inner speech is alrrost entirely predicative, Vygotsky suggests,
because "the situation, the subject of thought, is always known to the
thinker" (1986, p. 182).

Written speech and oral corrmunication

generally requires the full specification of subject and object in
order to be intelligible, but there are, Vygotsky says, two cases in
which predication can be encounterea in external speech: as the answer
to a question, or when the subject of the sentence is understood by all
concerned.
The kind of condensation or abbreviation of thought represented by
predicative speech becomes possible as a means of communication when
"the thoughts of two people coincide" (1986, p. 236).

As Lev

Tolstoy

had found in his developmental research, communication by abbreviated
speech is the rule, rather than the exception, among people who live in
close psychological contact.

Thus, Vygotsky suggests, the predications

of inner speech become externalized arrong individuals who participate
in a shared frame of reference, with nru.tual agreement as to perception
and perspective.
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For Vygotsky, as for Saussure and Wharf, specifically verbal
thought must be distinguished from other, non-verbal forms of thinking,
and is subject to the inner rules of language.

"Verbal thought," he

asserts, "is not an innate, natural form of behavior, but is determined
by a historical-cultural process and has specific properties and laws
that cannot be found in the natural forms of thought and speech" (1986,
p. 94); that is, in the purely associative and predicative m:)des of
thought characteristic of elementary consciousness.

Abstractions are

impossible without words, Vygotsky says; and although current critiques
of his work center around the adequacy of his definition of "concept,"
his position is one which identifies conceptual thought with verbal
processes.
Associative and conceptual thinking thus remain for Vygotsky two
distinct, although interconnected, processes, the one based on
generalized perceptions, the other on the abstraction of relations, and
the systematic creation of structure.

Thought is that process of

connection by which such structured relations are established and
developed through the mediating influence of words.

'"111ought,"

Vygotsky says, "is not merely expressed in words; it comes into
existence through them" (1986, p. 218).

Associative and categorical Relations

Vygotsky's younger colleague and friend, cognitive psychologist
Alexander Rornanovich Luria, further elaborated his ideas on the mutual
interdependence of thought and language, and the qualitative difference
between association and concept formation.

In Luria's conception,
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association is in itself already a form of abstraction, a transcendence
of purely sensory perception which is a necessary precondition for the
construction of abstract concepts.

But beyond the conceptual stage of

cognitive development, which is characterized by an awareness of what
Luria calls "categorical" relations, is rational thought itself, the
processes of logic, the ability to draw conclusions on the basis of
premises.

For Luria, associative and rational cognition are the two

methods by which human intellegence can broaden and deepen its field
beyond the imrrediate experience of sensory perception, and both modes
of thought process the data of perception through the medium of
language.
The essence of language, Luria says, is that which "enables us to
abstract, codify, and generalize signs and objects" (1982, p. 28).
Language designates things or actions, properties or relations, and
hence conveys and processes objective information."

The active

selection of a word does not simply indicate the object named; it
"analyzes it and introduces it into a certain system of associations
and relationships" (1982, p. 29).

This, in fact, is the function of

words: "words organize things into systems.

That is to say, words

codify our experience" (1982, p. 31), and allow for communication of
that experience with others.
The relations and properties signified by a word, over and above
its objective or nominal reference, compose what Luria, along with
other contemporary psycholinguistic researchers, calls its "semantic
field," a complex of connotations, derived from personal experience,
which surrounds every word and structures its connections with other
words.

It is this semantic field which is activated through the
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process of association, providing a choice among rich and meaningful
alternatives for the purposes of expression.

On

the other hand,

however, each word also has its "categorical" significance, its place
in a structured hierarchy of abstracted properties, with its formal
relations restricted to other elements sharing the same category.

The

latter mode of organization, the result of an analytical operation,
contributes the objective "meaning" of any given word; the synt hetic
process, working within the semantic rna.terial of individual experience,
creates what Luria calls the "sense" of the word.
Like Vygotsky, Luria found that "meaning" is subject to change;
the objective reference of a word may remain constant, but its place in
the conceptual hierarchy, the comprehension of its categorical
relations, is repeatedly redefined in the course of cognitive
maturation.

conceptual development has profound consequences, as both

Soviet researchers found: "as word meaning changes," Luria asserted,
"psychological processes also change" (1982, p. 50) .5
The serna.ntic field, or associative complex, is in its most basic
form a network of predications--actions, attributes and affects which
are linked to the experience of concrete situations.

At later stages

of development, Luria suggests, "the structure of word meaning takes on
an entirely different character.
The word enters into a system of hierarchically connected
and mutually subordinated categories. It acquires, as
linguists say, a paradigrna.tic character. The word's meaning
is situated in a hierarchical system of abstract oppositions
. • . At the stage of concrete concepts, the key role is
played by situational, object-actuated bonds; whereas at the
stage of abstract concepts, the key role is played by the
verbal and logical hierarchically constructed bonds (1982,
p. 52-53).
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With this change, the experiential and affective dimensions of the
word, its associative connotations, are left behind, and its expressive
potential comes to conform to the objective meaning shared in society.
The psychological shift in the analysis of relations is from concrete
to abstract, from predication to paradigm, from description and
differentiation to coordination and classification according to a
strict system of verbal-logical definitions.
In a perspective that they shared with Whorf and Saussure, and in
the intellectual tradition of dialectical materialism, both Vygotsky
and Luria saw this structural shift in the way language is used as
related to socioeconomic factors, as historically and culturally
determined, rather than as the result of natural cognitive development.
Luria's engaging memoir, The Making of Mind (1979), describes a series
of experiments he conducted in Soviet Central Asia to explore the
processes of linguistic coding, classification and abstraction, and
logical problem-solving among members of a non-literate society,
subsisting in relatively primitive conditions of life.
His results in this endeavor led him to the conclusion that people
of such traditional backgrounds "classify objects according to their
inclusion in a concrete situation" (1982, p. 62).

Their own forms of

conceptualization, as evidenced in Luria's Cartesian tests, proved to
be very different from those of urban, formally educated individuals,
and in their radical inclusivity were not entirely unlike Vygotsky's
"complexes."

In terms of abstract reasoning, Luria's aboriginal

subjects were completely unfamiliar with the kind of abstraction
characteristic of those who have been educated in the methods of formal
logical thinking.

The unwillingness of his subjects to move beyond the
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inmediate sensory dimension of personal experience, their focus on the
practical interrelationships between things, made categorial
discrimination difficult and deouctive reasoning a virtual
impossibility for them.

Within the context of their daily lives, the

abstract universals and part iculars of syllogistic logic bore no
intelligible relationship to each other, and led to no necessary or
inevitable conclusion.
From this experience, Luria identified rational thinking as a
process deriving from fonnal education, but not so much from
instruction in reasoning as such, as from the systematic approach to
words which is involved in the teaching of literacy.

The preconditions

for rational thought, he believed, must include a fundamental change in
the functional role of language.

Words must become separated from

their "syrnpractical" and "synsemantic" contexts and cease to express
associative relations before t hey can become tools for the orderly
classification and analysis of obj ective reality.

It is only when this

cognitive shift has taken place, under the influence of education, that
fonnal rrethods of thinking become possible.

Logic is a consequence of

language, but of language viewed as the structure of categorical
relations.

It can emerge, Luria says, "only during those stages of

cultural development when activity realized through the help of
language becomes an independent process" (1982, p. 203), divorced from
the concrete and perceptual process of associative cognition.
For Luria, as for Vygotsky, the context in which this
transfonnation was most likely to occur was the structured environment
of socialized education.

But many habits of thought which are acquired

and reinforced through family interaction may prove impervious to the
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structuring processes of a systematic conceptual perspective.

The

remainder of this chapter will be devoted to the ideas of two
metacognitive theorists, anthropologist Gregory Bateson and
psychiatrist R.D. Laing, on the influence of family cormrunication
patterns on the thought of the individual.

Cognitive Functioning and Language Patterns in the Family

Gregory Bateson has been cited by psychologist Howard Gardner as
one of the leading participants in the group that created cybernetic
theory, the irrmediate intellectual precursor of the "cognitive
revolution" (Gardner, 1985).

His work on information processing in

social systems, including cross-cultural research on families in
developed and traditional societies, presents an analysis of language
and its relation learning which has far-reachi ng implications for the
mental functioning and behavior of those involved in the corrmunication
patterns of the group.
For Bateson, all learning takes place within a specific context, a
"frame" by which information al::lout t he message to be learned, a
metaco:rmnunication, is presented to the learner.

The presence of dual

or multiple levels of information is rarely noticed, but contributes to
learning by providing a background against which the overt message is
to be understood, along with a set of rules and instructions for the
appropriate interpretation of the message.

The frame functions include

the message in an particular category of information, and to exclude
all other, irrelevant information.

"People will respond rrost energetically," Bateson suggests, "when 48
the context is structured to appeal to their habitual patterns of
reaction" (1972, p. 104).

These patterns are themselves developed and

habituated in the earliest of social settings, the family.

Values,

attitudes, and ideals are implicit in the metalinguistic frame in which
language is learned, in the way a word is used, the affective tone it
carries, the system of relationships into which it is introduced, the
interaction which it facilitates.

All these dimensions are elements of

the code which imparts meaning to the word in the systemic context in
which it is meant to function, transforming it from arbitrary sign to
corrmunicative signal.
Meaning, in Bateson's conception, is a "synonym of pattern,
redundancy, information, and 'restraint' 11 (1972, p. 130).

Language is

a system for the generation of pattern, and the act of corrmunication
is, in its essence, "the creation of redundancy, meaning, pattern,
predictability, information, and/or the reduction of the random by
'restraint' 11 (1972, p. 131-132) .

Pattern introduces the appearance of

order into the chaos of perceptual data, and allows for the
discrimination of differences on the basis of which structures of
meaning can be developed, predictions made, and information transferred
among individuals.
In much the same way that Saussure conceived of language as a
system of differences, Bateson, in one of several essays on the "double
bind" theory of cormnunication, defines information as "a difference
which makes a difference" (1972, p. 272).

Difference, in this view,

results from a modulation of conmunication, an adjustment or
qualification made in relation to other elements within the frame, or
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in relation to the frame itself, the context.

Data is selected to

become "information" on the basis of the perceiver's relative !X)int of
view; thus difference may not be a criterion of the selection process,
but rather a result of it.
Individuals within systems function together in such a way as to
reduce the negative impact of difference, Bateson says, through "a
sharing of premises regarding the meaning and appropriateness of
messages and other acts in the context of the relationship" (1972, p.
233).

In other words, they evolve common meanings and a collective

approach to the processing of information.
In any group, so long as the information contained in both the
message and the frame is logically consistent, cognitive operations can
function in a normal manner.

However, as Bateson found, when there is

chronic incongruence or contradiction between the two levels of
communication, information processing can be seriously impaired.

Mixed

messages of the kind which result in paradox, what Bateson called the
"double bind comnnmication," can cause the recipient to begin to doubt
the validity of his own perceptions, to distrust the information
contained in any context, and to react inappropriately to messages with
consistent contexts.

These behavior patterns, and the linguistic

patterns which accompany them, were found by Bateson to be habitual in
families in which one or more members suffer from functional thought
disorders, including schizophrenia.
The influence of family co:mmunication patterns stems from the fact
that individuals rarely examine the abstractions which underlie their
cognitive habits and their modes of linguistic interaction with one
another.

Yet premises and assumptions which have become automatic and
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can therefore remain unspoken contribute substantially to the context
in which verbal messages are formulated and interpreted.

Unless they

are critically examined, these patterns are reinforced and perpetuated
without alteration.

But any transferable change in understanding, what

Bateson calls "second order learning," or learning to learn, requires
just such a critical examination, a recognition of patterns as they
signify both meaning and relationship.
A family system characterized by resistance to this metacognitive
level of analysis will, by its very nature, impede the process of
second order learning.

As

Bateson points out, it is the function of

any system to be "self-corrective against disturbance" (1972, p. 435),
a function which is accomplished by a reactive reframing of disturbing
information.

By

this means, homeostasis is maintained, the status quo

is preserved, development is prevented, and t he necessity for change
restricted to an absolute minimum.
out of its habitual communication patterns, a family system
develops internal organization and a stable relational structure which
seems logical within its own context.

Li kewise, the patterns of

thought arising from within a corrmunication system become so
standardized as to appear rational to the participants in the system.
It is only when these patterns are placed in another context that
difficulties may become apparent, difficulties which manifest
themselves through the evidence of language and of reasoning.
Bateson's theories developed directly out of his experience with
dysfunctional families, as did those of R.D. Laing, a psychoanalyst and
psychiatrist at the Tavistock and Langham Clinics in London.

But both

approaches emphasize the role of conmunication in regulating cognitive
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operations, and the sets of relations which define the structure of the
system, in ways that are applicable to the unimpaired family as well.
For Laing, the "family" is "an introjected set of relations"
(1972, p. 6), patterns of reaction and interaction arrong individual
participants in the system which become internalized over time and are
subsequently reenacted in other contexts outside the original system.
"When such an internal template of space-time relations-in-sequence is
externalized," Laing says, "it appears to function both as a schema
governing ways external events are hoped, feared, seen to happen, and,
by inducing action and reaction, as self-fulfilling fantasy and
prophecy" (1972, p. 11).

The total set of interactions, according to

Laing, has an unrecognized dramatic structure involving multiple
generations, and the description of the set in any given moment depends
entirely on the perspective of the participant, the character and role
he has assumed in the context of the family "story."
Like Bateson, Laing believes that communication patterns can
induce patterns of behavior and of thought .

One of the most powerful

mechanisms of induction, in his view, is the language of predication.
The attribution by parents of qualities, especially negative qualities,
to their children, or the pronouncement of evaluative judgments, can
carry such force as to shape the child's entire perspective.

Parental

definitions of the child's behavior, whether objectively true or not,
can become true over time as the child internalizes both the predicate
and the context, the circumstances, in which it was delivered.
Furthermore, in the context of a mixed message, Laing suggests that it
is the predicative portion of the communication which takes precedence
over any other, discrepant information (1972, p. 79-80).
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Induction, for Laing, is a process of "mapping" one individual's
set of expectations and values onto another in such a way as to cause
the other to embody those attributions and behave accordingly (1972, p.
117).

Unlike the process of education, which might serve the same

apparent end, induction undermines the child's development; it is
linked with unexamined attitudes and habitual patterns of interaction,
and occurs because of unspoken prohibitions against examining the
structure and context of those patterns.
Some families operate, Laing says, as a "transpersonal system of
collusion" (1972, p. 99) in which members agree to maintain the
stability of the system by ignoring the existence of its operating
procedures, its "rules and metarules."

SUch rules, Laing says, "govern

all aspects of experience,
what we are to experience, and what not to experience,
the operations we must and must not carry out, in order
to arrive at a permitted picture of ourselves and others
in the world . . . If what we are instructed to achieve
cannot be achieved by the how we are instructed to achieve
it, we are in difficulty. (1972, p. 107).
A major factor in this difficulty, perhaps the determining one, is to
be found in the linguistic patterns in the family household, and in

particular, the psychological force of predicative speech.
The theorists mentioned in this chapter, with the exception of
Saussure, worked out their intellectual systems with explicit reference
to the psychoanalytic doctrines of Freud and his followers, including
C.G. Jung.

In the chapter which follows, the development of Jung's

ideas on cognition will be traced from his early empirical work in word
association, to his theoretical fornru.lation of a functional approach to
cognitive processing.

CHAP T E R

I I I

C.G. JUNG'S EARLY THEORY OF COGNITION

The professional career of Carl Gustav Jung--and the historical
course of twentieth-century psychology--took a decisive turn in the
moment when he discovered that his painstaking experimental work at
Zurich's famed Burgholzli Clinic gave empirical support to the radical,
shocking, and academically unacceptable theories of Sigmund Freud.

The

structural model of mind which had been outlined by the Viennese
neurologist in his monumental 1900 publication, The Interpretation of
Dreams, explained in one comprehensive representation a whole system of
cognitive functions and processes known only too well to the young
swiss psychiatrist from the fragmentary evidence of his patients' word
associations.

Despite the hazard to his own reputation as a scientist,

Jung chose to cast his empirical data on the side of Freud's
speculations, and in 1906 took the first step toward establishing a
relationship with Freud that would forever alter the world's
understanding of human cognition.
In the seven years of their professional collaboration and
personal friendship, Jung offered Freud what he could not have achieved
on his own:

not simply the validation of his theories, but access to

medical and intellectual circles outside Vienna as well.

The

Burgholzli Clinic drew interns and researchers from all parts of
Europe, from Russia and from America, and in its experimental research
facilities, a generation of psychiatrists learned Freud's
psychoanalytic theory through the practice of the word association
experiment.

As

part of that theory, they studied the structure of the
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psyche detailed in the final chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams, a
complex information-processing system that has been seen by some recent
theorists (Peterfreund, 1971; Erdelyi, 1985) as a forerunner of the
computer-based "multi-store" model of modern cognitive psychology.
But Freud's mechanical metaphor for the mind--the "compound
instrument," as he termed it--with its two modes of operation, primary
and secondary process thinking, was in some respects too static and too
homogeneous a model for Jung to adopt as his own.

While keeping

Freud's idea of two essential thought processes, which he called
"directed" and "non-directed" thinking, Jung eventually rejected the
structural approach to cognition for one which conceived of the mind in
terms of the fluid interplay of four dynamic functions, centered around
a nucleus of associated ideas which holds the essence of each
individual's personal self-consciousness.

Where Freud had posited a

single, comprehensive, unified apparatus of human thought, a structure
and function corrmon to everyone, Jung sought to explain the diversity
of human individuality with a theory of psychological types, describing
his own approach to the mind in terms which sound strikingly similar to
those of cognitive psychology's "levels of processing" model.I
The present chapter will present a brief summary of the early
cognitive theory of C.G. Jung as it emerged from the data of his
association experiments.

The first section will discuss the

reaction-types described by Jung and his colleague, Franz Riklin, in
their 1904 article, "The Associations of Normal subjects."

The second

section will follow the theory of reaction-types in its subsequent
development toward the concept of four cognitive functions, and in
particular the opposing pair of rational functions, thinking and
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feeling.

The final section will be devoted to Jung's discussion of

types and functions as they develop in context of the family.

Linguistic Orientation and Reaction- Types

Jung and Riklin began their experimental program with the idea
that an individual's responses on a word association test might fall
into patterns that could be identified and described as distinctive
reaction-types.

The criterion upon which such a differentiation might

be made was the preference the individual showed for specific kinds of
associative responses, particular semantic or logical relationships
which the respondent chose to set forth in his reactions to the
stimulus-words.
In order to test their hypothesis, Jung and Riklin gathered more
than 12,000 associations from thirty-eight normal adults, men and women
of varying ages, educational levels and linguistic abilities.

SU.bjects

were tested in conditions of undisturbed attention and in the presence
of a variety of distractions, including auditory and motor tasks,
visualizations, and conditions of physical and emotional fatigue.

Each

subject's responses were then classified according to a four-part
system, adapted by the Burgholzli researchers from an earlier schema
developed by Gustav Aschaffenburg and Emil Kraepelin for use in their
empirical investigations of association.

The system discriminates

among some thirty-seven types of associative response to a given
stimulus word, and is structured in such a way as to permit an analysis
of the relative strength of the logical or linguistic connection
inhering in the relationship between stimulus and response.
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At the top of the hierarchy are the so-called "internal
associations," those relationships which reflect objective conceptual
bonds between words.

Associations which fall into this sector are

those in which stimulus and response are united by reference to some
coordinating corrmon concept, or those which orient each other through
subordination or superordination.

Definitions and declarations of

cause are located in this initial group, as are all forms of
predication, including the syntactic (the subject-verb or verb-object
relationship) and the attributive (adjectival predication of quality,
quantity, attitude, or relation, and disposition as to place, time,
means and purpose).

These meaning-based or meaning-extending

associations are assumed to be the product of reflective thought, the
result of an analysis which has penetrated to the depth at which, in
the language of levels of processing theory, the conceptual material of
stimulus and response has been encoded in all its relational,
referential, thematic and functional complexity (Perfetti, 1979).
More superficial, and less complex, are the responses which fall
into the second category of "external associations."

These are the

responses conditioned by the operation of the classical laws of
association, the laws of contiguity, frequency and similarity, as well
as the automated responses of synonym and antonym, and the form
changes, word completions, and compound constructions that show that
the subject has made no effort to address the semantic content--the
meaning--of the stimulus word.

This is the realm of slogans,

interjections, proverbs, quotations and empty phrases, of "speech
formulas" (Lakoff, 1982), of verbal interaction which can occur without
the expenditure of attention, without an attempt at comprehension,
without regard for concept, idea, or meaning.
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M:)re marginal still are the responses of the third major category,
that of "sound reactions."

These are verbal productions which have

lost their claim to be called associations in the true referential
sense of the word; they are responses at the most superficial level of
cognitive analysis, reactions to the acoustic, phonemic and
phonological dimensions of the stimulus-word.

The most debased

responses of all are classified in the final, residual category.

Here

are grouped the repetitions of the stimulus word and the failures to
respond, as well as those indirect associations which are made in
response not to the stimulus-word, but rather to sane other,
unarticulated inner concept, the sense of which may be a complete
mystery even to the respondent.
Given this scale on which to position the verbal-logical
relationships fonned by their subjects' responses, Jung and Riklin
noticed that their data did, in fact, organize itself around a number
of distinct reaction patterns, or types, which could be identified in
part from an analysis of the relational category preferred by the
subject for the majority of his responses.

Some individuals, the

experimenters found, had a predominant tendency to answer the stimulus
with a word indicative of some conmon concept, a clear, coherent,
objective association which bore witness to an organized and logical
approach to the lexical and semantic information of the stimulus word.
Others, no less clear and objective, responded to the purely linguistic
dimensions of the stimulus, its gramnatical mutability, its involvement
in the popular phrases of everyday speech, its tendency to merge with
other words into compounds in which each element loses its intrinsic
meaning.
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In these two types of reaction, nothing in particular was revealed
about the subjective state of the respondent, his emotional response or
his personal orientation to the stimulus concept.

A certain am::>unt of

factual data might emerge from the response words themselves; members
of certain professions, for example, might give themselves away with
words that had become habitual through the corrmon language of their
careers.

But in contrast to these individuals, who shared what Jung

and Riklin called an "objective attitude," were respondents who
indulged in open self-disclosure with their associations, respondents
whose orientation was identified by Jung and Riklin as an "egocentric
attitude."

Aloong these respondents, two major types emerged, those

whose responses clustered in associative complexes which hinted at
specific personal experiences of a more or less emotional nature, and
those who reacted with the evaluative pronouncements of predication.
These four basic reaction-types2 represented four distinct
approaches to the information carried in the stimulus-word, and, by
extension, Jung believed, to the reality represented by the stimulus, a
reality which would appear in a radically different guise to a
objective-semantic reaction type than to a complex or a predicate type.
An

individual's interpretation of, and reaction to, the external

stimuli of his environment could perhaps be understood through an
analysis of these response preference patterns, which were themselves
evidence of the background and education he had experienced, the kind
of language he had heard, and affects expressed or concealed by means
of that language.
Far from mere linguistic phenomena, then, these associative
reaction-styles were signals of a set of attitudes about the nature of
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reality, and were accompanied by characteristics commonly held to be
components of persona:..Hy.

The degree of a subject's self-control, the

intensity of his emotional engagement, the quality of attention he was
able to maintain, his tendency to place the sound of a word into an
intellectualized conceptual hierarchy or into the vivid imagery of
predication, his preference for paradigm or syntagrn, for analytic or
synthetic formulations, for similarity or for difference, were all
evidence of underlying cognitive processes which varied among
individuals even as their reaction-styles, their choice of associate
responses, varied from one to another.3
The calm neutrality of the two objective ty:pes, for example, was
evident in their conceptual approach to the word, their abstraction,
the absence both of affect and of personal involvement with the matter
of the stirnulus-word.4

Among the egocentric ty:pes, a great number of

predicates in an individual's response pattern was found to accompany a
solid subjective stance, a high degree of concentration, a freedom of
emotional expression, and a remarkable trait not shared by members of
other reaction-ty:pes, the ability to generate internal imagery as a
non-verbal associative response to the stimulus-word.

A high

proportion of superficial reactions among an individual's responses,
finally, the sort of words that have become embedded and automatized in
the language of corrnnon discourse, was found to occur in conjunction
with a high degree of distractibility and the tendency to selfrevealing reminiscence, which might either be given free expression, or
else, if too painful, suppressed.
The program of research into normal associations at the Burgholzli
Clinic was designed to provide a baseline against which the utterances
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of mentally ill individuals could be compared.

Rather than finding any

clear-cut differentiation between the associations of nonral and
disturbed individuals, however, Jung and his colleague found only a
difference of degree.

The verbal patterns of their subjects proceeded

on a continuum from the tight and structurally stable conceptual bonds
of coordinate, subordinate and superordinate relationships, through
varying intensities of predication, to the more superficial and
automatic reactions of synonym, antonym and casual phrase, to
apparently incoherent responses and failures stermning from some private
inner experience which the subject either refused to reveal or was
actually unable to explain to the experimenters.

At this end of the

spectrum, Jung and Riklin observed , the responses of perfectly average
individuals began to coincide with the k ind of linguistic behavior that
might be observed in clinical cases of hysteria, manic disorders, or
more pathological kinds of cognitive dysfunction.
In pathological states, the same t wo orientations or attitudes
which distinguished the responses of normal individuals could be also
be seen, differentiated again i n terms of relative degree:

the

outwardly-directed organizing tendency of t he objective type, and the
inwardly-focused evaluative tendency of the egocentric type.

These two

attitudes were the first of the cognitive phenomena to be drawn by Jung
from the material of his word association experiments to serve as the
foundation for his emerging theory of psychological types.
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Toward a Functional Typology of Cognition
Much of the verbal behavior Jung and his colleague observed in
their word association research was not, in fact, the evidence of
deep-lying psychological processes or of complex, conceptually-based
thought.

Rather, the responses they collected might better be

described as "linguistic reactions," which the researchers held to
"represent the psychological connection only in a remote and imperfect
way" (1973, p. 10).

Language itself, and not the intention of the

respondent, provided the motive force for many of the reactions.

The

individual's inner association "cannot become the object of another's
consciousness without being transformed into the familiar syrnlx>lism of
language," according to Jung and his colleague (1973, p. 11) .

This

transformation will be shaped by the individual's fluency in the
language, but also by the frequency that certain associative pairs and
common phrases have established for themselves in the patterns of
ordinary social discourse.
The linguistic roots of cognitive processing.

The primacy of language-

based associations asserted itself most strongly when a subject's
attention was artificially diminished.

Jung and his coauthor explained

the phenomena they observed in the distraction portion of their
their experiment in dynamic terms:
. . • one could say that the "associative energy" (Ranschburg)
was to such an extent diverted to another area that only a
portion of it is still available for the reaction. Thus a
correspondingly poor or easy (that is, strongly canalized)
association is given, because the stinrulation of ready and
accustomed cerebral mechanisms requires a smaller amount of
energy than the canalization of relatively new and unaccustomed
connections (1973, p. 43).
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When distracted, fatigued, or emotionally disturbed, then, a
subject responds with the easiest reactions to produce, those which
have become mechanical through practice, habit, or repetition.

such

habitual connections between words would naturally include not simply
those formulas an individual has rehearsed on his own, but also those
high-frequency verbal patterns, "stereotyped word-connections" (1973,
p. 184) which are shared throughout a linguistic or social group by
virtue of a conmon form of speech.

In this way, Jung and Riklin

suggest, "ideas already automatized and condensed in language assist
the subject in his effort to comprehend the meaning of the stimulus
word and to work it over" (1973, p. 138) with the mst economical
expenditure of effort.
When concentration of attention on the idea of the stimulus-word
is possible, on the other hand, "these purely linguistic connections
are suppressed" (1973, p. 138), and the subject is free to select the
appropriate level of analysis at which to formulate a meaningful
association, one which conveys the sense of the associated idea.
Attention, then, aids the development of the stimulus idea by
controlling and directing the process of association, and by keeping
the meaningless verbal patterns of the language, always present in

memory, excluded from the focus of consciousness.
The processes of language reflect the dynamics of thought at a
deeper, mre structural level as well, as Jung wrote in his 1913
article, "A Contribution to the Study of Psychological Types."

There,

he compared the two orientations of consciousness that he had seen in
his reaction-types, the outward- or inward-looking attitudes which he
now called extraversion and introversion, with the dynamics of
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transitive and intransitive verbs in language.

According to

contemporary linguistic scholar Franz Finck, Jung said,
. . . there are two main types of linguistic structure. The
one is represented in general by the transitive verbs: I see
him, I kill him, etc. The other is represented by the
intransitive verbs: He appears before me, he dies at my feet.
The first type clearly shows a centrifugal movement of libido
going out from the subject; the second, a centripetal movement
of libido coming in from the object. The latter, introverting
type of structure is found particularly among the primitive
languages of the Eskimos (1971, p. 507-508).
Thus, a linguistic analysis of function serves as an analogy for the
differences in attitude which distinguish two types of individuals, the
introvert and the extravert, whose differing verbal behavior Jung had
already observed on the word association test.

But language is far

more than a repository of automatic verbal patterns and an indicator of
the direction in which an individual's consciousness prefers to turn.
Language is the medium in which the process of cognition actually takes
place.
Directed and non-directed thinking.

In the work which represents the

tumultuous process of his own mid-li f e self-analysis,3 Jung began
an examination of cognitive processing wh ich would lead him to a
theoretical and personal break with his mentor Freud.

Yet his point of

departure in that work, Symbols and Transformations of the Libido, is a
discussion of thinking which seems to owe much to ideas Freud had
expressed in The Interpretation of Dreams.
Under the heading, "The Primary and secondary Processes," Freud
had elaborated an operational theory for his mechanical model of the
psyche based on the process of association between words and ideas.
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The material of memories, dreams, and conscious thought is acted upon
by two essentially different cognitive processes, Freud suggests, the
one driving toward a reduction of tension through a discharge of
energy, and the other attempting to minimize the accumulation of
tension by maintaining the entire system in a state of rest.

The

dynamics of the first operation he called the "primary process"; its
function was manifest in the images of dream and fantasy, in the
sound-based associations characteristic of depressed attention, in
impulses, emotions and desires.

By

contrast, the "secondary process,"

the equilibriating and controlling operation, was that dynamic which
allowed for the exploratory cognitive work of "experimental thought"
(1950, p. 452), using pleasure and pain as signals to adjust its
course as it progressed through the associative network of memory.
Primary process thinking, Freud suggests, seeks an "identity of
perception," a sensation-based experience providing the gratification
of a wish for physical pleasure.

The secondary process, on the other

hand, finds its goal in a more rarefied f orm of pleasure, an "identity
of thought" (1950, p. 453).

"Thought must concern itself with the

connecting-paths between i deas without allowing itself to be misled by
their intensities;" that is, by the enticement of sensual
gratification they may represent.

Nor, Freud says, can thinking allow

itself to be detoured by the obstacles of pain:
the tendency of the thinking process must always be to
free itself more and rrore from exclusive regulation by
the pain-principle, and to restrict the development of
affect through the work of thought to the very minimum
which remains effective as a signal. This refinement in
functioning is to be achieved • . . with the help of
consciousness (1950, p. 454).
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The ability to follow a train of thought with purposive and
directed attention, avoiding the attractions of pleasure and the
prohibitions of pain, is one which appears comparatively late in an
individual's development.

The apparatus for the primary process is

functional at birth, but the operations of secondary thinking develop
only gradually, Freud says, "inhibiting and overlaying the primary,
whilst gaining complete control over them perhaps only in the prime of
life" (1950, p. 455).

Both modes of cognition are perfectly normal,

and both coexist in the mental systems of perfectly normal
individuals, although in mature adults the primary process tends to
reveal itself only in the form of dreams and in the symptoms of
diverted attention--parapraxes, slips of the tongue, temporary lapses
of memory.
The means by which the secondary process, what might be thought
of as "normal," or rational, thinking, gains its ascendancy over the
supposedly "incorrect" or "defective thinking" (1950, p. 456) of the
primary process, Freud asserts, is repression.

This was the very

operation which Jung had observed in his experimental work as well,
and he had attributed to it a similar function, that of excluding
inferior associations, verbal-motor patterns and sound responses, from
the focus of consciousness.
When Jung moved on from the study of verbal behavior to a
consideration of the mythological and symbolic structure which
underlies the production of psychotic fantasies, he began his work,
translated under the title The Psychology of the Unconscious (1916),
with a discussion of two kinds of thought, "directed" and
"non-directed" thinking, which seem related to the primary and
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secondary processes described by Freud, but refined by explicit
reference to the linguistic matrix out of which "directed thinking"
develops.6
The process of conscious thought, Jung says, works itself out in
the form of words.

Language, and verbal concepts, are the material in

which thought is cast; even the mJst private forms of thought, if
subjected to an attentive analysis, would reveal themselves in the
guise of internal speech.

This thinking in words, or "logical"

thinking, is preeminently designed for corrmunication with others.

It

is adapted to the shared reality of society, and through that
adaptation fosters an outward-looking attitude toward the world.

"As

long as we think directedly," Jung says, "we think for others and
speak to others" (1916, p. 14), using a system of sounds that over the
course of centuries have come to carry conmonly accepted conceptual or
semantic meanings.
The development of a regularized system of meaning has depended
historically on the separation of sounds from the concrete, sensual
and affective realities they originally signified, and a shift to the
signification of relations and comparisons which alone permit the
operation of abstract thought.

But while containing, and

transmitting, these standard patterns of information, language also
permits the development and exercise of private reference, and thus
serves as a double-edged instrument, with functions in both the
personal and the social realm.
Jung agreed with the English philosopher Baldwin, whom he quotes
extensively, that language systematically delimits thought.
FurthermJre, it also serves to condition the faculty of judgment, as
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each individual, through trial and error, learns to adjust and conform
his own immature and ideosyncratic understanding of words to the
conventional meanings fixed within the language.

social confinnation

is a sign of the appropriateness of an individual's usage, not only of
words themselves, but of concepts elaborated from those words as well.
Thinking by means of internal speech, or "directed thinking,"
Jung writes, "is the manifest instrument of culture," a comparatively
recent development in historical terms.

Education in the methods of

directed thinking gradually forced the human cognitive process out of
its inward, subjective orientation to the objective realm of social
interaction;? this radical reorientation of mind has allowed for the
advances in science and technology on which modern society as we know
it has been built.
But this acquisition of the benefits of l ogical processing is not
made without cost.

Di rected thinking, Jung suggests, requires the

expenditure of energy, and thus cannot be sustained for extended
periods of time.

And in the interim, when fatigue or inattention

supervene, an alternative cognitive process is allowed to emerge, one
which works with images, feelings, and desires, a thought process
described by psychologist William James as "merely associative"
thinking, and called by Jung "non-directed" or "fantasy thinking."
Thus Jung, like Freud, builds a cognitive model on the
distinction between two contrasting modes of thought:

one controlled,

attentive, objective, governed by the logical principles of
abstraction, the product of maturity or of rigorous education; the
other archaic, undisciplined, spontaneous, egocentric, and
anti-social.

"The first," Jung says,
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working for communication with speech elements, is troublesome and exhausting; the latter, on the contrary, goes
on without trouble, working spontaneously, so to speak,
with reminiscences. The first creates innovations, adaptations, imitates reality and seeks to act upon it. The
latter, on the contrary, turns away from reality, sets
free subjective wishes, and is, in regard to adaptation,
wholly unproductive (1916, p. 22).
A representation of the world formed under the influence of one type
of thought would be quite different from the impression left by the
operation of the other, Jung suggests, and it is the role of directed
thought to correct and rrodify the productions of associative or
fantasy thinking.8

The essential distinction between the two rrodes

of thought, can be traced to the fact that non-directed thought
corresponds to the attitude of introversion, a focus on the processes
of inner, subjective experience, while directed, or logical, thought,
occupies itself with the objective interests of extraversion.
By

the time of his next major publication, Psychological Types,

however, Jung had come to realize that the attitudes of introversion
and extraversion could be adopted with equal ease by thinkers of both
directed and non-directed rrodes.

Furthermore, he had come to realize

that the process of rational thinking was itself comprised of two
different functions, one of which is distinguished by a number of
qualities reminiscent of the subjective, judgmental approach of the
"predicate type" subjects of his early word association experiments.
The cognitive process underlying their preferred style of association
Jung named the "feeling function," and described its logic as the
opposite of that used in the other rrode of rational cognition, which
he chose to call the "thinking function."
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Thinking and Feeling
The essential difference between analytical and associative
thought, between discrimination and evaluation, between deduction and
predication, intellect and sentiment, logic and judgment, is for Jung
a problem of "psychological types," and in his 1921 IOOnograph of that
name, he traces the history of typological differences through
aesthetics, literature, psychopathology and philosophy from the
nineteenth century back to its roots in classical and medieval
thought.

The question at stake in the unresolved scholastic argument

over nominalism and realism, and the conflict in ancient philosophy
between the doctrines of inherence and predication, Jung says,
is the typical opposition between the abstract standpoint,
where the decisive value lies in the mental process itself,
and the personal thinking and feeling which, consciously
or unconsciously, underlie orientation by the objects of
sense (1971, p. 36).
The first process characteristically draws from a multiplicity of
appearances an idea which orders and contains diversity; the second
process attempts to reduce the insubstantial idea to something
concrete and particular.

The first is objective and impersonal, the

second subjective, personal and reductive; the first is a development
of the function of thinking, the second is related to the operation of
the feeling function.
Both thinking and feeling are said by Jung to be "rational"
cognitive functions; they are IOOdes of infonnation processing, in
contrast to the "irrational" functions of sensation and intuition,
which govern the processes of perception.

All four functions, he

says, are available to every individual, and ideally operate in
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hannonious equilibrium.

But in practice, they are developed at

different rates and employed by an individual in differing degrees.
function which is preferred becomes habitual.

A

Chronic reliance on one

of the four allows it to determine "type," the characteristic rrode in
which an individual interprets and responds to his environment.
The two rational functions of thinking and feeling, Jung
suggests, are both the products of reflection, and both are designed
to assist in the adaptation of the individual to objective values
(1971, p. 458).

Thinking, in this scheme, includes the active process

he had earlier described as "directed thought," as well as the passive
experience he had designated "fantasy thinking."

What the two

operations share in comrron is a process of bringing "the contents of
ideation into conceptual connection with one another," a coordination
of ideas under a corrnnon concept (1971 , p. 481).

Where the arrangement

of concepts is made in accordance with objective laws of logic,
consciously applied, the process is a fully rational one; but even
when the arrangement occurs unintentionally, in what might be called
an irrational manner, the act of ordering with reference to a concept
still distinguishes the result as a product of the thinking
function.9
Feeling, on the other hand, has only one criterion by which it
introduces order:

the value of an object, on the basis of which it is

either to be accepted or rejectect. 10 Feeling "is an entirely
subjective process," Jung says,
which may be in every respect independent of external
stimuli, though it allies itself with every sensation •
. . . feeling is a kind of judgment, differing from
intellectual judgment in that its aim is not to establish
conceptual relations but to set up a subjective criterion
of acceptance or rejection (1971, p. 434).
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Simple feeling, Jung says, is concrete, closely allied with sensation
in its task of evaluation.

But as a rational function, feeling is

also capable of abstraction.
In the same way that thinking organizes the contents of
consciousness under concepts, feeling arranges them
according to their value. The more concrete it is, the
rrore subjective and personal is the value conferred upon
them; but the more abstract it is, the more universal and
objective the value will be (1971, p. 435).
Like thinking, feeling is rational in that "values in general are
assigned according to the laws of reason, just as concepts in general
are formed according to these laws" (1971, p. 435).

It must be

distinguished from affect in that it is a principle of discrimination,
a criterion of judgment, and not in itself a state of emotional
disturbance.

But the feeling f unction can lead to an arousal of the

emotions, if the intensity with wh ich evaluation is performed reaches
a sufficiently high degree.
Because the criteria of thinking and feeling are, in essence,
antithetical to one another, the f unctions are considered opposites.
The normal adaptation of an i ndiv i dual requires the choice of one mode
over the other; the preferred mode is then developed at the expense of
the other.

Feeling, Jung says, "can never act as the second function

alongside thinking, because it is by its very nature too strongly
opposed to thinking.

Thin~ing, if it is to be real thinking and true

to its own principle, must rigorously exclude feeling" (1971, p. 406).
As

cognitive functions, they are equal, but mutually exclusive.
The characteristics associated with the feeling function--its

evaluative tendency, its reliance on the sensory dimensions of
consciousness, and above all its strong subjectivity--are all
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attributes which Jung had first noticed in the word associations of
his predicate-type subjects.11

Although he does not explicitly make

the connection in his discussion of the types, the pattern seems
compelling, as does the conclusion which follows:

that as exemplars

of the feeling type, individuals with high levels of predication
would, almost by definition, have difficulty with the use of their
thinking function.

And to the extent that thinking is a process of

conceptual coordination, those who show a preference for the
coordination of words with reference to concepts should, by contrast,
demonstrate a well-differentiated thinking function.

However, by the

time he had completed his work on functions and types, Jung had long
since abandoned the experimental method which might have given
empirical support to his theory, which rests instead on clinical
observations from his practice as a psychoanalyst.
Thus far, the discussion has centered around several specific
aspects of Jung's approach to individual psychology, on cognitive
processes which can be subjected to analysis as isolated phenomena in
persons equally isolated from one another.

What remains to be

examined is his work in the area of functional systems, his
observations on the psycholinguistic dynamics of the family.
The Family Constellation
Jung warned the students of his early experimental research that
the results of an individual's word association test should not be
taken as indicative of an "intellectual" type.

The coordinates,

definitions, or predications which dominate a subject's reaction
pattern are not, he emphasized, the products of "intellectual
peculiarities, but depend entirely on emotional attitudes."

The
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better educated subjects
usually show trivial, well-canalized verbal associations,
whereas the uneducated make more valuable, often more
meaningful, associations. This behavior would, from an
intellectual point of view, be paradoxical (1973, p. 458).
The clear conceptualizations and orderly verbal arrangements
which appear in the responses of less educated people, Jung suggests,
are not so much the result of an evolved thought process as of
emotional involvement, an interest in the task, which contributes to
an intensity of attention by means of which the deeper conceptual
associations may be accessed.

The attention of educated subjects is

not so well concentrated; their emotions are not engaged by the task,
and as a result the associations they produce arise from the more
superficial and automated level of semantic and linguistic analysis.
Attention, Jung suggests, is in i tself an emotional phenomenon
(1973, p. 525),12 and a critical one, i n that the quality and depth
of cognitive processing is directly dependent upon it.

But other,

more obvious, signs of emotion are t o be found in the responses of the
predicate or the complex type individual, which become even more
striking when the individual ' s associ at i ons are set in context of the
responses of his family.

Certain reaction-types--in particular the

predicate type--tended to redundancy within family groups, with
consequences that Jung believed could be detrimental to the
development of the children within the family.
The question of reaction patterns within families had arisen in
the earliest stages of Jung and Riklin's investigation of associative
behavior in normal subjects.

Their original experimental sample of

thirty-eight individuals had contained eight subjects who shared a
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family connection:

two sets of sisters with their respective roc>thers,

and a mother and daughter pair.

All members of each family group,

when tested, proved to l:lelong to the same reaction-type, and
furthermore, the differences l:letween and among their individual
reaction patterns seemed to occur in a regular and predictible way.
These preliminary observations seemed to the researchers to
justify the hypothesis of a "familial disposition" (1973, p. 60) as a
way of explaining the phenomenon, but in order to explore the deeper
dimensions of this linguistic similarity among members of the same
family, a second experiment was designed and carried out under Jung's
supervision by one of his students at the Burgholzli, Dr.

Enma

Furst.

Association tests were performed with members of twenty-four families
of varying levels of education and social status, and the results were
published in 1909, in the second volume of Diagnostic Association
Studies.

In the same year, Jung presented the material in a lecture,

"The Family Constellation," at Clark University in Worcester,
Massachusetts.13
As had l:leen predicted, members of families were found to show
striking similarities in their associations, not simply in terms of
the words with which they responded, but also in terms of their
response patterns, the way the responses fell into the categories of
the logico-linguistic classification system.

In the absence of what

we might consider standard statistical tests for the quantification of
the observed phenomena, Jung invented a simple numerical formula by
which individual responses could l:le compared with each other, and was
able to demonstrate that the reaction patterns of relatives show
greater similarity to each other than do the patterns of unrelated
persons.

Interfamilial agreement was correlated with the relationship
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of the individuals compared:

children's associations were closer in

type to the mother's responses than to the father's; mothers were
closer to their daughters than to their sons, and married women seemed
more affected by the reaction type of their spouse than that of their
family of origin.
The linguistic conformity of some respondents in the sample was
uncanny.

Speaking at Worcester of one mother-daughter pair, Jung

says:
One might indeed think that in this experiment, where the
door is thrown wide open to so-called chance, individuality
would become a factor of the utmost importance . . . But, as
we have seen, the opposite is the case. The daughter shares
her mother's way of thinking, not only in her ideas but also
in her form of expression; so much so that she even uses the
same words (1973, p. 469).
The kind of thought captured in an associative response, Jung says, is
"not inconsequent . . . nor free, but strongly determined within the
boundaries of t he environment.
If, therefore, even the most superficial and apparently
most fleeting mental images are entirely due to the
constellation of the environment, what must we not expect
for the more important mental activities, for emotions,
wishes, hopes, and intentions? (197 3, p. 469)
The emotional attitude of t he parent, as conveyed in a habitual
reaction type, can so contaminate the familial environment that the
child adopts that attitude as his own, complete with its linguistic
forms of expression.

This is particularly the case, Jung says, with

the reaction-types that are most charged with emotional content, those
highest in the evaluative terms of predication.
The wife and daughter of a chronic alcoholic, tested in the
experiment, were examples of this form of psycholinguistic
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identification.14

It may be understandable, Jung says, for the wife

to express her disillusionment with her life through the predication
of intense value judgments, but
it is quite unnatural for the daughter to appear as an
extreme evaluating predicate type. She responds to the
stimuli of the environment precisely as her rnother does.
But whereas, in the mother, the type is to some extent a
natural consequence of her unhappy situation, this simply
does not apply to the daughter. The daughter merely
imitates her mother; she follows her mother's pattern
(1973, p. 473).
This imitation is neither conscious nor intentional; rather, it is the
sign of an unconscious and highly dangerous process of empathetic
identification, a result of the child's inability to protect herself
from being permeated by the intense emotional environment in which she
lives.

The phenomenon by which emotions are transmitted among living

beings is biological in origin and was designed to protect the
individual and the group; the expression of feelings serves survival
by evoking similar feelings in others.

But the engagement of this

primitive response in more developed surroundings can have devastating
consequences.

Close contact with the emotional force of an evaluating

predicate type leaves the bystander feeling "infected," overwhelmed,
"carried away."

And, as the associative evidence suggests, the impact

of this assault on the empathetic system can even transform a young
girl into the likeness of a dissatisfied and bitter matron, doomed,
perhaps, to repeat her mother's unhappy destiny (1973, p. 473).15
This example of the transmission of attitude from rnother to
child, Jung concludes, highlights the importance of the environment in
the development of the individual, in the educational setting no less
than in the hOIIE,
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It is not pious precepts nor the repetition of pedagogic
truths that have a moulding influence on the character of
a developing child; what most influences him are the
unconscious personal affective states of his parents and
teachers. Hidden conflicts . . . secret worries, repressed
wishes, all these produce in the child an emotional state,
with clearly recognizable signs, that slowly but surely,
though unconsciously, seeps into his mind, leading to the
same attitudes and hence the same reactions to the environment.
Among those recognizable signs are the verbal reactions that appear on
a test of word associations, but other behavioral manifestations may
serve as signs as well.
Fathers and mothers deeply impress their children's minds
with the stamp of their personalities; the more sensitive
and impressionable the child, the deeper the impression.
Everything is unconsciously reflected, even those things
that have never been mentioned at all. A child imitates
gestures and, just as the parents' gestures are the
expressions of their emotional states, so in turn the
gesture gradually produces an emotional s t ate in the child,
as he makes t he gesture his own. His adaptation to the world
is the same as his parents' ( 1973 , p. 474 ).
Word and gesture then, not onl y convey information about attitude
and affective state, but can actually induce them in the child.
Reactions to the environment, habituated through practice and
reinforced by the milieu, perpetuate themselves across generations,
leading to the development of what Jung had earlier called "the family
disposition."

An

understanding of these processes by educators was

essential, he believed, in order for them to discharge their
responsibility to the developing child, in liberating him from the
debilitating influence of the horne environment, while helping him
retain whatever might be of value in it.

At the very least, they

ought not to contribute to the child's difficulties by permeating the
school atmosphere with their own unresolved emotional issues.
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The discovery of agreement in reaction-type among family members,
for Jung, was not simply an intellectual curiosity.

It had profound

implications for the cognitive development of children, and an equally
profound significance for the healthy functioning of the family as a
group.

The mere fact of linguistic conformity was only the surface

manifestation of a deeper current, one which powered the family system
and underlay the dynamics of its members' interactions with one
another.
In a contemporaneous work, "The Significance of the Father in the
Destiny of the Individual" (1961), Jung further developed his themes
of environmental contagion, the influence of evaluative predication on
the emotional states of others, and the psychological dangers of
identification, and amplified his theories with case material from his
therapeutic practice.

Although in terms of conclusions it does not

add to the impression he had left in his speech on "The Family
Constellation," it indicates the centrality of these ideas to the
cognitive theory he had evolved from his observations of verbal
associative behavior.

And although it is cast in Freudian terms, the

work stands as an important link in Jung's own post-Freudian
theoretical development.

In future years, he was to return to the

same material, and, just as he had found evidence to support Freud's
views in his days as a young psychiatrist, he would look at the data
again and find the foundation of his own mature theory of the psyche,
the theory of archetypes and the collective unconscious.

Although the word association work done at the Burgholzli Clinic
at the turn of the century cannot be considered "statistical" in the
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modern sense of the term--the experimenters worked only in terms of
mean and modal figures, standard deviations and the correlational
formula devised by Jung, and had no way of determining such matters as
validity, reliability or significance--nevertheless, the descriptions
of logical and linguistic patterns reported in the studies of family
associations were made in such positive terms as to imply a high level
of statistical significance.

It was the purpose of the present study,

reported in the chapter which follows, to replicate the Burgholzli
work on family associations with a more modern statistical analysis,
and to examine two claims of Jung's early cognitive theory: the
existence of a family reaction-type, and the interference between the
processes of thinking and feeling.

CHAPTER

IV

THE EMPIRICAL STUDY

The processes of thinking and feeling, of predication and
coordination, of associative and analytical cognition that had so
fascinated C.G. Jung lend themselves to study through empirical means,
no less so than did his sense that the family environment plays a
critical role--perhaps the decisive one--in the developrrent of an
individual's cognitive style.

In 1903, even before his first study of

associative behavior was in print, Jung and his student, Emna Furst,
were engaged in the analysis of responses from twenty-four families,
the members of which showed remarkable agreement in terms of
reaction-type.

Once the fact of conformity among families had been

suggested, however, no further work seems to have been done in this
area, and as late as 1935, when Jung delivered a series of lectures on
his psychological theories at t he Tavistock Clinic in London (Jung,
1968), the material on family association he presented was derived
from the early experimental work of Dr. Furst.
Although in an earlier presentation at Clark University he had
described her study as of "merely theoretical importance" (1973, p.
466)--that is, without intrinsic therapeutic or psychoanalytic value-the insight it gave into the underlying structural similarity in
cognition within family groups can hardly be dismissed so lightly.
metacognitive examination of one's reactions to the environnent--and
in essence, most reactions are purely associative in nature--cannot
avoid comparison with the reactions of one's parents, siblings and
other close relatives.

such a reflection can bring to light the

A
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detrimental effects of automatic patterns learned in childhood, and
lead an individual to the assumption of responsibility for the content
of his own reactions.
The present chapter reports an experiment that was designed to
explore two aspects of Jung ' s early theory of cognition:

first, that

a "family disposition" shapes the associative styles of individual
members into conformity with one another; and second, that the
cognitive qualities of the feeling function interfere with the
operation of logical thought.

A simple word association test, coupled

with a test of deductive reasoning, provided the tools for the
exploration.

Fifty-two members of fifteen different families then

agreed to grant this special glimpse into the logical and linguistic
patterns that exist within their households.

Conditions of the Experiment

HyPOtheses.
1.

This work was begun with four basic hypotheses:

That as Furst had demonstrated, there i s a statistically

significant level of redundancy in patterns of associative response
among family members;
2.

That the predicate reaction-type is dominant in any family in

which it occurs in at least one of the parents;
3.

That mothers and daughters will show a higher degree of

linguistic conformity than other family members;
4.

That a high proportion of predicate responses on a test of

word association will correlate negatively with a standard measure of
deductive logic, one of the major critical thinking skills.

82
In addition, the experiment was designed to provide parameters
within which the response agreement of normal families might be
contained.

Although Jung, Riklin and Furst were interested in aspects

of individual psychology and reported their data to reflect the
behavior of individuals and individual families, the present analysis
will focus only on trends within the aggregate.

Selection of subjects.

Unlike an experiment that seeks to examine the

characteristics of a number of free and unassociated individuals, a
study of families is made much more complex by the fact that consent
must be given by all members of the group in order for that group to be
considered as a coherent system.

The unavailability, unwillingness, or

incapacity of one or two members to participate can leave the
experimenter with an interesting, but incomplete, picture of processes
operating within the group as a whole, and unfortunately this was the
case in all but two of the families in the sample.

To this

complication should be added the circumstances of divorce and death of
a parent, which obtained in four of the sample families; in these cases
the extent of associative resemblance of the children to the absent
parent can never be subject to investigation.
However, these limitations reflect the realities of everyday life,
and their influence on the sample discussed here is a consequence of
the experimenter's decision not to design a clinically ideal sample,
with artificial constraints placed on the compositional or numerical
definition of "family," but rather to follow the more pragmatic
practice of Jung and Riklin in selecting the individuals to study.
Like the thirty-eight men and women who were chosen to serve as
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subjects in the original Burgholzli experiment on associations of
normal individuals, the core participants in this study were all
affiliated with the institution where the experiment took place:

they

were either professional colleagues of the experimenter or fellow
students in the graduate program.

Random chance thus did not play a

part in the initial selection of the families, but the inclusion of a
family's data did depend, in the final analysis, on the unpredictable
agreement of a majority of its members to participate as subjects in
the experiment.
Four of the families who were asked to serve did not do so:

of

these, one refused at the outset; another withdrew after the testing
was already well underway; and two, who had agreed in principle, found
it impossible to make themselves available during the time frame in
which the experiment was conducted.

On

the other hand, one family came

forward voluntarily to participate, after the father heard from someone
in his office that the study was being done.I

With this one

exception, however, all families were personally invited by the
experimenter through one of their members, usually a parent; and
consent of other family members was obtained either by the experimenter
personally or by a member of the family who had already been tested,
and who could therefore allay the concerns of relatives who might
otherwise hesitate to participate if asked by a stranger.

No subject

was compensated for participation.

Characteristics of the sample.

A total of fifty-two individuals are

included in the sample, representing fifteen different families.
might be described as traditional nuclear families; two are

Six
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multi-generational extended families, two are extended families
involving in-laws, and in addition there are two separate dyads, a
father and son, and a pair of sisters.

The most extensive family unit

in the sample comprised nine individuals: two parents, six children
and a grandchild whose father is the parents' oldest son, and who
frequents the homes of all his older relatives, including the
grandparents.

Two of the families consist of two parents and four

children, and in one of these groups, the husband of the youngest
daughter and two children of the oldest daughter also agreed to
participate.
The composition of the sample in its final form is detailed in
Table 1.

The unit of analysis is the dyad, a structural relationship

obtaining between any two members of the family.

Abbreviations which

will be used in subsequent tables to refer to dyadic relationships are
also given in Table 1 .
For the sake of simplicity, a family is defined as a nuclear
group comprised of at least one parent and at least two children;
thus, the smallest family in the sample will consist of at least three
dyads.

These nuclear groups will be considered as separate units,

regardless of any relational affiliation which may exist with members
of other nuclear groups.2

In other words, the extended family

relationships of aunts, uncles, grandparents, cousins and in-laws
which are present in the sample as a whole will not be subjected to
analysis for levels of linguistic conformity.

Given this working

definition of "family," then, the sample contains nine families
(Families 1 through 7, 9, and 11), and two groups which might better
be conceived as sets of dyads (Families 8 and 10), as well as four
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TABLE 1

Composition of Sample Families

Family 1: 6 members, 15 dyads
Father-Mother (f-m)
Mother-Daughter (m-d)
Mother-Son (m-s)
Father-Daughter (f-d)
Father-Son ( f-s)
Sister-Sister (s-s)
Brother-Brother (b-b)
Brother-Sister(b-s)

1

Family 7: 6 members. 15 dyads

2

Father-Mother
Mother-Daughter
Father-Daughter
Sister-Sister

2
1
1
4

Mother-Daughter
1
Mother-Daughter-in-Law(dl) 1

2

2

1
4
4

6

Family 8: 3 members, 2 dyads

Family 2: 4 members, 6 dyads

Family 9: 3 members. 3 dyads

Father-Mother
Mother-Daughter
Mother-Son
Father-Daughter
Father-Son
Brother-Sister

Mother-Daughter
Mother-Son
Brother-Sister

1
1
1
1
1
1

Family 3: 4 members, 6 dyads
Father-Mother
Mother-Son
Father-Son
Brother-Brother

1
2
2

Family 10: 4 members, 6 dyads
Mother-Daughter
1
Daughter-Husband (d-h)
1
Husband-Sister (h-s)
1
Mother-Son in Law (sl)
1
Mother-Husband's Sister(hs)l
Daughter-Husband's Sister 1

1

6 dyads

3
3

Family 11; 4 members,
Father-Mother
Mother-Son
Father-Son
Brother-Brother

3
3
3

Dyad 12 (Family 7)
Husband-Wife (h-w)

3
9

Dyad 13 (Family 4)

1

Father-Son

1

Dyad 14
Father-Son

1

Family 4: 9 members. 29 dyads
Father-Mother
Mother-Daughter
Father-Daughter
Mother-Son
Father-Son
Sister-Sister
Brother-Brother
Brother-Sister
Father-Grandson (gs)

1
1
1

1

Family 5; 3 members, 3 dyads
Mother-Companion (m-pc)
1
Mother-Son
1
Companion-Son (pc-s)
1

1
2

2
1

1

Dyad 15
Sister-Sister

1

Family 6: 3 members. 3 dyads
Father-Mother
Mother-Daughter
Father-Daughter

1
1
1

TOTAL DYADS IN SAMPLE

98
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separate dyads of related individuals (Families 12, 13, 14, and 15).
Data from these dyadic groups are not included in all portions of the
analysis which follows.
The native language of all subjects is English.

With that single

characteristic in common, the families represent a broad range of
ethnic, cultural and socio-economic backgrounds.

One family is black,

and deeply involved in the life of its religious corrmunity.

One

family is Jewish, six are Irish-Catholic, and in one family, the
parents retain a strong fundamentalist Protestant affiliation which
has been abandoned by the children.

In two of the families, expressed

unorthodox spiritual beliefs prevail, and in two, there was no mention
made of cultural, religious or spiritual ideation.
In terms of socioeconomic distribution, no direct data was taken
on range of family income, but inferences can be drawn from the
educational level and occupation of family members.

Sixteen of the

adult participants are employed or self-employed in professional or
administrative capaticies; eleven can be classed as blue-collar
workers, a category which includes supervisory positions for which a
college education is not required.

Five are primarily homemakers;

thirteen are full-time students, including nine who are currently in
grade school or high school; and six reported themselves as retired,
but with the exception of only one, a businessman, did not specify the
positions which they held during their working careers.
All families can be assumed to fall into a moderate to
lower-middle income range; none were exceptionally prosperous, and
while some might conceivably identify themselves as members of the
"working poor," none were below the official poverty level.

All but
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two of the families live in a major metropolitan center; one family
lives in a small town in a rural area, and one in a moderate-sized
conrnunity at some distance from any large city.
In terms of education, twenty of the thirty-one adults in the
sample held at least the baccalaureate degree.

Another eleven, of

whom four are currently full-time college students, had attended
between one and three years of college, and twelve had only a high
school diploma.
The sample was slightly weighted toward women, with twenty-eight
female participants, as against twenty-four males.

Subjects ranged in

age from 12 to 76 years of age; twenty-two of the subjects, or 42%,
fell in the mid-range age bracket of 20 to 39; ten were below the age
of 19; eight were between the ages of 40 and 59, and twelve were over
the age of 60.
Although care was taken as nruch as possible to select only
families which were not exceptional in terms of emotional difficulties
or disturbances within the home, information volunteered after the
test by individual subjects revealed the fact that in at least four of
the families, conditions in the past had been such as to warrant some
degree of professional or psychiatric intervention with at least one
of the members.

To what extent such intervention may have been

necessary in other families whose members were not quite so
forthcoming will, of course, never be known.
however, for several reasons:

It is worth mentioning,

first, as a reminder of how truly

commonplace psychological dysfunction can be, even within a seemingly
"normal" population; second, because echoes of disturbance still
resonate in the responses of a number of the subjects of the test
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reported here; and third, because past experience with psychological
assessment practices had made some of the subjects unhappily familiar
with the specific process of the word association test.
Since the purpose of this experiment was an analysis of
linguistic phenomena and their relation to formal-logical processes,
and not an examination of individual or group pathology, however, it
was decided that no data would be excluded from the sample solely on
the basis of the subject's reported or self-confessed psychological
history.

Where data has had to be excluded from some portion of the

analysis (and in one case this proved to be necessary), it is only
because the subject deliberately refused to comply with the
instructions given at the outset of the test.

Where this exclusion

occurs, it will be noted.

Test administration.

The experiment was conducted in two parts.

First, the subject was asked to gi ve verbal associations to a list of
one hundred ordinary words, read by t he test administrator one at a
time.

Prior to the beginning of t he t est , the subject was read, or

was given to read, a set of instructions which asked that he or she
simply say the first word t hat came to mind, as quickly as possible,
after the stimulus word had been heard and comprehended.

At the

conclusion of the word association task, the subject was given ten
minutes to complete eighteen questions from the deductive logic
section of the Ross Test of Higher Cognitive Processes.

These

instruments are reproduced as Appendices 1 and 2.
Time constraints, as well as logistical considerations, dictated
the creation of a research team to assist with the administration of
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the tests.

Twenty-one of the fifty-two subjects were tested directly

by the experimenter.

The rest of the data was collected by nine

colleagues, each of whom had first been tested and then given a set of
simple guidelines to govern their behavior as test administrators.
Each of these nine assistants then obtained data from at least one
other member of his or her immediate family, and two of them, who
became entranced by the game-like quality of the process, went on to
test eight relatives apiece, including parents and siblings as well as
nieces, nephews and in-laws.
In all but six cases, the test was administered with subject and
tester face to face in the same room.

In those six cases, where the

relatives were away at school or permanently living in another city,
the word association test was administered by telephone, and the Ross
Test was either mailed or was not given at all.

Ten of the subjects

were tested in their workplace (or the workplace of the parent, in the
case of one minor child); the remainder were tested either in their
own homes or in the "family" home, the residence of those members
around whom the extended family centers.

Although every effort was

made to insure that each subject had the same degree of privacy with
the tester, in one family it proved necessary to test two members in
the presence of the mother, who had already given her responses.
The majority of the testing for each group was carried out at the
same place, on the same day, and took place either during a holiday,
when the family had already planned to be gathered together, or in the
early evening of a workday, after dinner.

Two of the subjects had

just awakened from a nap at the time the test was administered, and
this condition may have had an effect on both the content of their
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responses and their reaction-times.3

In three families, the testing

of individual members extended over a period longer than a week, and
this was due both to logistical difficulties as well as to uncertainty
as to whether or not the prospective subjects would agree to
participate.
Part of the condition of the experiment was that individual
subjects not be made aware of responses that other family members,
previously tested, had given to the stimulus-words.

Where groups were

tested in the home, great care was taken to see to it that the subject
and the tester were physically isolated from other family members who
were waiting to be tested.

Even in cases where the time period of the

experiment was prolonged over several days or weeks, it is most
unlikely that the subjects who were last to be tested had been made
aware of the responses previously given by the i r relatives.
In these conditions, a t otal of 5,200 word associations was
collected, together with thirty-eight completed copies of the Ross
Test of deductive reasoning.

The Word Association Exper i ment

The instrument and classification system.

The word list used in the

experiment was closely modelled on the A.A. Brill translation of the
list reported by Jung in his 1909 article, "The Association Method"
(1973).

As an instrument, that list had itself been modified in

practice over the course of time from the list initially devised for
use in the experiments at the Burgholzli Hospital; in particular, many
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of the highly-charged affect-laden terms in the original list had been
dropped in favor of milder words signifying a similar concept, or
neutral terms evocative of no particular affective response.

The

present list (see Appendix 1) differs from the Brill version of Jung's
list in twelve items.

Of these alterations, seven are different

translations of the original term, and five are substitutions from an
earlier version of the list for stimulus words that were thought to be
redundant or inappropriate for a test involving children.4
It would be ideal to be able to classify the stimulus-words as to
grammatical form, with fixed percentages of nouns, verbs, and
adjectives, and in fact, this sort of computation could be done with
the formal signs which appear in the written list.

In practice,

however, as the written signs are transformed first into acoustic
patterns by the speaker and then into mental concepts by the hearer,
they undergo permutations wh ich take them far from their original,
clear-cut morphological identity .

There are at least thirteen words

on the stimulus-list that lend themsel ves to ambiguities in
interpretation, due to the hornonyrnous f orm they assume when
functioning in different grammatical r oles.

Is "fall," for example,

an unequivocal verb in the German or i ginal, necessarily a verb in
English?

Might it not also be a noun, or could it perhaps even be an

adjective, as in "fall foliage"?

can "marry" not legitimately be

heard as "Mary," or "dear" as "deer," leading to unexpected, but
perfectly direct, associative responses?
To a great degree, such ambiguity as to nouns and verbs was
absent from Jung's German list; the formal structure of German verbal
infinitives instantly distinguishes them as verbs, an identification
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which must be accomplished in English by the addition of the separate
prefix "to," as in "to pay," "to ask," "to swim."

The Brill

translation of Jung's list faithfully reproduces the cumbersome
two-word verbal infinitive for the 24 stimulus-words which were
single-word verbs in the German original.

The present list did not

formally indicate any differentiation between verbs and other
grammatical forms, leaving the interpretation, and consequently a
wider field of choice for a potential associative res:p:>nse, entirely
up to the subject.

Several subjects were uncomfortable with this

degree of freedom, and wanted to know "which one" of the horoonyrns the
experimenter meant; the answer was that it was whichever one the
subject thought it was.

The lexicon of responses, which appears in

the appendix, clearly shows the degree to which subjects differed in
their interpretation of the given stimuli.
Classification of response words.

The source of numerical data

on which the following analysis is based is the time-consuming,
perplexing and at times intensely frustrating process of res:p:>nse word
classification, a "difficult and unrewarding task" indeed, in the
words of Jung and Riklin (1973, p. 9).

The entire analytic structure

of comparisons and conclusions, of coherence, of contrast, of
conmonality and of difference must stand or fall on the foundation
laid, piece by painstaking piece, in the relationship identified
between each single stimulus-word and its elicited associate.
perils inherent in this process are not to be minimized.

The

Just as a

word like "fall" is not by nature a noun, an adjective or a verb, but
is boxed into its semantic function by the verbal environment which
surrounds it at any given time, so too a superficially self-evident
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verb-noun pair like "pay-money" or "ride-rollercoaster" may on deeper
examination prove to be an implied pair of synonyms, on the one hand
(the pay one receives is in the form of money), or a specification of
an impl ied substantive, on the other (rollercoaster as one particular
instance of "a ride").
It might be thought that the subjects who gave the responses
ought to be able to help to clarify their associative relationship to
the stimulus word, and in some few cases, particularly in responsepairs which reproduce current advertising slogans or other culturallyembedded proper nouns (names of television shows, rock groups or
popular publications), post-test questioning of the subject proved to
be helpful.

For t he most part, however, the subjects either could not

remember what t hey had actually t hought while producing the response
in question, or in trying to remember began t o confuse themselves with
other possible al ternat ives t o the explanation that first came to
mind.

After provoking a few such embarrassi ng s ituations, the

experimenter chose to stop asking for subjective explanations, and to
rely on intuition and t he inner l ogic of the subj ect's overall
r esponse-pattern to help classify any quest ionable responses.
In general, responses have been classified according to the
schema presented by Jung and Riklin i n t heir 1904 article, "The
Associations of Normal subjects," whi ch i s described in detail in the
preceding chapter.

The organizing principle of this hierarchical

system is the degree of logical relatedness obtaining between the
stimulus and response words.

A surrmary of the analytical categories

is presented in Table 2, on the following two pages.

Column 1 gives

the categories of the most detailed analysis performed by Jung and

Table 2
Response Classification Systems
Jung-Riklin System
I. Internal .Associatiais
A. Grouping
1. Coordination
a. By conmon general
concept ( 0111 )
b. By similarity (0112)
c. By internal relationship (011 3 )
d. By external relationship (0114)
e. By example (0115)
2. subordination
a. Actual subordination (0121)
b. Specification (0122)
3. SUperordination (0130)
4. Contrast (0140)
5. Groupings of Doubtful
Quality (0150)
B. Predicative relationship
1. Noun and adjective
a. Internal predicate
i. objective judgment (0211)
ii.value judgment (0212)
b. External predicate (0213)
2. Noun and Verb
a. subject relationship (0221)
b. Object relationship (0222)
3. Determination of place,
time, rreans and purpose (0230)
4. Definition or explanation (0250)
c. causal relationship (0300)

Siq>lified J-R System

1. Coordination

Furst's System

1. Coordination

2. SUb- and supraordination
3. Contrasts
2. Predicate

4. Value predicates
5. Other predicates
6. Relationship of
subject and object
7. Designation of time,
place, means, etc.
8. Definition
3. causal

l.O

A

II.

External. Associatioos
A. Coexistence (0400)
B. Identity (0500)
C. Linguistic-motor forms
1. Canalized verbal
associations
a. Simple contrasts (0611)
b. current phrases (0612)
2. Proverbs and quotations (0620)
3. Compound words and wordchanges (0630)
4. Anticipatory reactions (0640)
5. Interjections (0650)

III.

9. Coexistence
10. Identity
11. Linguistic-motor

12. Word formation

Sound Reactims

A. Word-completion (0700)
B. Sound (0800)
c. Rhyme (0900)
IV.

4. Coexistence
5. Identity
6. Linguistic-motor

Miscellaneous
A. Indirect associations
1. Connection by conman
intermediate concept (1010)
2. Centrifugal sound-shift (1020)
3. Centripetal sound-shift (1030)
4. Shift through word-completion
or linguistic-motor form (1040 ).
5. Shift through several
intermediate links (1050)
B. Meaningless reactions (1100)
C. Failures (1200)
D. Repetitions of the stimulus
word (1300)

7. Word-completion
8. Sound
9. Rhyme

13. Word-completion
14. Sound

15. Remainder
10. Indirect

11 . Meaningless
12. Failures
13. Repetition/stimulus

\.0
lJ1
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Riklin; the numbers in parentheses are the code numbers assigned to
each category for purposes of the computer analysis perforrred in the
present study.

Column 2 gives the sumnary categories of Jung and

Riklin's work with normal individuals, and column 3 shows the slightly
different arrangement of sununary categories used by Furst in her
analysis of data from families.

The analysis which follows will make

reference to all three levels of complexity in terms of response
classification.
The basic numerical data of the analysis derives from a
classification across the full range of relational categories.

Each

category was assigned a unique four-digit code number on a scale
proceeding from 0111, representing the tight conceptual bonds of
coordinate responses, through intennediate numbers indicating the
increasing marginality of linguistic responses, to the high numbers of
residual responses and failures.

Mean and modal figures for

individuals and families can be understood with reference to this
coding scale.

A low modal response figure, for instance a 230 or 350,

would indicate a predominance of conceptual or meaning-based
associations in an individual's responses; the higher the figure, the
more superficial the overall pattern it represents.
Prior to beginning a presentation of the data, however, a word
remains to be said about some of the aspects of the classification
system which diminish its capacity to function as an objective
instrument.

The identification of response category has in general

followed the examples given by Jung and Riklin in their article "The
Associations of Normal Subjects."

In practice, it is difficult, if

not in fact impossible, to identify the shades of meaning which might
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distinguish an intended synonym from a coordinate response, and yet
the difference is one which distinguishes two major relational
classes, internal and external associations.

Contrasts, or antonyms,

likewise might be classed either as ordinates (internal) or as
linguistic-motor reactions (external), depending on principles of
judgment on which Jung and Riklin are not entirely clear.

The choice

of one category over another has implications for the weighting of an
individual's entire response-profile, and consequently for any
comparisons which might be drawn between individuals or among groups.
In consideration of the inconsistencies which seem to have been built
into the classification system, several principles of analysis have
been adopted in this study which are intended to minimize the need for
subjective judgment and provide for a reliable level of consistency in
classification.5
The effect of these principles has been to shift the entire
classification system in the apparent direction of the linguistic,
less conceptually coherent, more automatized reaction types, with the
result that individuals who habitually r espond in synonyms and
antonyms, for example, have a much h i gher numerical coefficient
assigned to their response profile than they might have if any of
those associations had been were classified as ordinates of some kind.
This fact must be bourne in mind if the present data is compared with
the results obtained by Jung, Riklin and Furst at the turn of the
century.
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Response corrmonality.

The results from the fifty-two individuals in

the sample were analysed and compared in a number of procedures which
examined different dimensions of response corranonality.

The first set

of procedures dealt with the actual word responses given by each
individual, and the categories assigned to each response.

In this

phase of the work , comparisons among family members were made in such
a way as to establish par ameters wi t hin which relatives' associations
are similar to each other; t hese similarities were then compared
against levels of similarit y wh ich exist in the entire population of
unrelated individuals.

The second phase of the analysis examined the

patterns which emerged when t he data was sort ed by category and
grouped according to t he schemas of Furst and of Jung.

Here,

coefficients of difference wer e establ ished for each of the
interfamilial dyads, and dyads were ranked wi th in each f amily in order
of t heir manifest agreement.

Third , moda l response types were

determined for each family member , and a contingency test was
performed to see i f the patter ns obtaining between parents and
children was stat istical ly significant .
In noticing t hat wi thin a family, a fathe r and s on, for example,
assoc i ate "like" one another, the observer mi ght be making reference
to any one of three dimensions in which associat i ve similarity can be
demonstrated.

Firs t, t here is the surf ace level of t he actual

response words themselves:

do father and son give an identical verbal

response to the same stimulus word?

But t he words themselves fall

into categories which begin to erode t he differences perceived at this
superficial level; father and son may reply with different words, but
both words may be antonyms to the stimulus, and thus represent a
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comnon response at the categorial level of analysis (for the full
range of categories used in this analysis, see Table 2, column 1).
Finally, a father and son may each respond with a great overall number
of antonyms, but not necessarily to the same stimulus-words; a similar
total percentage of shared response categories may exist, but the
similarity can only emerge when individual response categories begin
to be grouped into the more comprehensive summary categories shown in
the second and third columns of Table 2.
In the present section, the first two levels of potential
comnonality between and among family members will be examined, those
levels which reflect the actual verbal responses made to each of the
one hundred stimulus words of the test, in the actual order in which
they were given, and the most specific category into which the
responses can be classified.

The results summarized here are intended

to be descriptive only; no standard statistical procedures or tests of
significance were performed at this stage of the analysis.
Verbal cornnonality.

The tendency of family members to produce

the same verbal response to the same stimulus-word is most startling
when the response words are unique to that family within the sample,
or unusual in some other regard.

The fact that all members of a given

family respond with "sister" to the stimulus-word "brother," for
example, loses its significance if this specific response has a high
frequency in the sample as a whole.

The associate-pair "journey-

adventure," on the other hand, given only by three male members of
Family 4, out of the entire population of fifty-two respondents, is a
more viable indicator of associative commonality within that
particular family.
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Most of the coIIUTIOn responses elicited in this experiment are, in
fact, merely a reflection of conventional associative frequencies found
in the population at large.

However, the fact that linguistic

convention underlies the shared responses of family members does not
diminish the level of conformity as such within that family.

As

a

matter of interest, the frequency of all responses elicited in the
sample is given in the lexicon as Appendix 3.
Percentages of identical verbal responses given by family members
are given in Table 3.
members are shown.

Only those families with at least three related

The top figure in each column represents the number

of instances in which all members of the family gave the same response
to the same stimulus word; for example, in Family 4, with nine members,
4% of the stimulus words evoked an identical response from all members.
In Family 1, there were no words which evoked the same response from
all six members; on the other hand, in Family 7, also with six members,
five stimulus words evoked the same response f rom a l l members.

Table 3
Percentage of Identical Responses to Stimulus Words
Family

9 members, same response
8 members, same response
7 members, same response
6 members, same response
5 members, same response
4 members, same response
3 members, same response
2 members, same response
At least 2 with same response

1
2
4
3
5
6
7
9 11
n=4
n=4
n=9
n=6
n=3 n=3 n=6 n=3 n=4

0
0
2
18
45
59

6
19
37
58

2
15
43
58

4
4
5
4
8
16

25
83
93

10
29
39

13
23
36

5
7
12
19
73
89

5
35
40

5
14
35
53
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succeeding rows in each column show the percentage of stimulus
words to which an identical verbal response was given by any
combination of members, with reference to the total number in the
family.

For example, in Family 2, with four members, three gave

identical responses 19% of the time, but they were not necessarily the
same three individuals in every case.
Because the families are composed of differing numbers of members,
it is not possible to make many direct comparisons from one family to
another.

However, it seems as though larger families have a greater

chance of corrmon responses occurring in at least two of the members
(last line of Table 3) because of the greater number of dyads existing
within them.
The consideration of any two responses to each stimulus word leads
to an examination of responses given by specific individuals in
comparison with other members of their families; these figures are
given in Table 4, on the following page.

Each member of a family is

compared with any and all other members for identical verbal responses.
In Family 1, for example, 38"~ of the father's verbal responses were
rratched by at least one other member of his family, while only 11% of
the mother's responses were shared by any other member.

Again, higher

percentages seem to be associated with greater numbers of individuals
in the family, with commonalities in the 50-60% range appearing in
Families 4 and 7, but only 27-3'2% in families of three members.

The

lowest corrmonality figures in the sample belong to the mother and first
daughter of Family 1, and, as will be seen, the response patterns of
these two individuals will so depress the aggregate averages as to
require their exclusion from some of the calculations which follow.

102

Table 4
Percentage of Responses Shared by Individuals
with Any Other Member of the Family
Family

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

father

38
11
11
27
38
26

41
36
37
41

38
43
37
41

45
63
47
54
60
51
63
39
47

28
28
32

29
28
28

59
58
52
48
55
43

mother
1st child
2nd child
3rd child
4th child
5th chi ld
6th child
arandchild

9

11

28
29
27

29
40
34
29

Although not every family can be analysed into comparable dyads,
some overall averages can be established for the degree to which family
members share corranon verbal responses with each other.

The figures

in Table 5 represent the percentage of instances in which the
identified family member gave a verbal response which was identical to
the response of any other member of the family.
Table 5
Average Percentage of Responses Shared by Individuals
with Any Other Members of the Family
Father:
Mother:
1st Child:
2nd Child:

38 .4
37.2
33.3
36.6

These figures suggest that in the average family of three or more
members, any individual might be expected to produce the same
association as any other member between 33-38% of the time.
Once this general level of verbal commonality has been
established, it remains to compare responses from specific pairs of
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individuals, to determine the corrnonality which exists between members
of structural intrafamilial dyads.

Results from this analysis are

presented in Table 6, on the following page.

Families of three or more

members are given on the left half of the chart; families of dyads are
on the right.
Here, commonality ranges from 1 to 31%, with about half of the
dyads (39 out of 77) producing identical responses between 20 and 30%
of the time.

Family groups, conceived as the aggregate of their

constituent dyads, show commonality averages of between 7.2 and 26.0%,
with a mean of 19.3%, and the average verbal commonality of all
intrafamilial dyads is 17.9%.

The two highest figures, 29 and 31%,

belong to mother-daughter dyads, the mother and second oldest daughter
from Family 7, and the mother and third oldest daughter from Family 4,
respectively.

The next highest figure, 28"/o, is shared by two other

dyads from Family 7, the mother-father pair, and the pair consisting of
father and second daughter.

Again, the lowest figures in all but one

of the dyadic categories are to be found in the responses of Family 1.
The summary given in Table 7 represents averages for the major
intrafamilial dyads in the sample.

These figures indicate the

instances in which both members of the identified pair produced
identical verbal responses to the same stimulus word.

It seems that

parental dyads, and mother-elder child dyads, give identical response
more often than other pairs of relatives, but the differences are so
slight as to carry no significance.

What emerges clearly from these

figures, however, is that any given pair of family members might be
expected to produce identical responses to any stimulus word just under
20% of the time.

Table 6
Percentage of Identical Responses Given by Members of Familial Dyads

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

DYAD
Father-Mother
Father-1st Child
Father-2nd Child
Father-3rd Child
Father-4th Child
Mother-1st Child
Mother-2nd Child
Mother-3rd Chi ld
Mother-4th Child
1st Child-2nd Child
1st Child-3rd Child
1st Child-4th Child
2nd Child-3 rd Child
2nd Child -4th Child
3rd Child-4th Child

4
6
9
23
11
4
4
4
2
3
4
1
13
9
11

18
23
24

26
10
18

17
21

21
21

18
25

24
14

21

18

20

12

23
20
17
18
23
23
22
31
20
17
25
20
24
24
20

28
26
28
23
22
24
20
29
17
22
22
22
21
14
27

AVERAGES

7.2 21.3 17.3 21.8 19.6

FAMILY

20

9

11

8

10

10

19
16
14

17
16

26
18

17

14

23 16.7 17.8

13

10

12

18

17

13

14

23

25

18

27

13
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18

27

26

18

17

19 . 10
19.10
18.30
21.30
18.60
18.70
17.00
21.30
13.00
17.50
17.00
14.30
19 .30
15.60
19.30

23

f-'

:&
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Table 7
Average Percentage of Verbal Response
Commonality in Members of Familial Dyads
Father-Mother:
Father-1st Child:
Father-2nd Child:
Mother-1st Child:
Mother-2nd Child:
categorial corrmonality.

19.5
17.9

18.3
19.4
17 .o

When the focus of analysis is shifted to

the next level of abstraction, that of responses among family members
which share a category designation in common, the figures show a
marked increase in conmonality.

At the categorial level of analysis,

verbal responses which differ in content may represent the same "type"
of response.

For example, the stimulus-response pairs "bird-fly" and

"bird-sing" although apparently different, are both "predicate"
responses to the stimulus, actions or s tates which can be predicated of
the term "bird," and thus are classified as belonging to the same
category of response .

Again, the full range of categories into which

responses have been classified is given in Table 2, above.
As

Table 8, on the next page, indicates, for families of six or

more members, 99-100% of all stimulus-words will evoke responses from
at least two family members which can be classified in the same
category, using the thirteen-part Jung-Riklin system shown in Table 2.
In families of four, between 87 and 100% of stimulus words evoke a
response of identical category from two or more members of the group,
and families of three show about a 7(1'/o categorial conmonality rate
between responses of any two members.
Families of six or more share between 40-50% responses among half
their members; families of four have a slightly higher rate of
commonality among half their members, between 56 and 66%.

The highest
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Table 8
Percentage of Categorial Responses in Common
Family

1
n=6

9 members, same category
8 members, same cateoory
7 members, same cateoory
6 members, same category
5 members, same category
4 members, same category
3 members, same cateoory
2 members, same category
At least 2, same cateoory

1
6
13

46
77
99

.3
2
4
7
5
6
9 11
n=4 n=4 n=9 n=3 n=3 n=6 n=3 n=4

6
7
11
13
13

29
66
92

19
28
31 50
56 79
87 100
6

22
51
73

8
15
28
25 40
46 74
71 100

21
52
73

15
26
62
90

rate of unanimity is found in Family 6, where 25% of the stimulus-words
evoked responses in the same category from all members of the family.
Family 1, which had no verbal responses shared by more than four of its
six members and only two identical responses shared by four members
(see Table 3, above), shows 13% commonality among four members when the
verbal associations are converted into their appropriate relational
classifications.
Overall, the rate at which a similar category response is produced
seems to be about twice the rate which occurs when only the actual
response word itself is taken into account.

This result has not been

subjected to any test of statistical significance, however, and until
such time as a more detailed analysis is performed, it can only be
presented as descriptive of a trend existing within the present sample.
When at least three responses are shared among members of a group
which comprises four or more individuals, it is possible to analyse the
percentages of commonality into constituent groupings representing

107

intrafamilial alliances or sub-systems.

Of the 46 instances of corrnnon

category response among three members of Family 1, for example, the
father was party to 29 of them; seven of them involved the father and
the two sons, and another eight involved father, mother, and older son.
Of the thirteen instances in which four responses were shared in
corrmon, the father and older son were among the respondents in eleven
of them; the older son was involved in all thirteen; seven of the
instances included father, both sons, and the younger daughter.
While space does not permit a detailed analysis of all the
corrmonalities which are include three or more members, suffice it to
say here that the results seem to indicate the existence of
demonstrable internal fissures within family groups, interior groupings
among members which may indicate stable coalitions or subgroups among
members.

Only a sensitive post-test interviewing process would reveal

the extent to which these verbal alliances are replicated in other
areas of the family's interaction, and clearly, such investigation
falls outside the realm of the present study.

As a matter of interest,

however, the data on interior groupings within family units is
presented in Appendix 5.
When the percentage of shared category responses of each family
member is compared with similar data on the verbal responses, all

figures are elevated to a striking degree, more than doubled in most
instances (see Table 9, on the following page).

Most surprising of all

are the figures for the mother and older daughter of Family 1, who
shared only eleven verbal responses with any other members of their
family (see Table 4, above).

When the words they produced are

converted into their appropriate relational categories, the daughter
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Table 9
Categorial Responses Shared Among Family Members
Family

father
mother
1st child
2nd child
3rd child
4th child
5th child
6th child
1orandchild

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

73
57
40
60
84
67

68
69
59
70

67
60
52
49

85
90
80
89
88
85
91
83
92

58
54
55

58
53
55

90
82
87
82
85
79

9

11

55
57
55

65
68
67
62

is shown to share 40% of her responses with others, and the mother a
stunning 57%, a five-fold increase over her verbal corrm:>nality rate.
Thus, although her actual words may have been ideosyncratic or unique,
the way in which she approached the stimulus word--her choice of a
relational category with which to respond--clearly was not.

It is at

this level of abstraction that deeper levels of agreement among family
members can begin to become apparent, structural similarities which are
obscured by the surface differences among individuals' verbal
responses.

The response words themselves differ, but the relations

between stimulus and response may prove to be the same.
About 8% of the subjects share at least 90% of their categorial
reactions with another member of the family, as can be seen in Table 9;
the mother, second son and grandson of Family 4 and the father of
Family 7 show this high degree of intersection with others.

Another

eleven persons--roughly one quarter of the sample--responded with words
whose categories were matched by between 80 and 90% of their relatives'
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responses.

Even the lowest degree of commonality was a respectable

40%, and all individuals with the exception of this one (the older
daughter of Family 1) shared categories in at least 50% of their
responses.
Average figures for shared categorial responses of family members
are presented below; these figures represent the percentage of
instances in which the designated family member responds in categories
which are matched by any other member of the family.

As can be seen

from a comparison with figures given above in Table 5, category
conmonality can be expected to occur at about twice the rate of the
average level of commonali t y which exists when only the actual words
themselves are examined.

Again, because no commonly accepted

statistical procedures were performed on these figures, they must be
understood as merely descriptive.
Table 10
Average Percentage of Cat egory Commonality
f or Family Members
Father:
Mother :
1s t Child :
2nd Child:

70. 5
65 . 3
61 .6
66. 7

As before, it seems as though t he fathers share a somewhat higher
percentage of responses with others in the family than do roc>thers or
children, and that the younger child tends to a slightly higher degree
of category conmonality overall than the older child or the roc>ther.
When categorial choice is examined across the structural dyads of
which each family is composed (see Table 11, on the following page), an
overall average family cormonality rate of 38.37% emerges from the
entire sample of related individuals.

Commonality within dyads ranges

Table 11
Percentage of categorial Commonality AmJng Family Dyads
FAMILY
DYAD
Father-Mother
Father-1st Child
Father-2nd Child
Father-3rd Child
Father-4th Child
Mother-1st Child
Mother-2nd Child
Mother-3rd Child
Mother-4th Child
1st Child-2nd Child
1st Child-3rd Child
1st Child-4th Child
2nd Child-3rd Child
2nd Child-4th Child
3rd Child-4th Child

AVERAGES

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

19
15
23
50
36
18
21
27
18
15
22
11
31
27
33

37
36
44

37
29
37

37
42

40
42

36
44

35
25

38

30

33

24

46
44
34
43
37
43
35
44
36
28
42
38
44
49
20
39

48
44
54
42
40
43
40
40
39
40
43
37
44
30
43

24.4 38 .3 31.2 40.1

39 37.3 41.8

9

11

8

10

10

42
39
34

40
38

43
35

39

37

30 38.3

30

10

12

41

36

13

14

43

46

38

49

30
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38

49

40

41

36

43

46

38.30
38.00
37 .70
45.00
37.70
35.80
34.00
37 .00
31.00
33.90
35.70
28.70
39 .70
35.30
38.30

40

I-'
I-'

0
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from a low of 11% (Family 1, older daughter-younger son) to a high of
59% (Family 4, third son-grandson).

Four of the dyads show a

conmonality of 50% or above; three of them involve pairs of males
(Family 1, father-1st son; Family 4, 1st son-3rd son and 3rd
son-grandson), and the fourth is a father-daughter pair (Family 7,
father-2nd daughter).

Thirty-six percent of the dyads in the sample

share responses at a level of between 40 and 50%; of these dyads,
two-thirds are members of Families 4 and 7, which are not only among
the most numerous of the families, but also the most closely knit in
terms of shared responses.

Even the least closely related dyad of

Family 7 still has a corrmonality rate of 30%, as compared with 11% for
the comparable pair in Family 1, and 24% for the least similar pair in
Family 3.
Average figures of categorial conmonality in the most frequently
occurring intrafamilial dyads are given in Table 12, below.

As

with

the figures for individual respondents, the commonality of pairs when
examined at the categorial level i s about twice that obtaining when the
words alone are subjected to comparison.
Tabl e 12
Average Percentage of Categorial Conmonality
Within Familial Dyads
Father-Mother
Father-1st Child
Father-2nd Child
Mother-1st Child
Mother-2nd Child

38.3
36.4
37.7
36.2
34.0

Only those families consisting of three or more members have been
figured into these averages.

And as before, the father's similarity to

both first and second children is slightly higher than that of the
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mother.

It is also worth mentioning that the father-son dyads which

occur as isolated units in this sample would raise the overall average
for fathers and children by several percentage points, for reasons
which cannot be clarified in the absence of considerably more data.
The cohesion of a family's responses can be best expressed in
terms of the actual percentages of coIIITX)n reactions, but the tightness
of the range in which the corrm::>nalities are contained is also a measure
of similarity descriptive of the family as a whole.

Because it refers

to the distance between the most and least similar members of the
family, the figure for each family's range is rather less dependent on
the factor of number of family members than is a numeric measure of
shared responses among members, which tends to increase with increasing
family size.

The most expansive range of category corrm::>nality is 39,

the difference between the 11% corrm::>nality of the 1st daughter-2nd son
dyad and the 50% commonality of the father-1st son dyad of Family 1.
It is rivalled in scope only by the 31 point range of Family 4, the
distance separating the 1st daughter-1st son dyad (28% commonality)
from the 59% high point of 3rd son-grandson.

The tightest ranges are

those of Families 5 and 9; the levels of commonality for all dyads in
these families fall within 5 and 2 points of each other, respectively,
and thus their levels of commonality with each other are to all intents
identical.

Dyad commonality in Families 2, 3, 6 and 11 occurs within a

range of between 9 and 12 points, still fairly tightly compressed when
compared with the wide expanse across which the dyads of Family 1 are
distributed.
Table 13, on the following page, presents a comprehensive view of
the categorial corrmonality shared among all related dyads in the

Table 13
Categorial Cormonality Within Families

50
36
33
31
27
27
23
22
21
19
1B

1B
15
15
11

f-1 s
f-2S
1 S-2S
2d-1 s
m-1 s
2d-2s
f - 2d
1 d-1 s
m-2d
f-m
m-1d
m-2S
t-1 d
1d-2d
1 d-2S

44
44
37
36
36
33

41

m-dl
m-d

37
37
35
29
25

24

f-m
f- 2 s
m -1s
f- 1s
m-2S
1 s - 2s

59
58
49
48
46
46
46

44
44
44
43
43

43
42

40

Family 10

Family 9

Family 8

30

f- s
m-s
t- m
f-1 d
m-1d
d-s

Family 4

Family 3

Family 2

Family 1

40
39
38

m-d
d-s
m-s

49
39
38

dh-s
m- d
m-dh

39
39
38
38
38
37
37
36
36
35
35
35
35
35
34
34
33
32
32
31
28

3s-gs
1 S-3S
1 s-3d
f-gs
f-m
m-3S
m-gs
f - 1d
m-2d
1 s-2d
f- 2d
m- 1 d
1 s-gs
1 d-2d
m - 4S
f-3S
2d-3d
1 d -3d
3d-3s
4s-gs
f - 3d
f-4s
m-3d
2d-4s
m-1 s
1 d-3S
1 d-4S
1 S-4S
3s-4s
f-1 s
2d -as
2d-3d
2d-as
3d - 4s
1 d -gs
1 d-1 s

Family 5
42
38
37

IPC - S
m-s
m -p c

Family 6

42 f-d
40
30

f- m
m-2d

Family 7
54
48

44
44
43
43
43
42
40

40
40
40
39
37
58
30

Family 11
43
42
39
37
35
34

m - 2S
f-m
f- 2 s
2s - 4s
m-4S
f-4 s

Dyad 12
36

h-w

Dyad 13

f - 2d
f-1 d
f- m
f-1 d
2d-3d
m-1d
1d-3d
3d-4d
f-3d
f-4d
m - 2d
m-3d
1d-2d
m-4d
1d-4d
2d-4h

Averages
37
59
11
48
8 .67

mean
max
min
range
st.dev .

43 f- s
Dyad 14
36

f-s

,_.

,_.
w
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sample, arranged in descending order of each family group.

The extent

to which each dyad differs from the average of the sample can be seen
from the figures for mean and standard deviation given at the end of
the table.

Response predictability: correlation tests.

The analysis of data

presented thus far has been primarily descriptive in nature, based on
procedures which required nothing more complex than the visual
comparison of similar words written on a page, or the mechanical
tallying of similar category codes once words had been converted into
numbers.

Any significant i nferences as to patterns of verbal

association among family members, however, should be based on some sort
of recognized statistical procedure, one which might be able to
distinguish differences--if indeed any exist--between associative
response patterns of individuals as family members, and patterns which
exist in the population at large.
In this phase of the investigat ion , two series of correlations
were performed on the data of each individual's responses, first, in
order to determine levels of agreement within the family group, and
second, in order to compare each ind i v i dual with all unrelated
individuals in the sample.

In t he process of comparing figures for

related and unrelated groups, i t was expected that any trends
distinguishing family members from all others would become evident.
Table 14, on the following page, presents the correlation
coefficients obtained for each related dyad in the sample.

The

procedure of correlation is intended to determine the level at which it
is possible to predict one individual's responses, given the data of

Table 14:

f-m
f-1 d
f-2d
f-1s
f-2S
m-1d
m - 2d
m-1 s
m-2S
1 d-2d
1 d-1 s
1 d-2S
2d-1 s
2d-2S
1 S·2S

0.37
0.34
0.42
0 .40
0 .29
0 .12

m-d
m-dl
d-dl

f-m
f-d
f- s
m- d
m-s
d- s

0.08
0.11
0.09
0.24
0.18
0.20

0 .29
0 .24
0.00

m-d
m-s
d-s

f-m
f- 1 s
f- 2s
m -1 s
m-2S
1 S- 2S

Family 10

Family 9

Family 8
0 . 18
0 . 19
0.14

Family 3

Family 2

Family 1
-0 .13
0 .02
0.25
0.39
0 .44
0 .11
-0.11
0.11
- 0 .08
- 0.05
0.14
-0.06
0 .1 8
0.19
0.28

Correlation Coefficients of Responses of Familial Dyads

0.27
0 .24
0.23
0.27
0.15
0.30

rn-d
rn -dh
m-dhs
d-h
d-hs
h-s

Family 5

Family 4
0 . 26
0.27
0.37
0 .27
0 .42
0.20
0 .32
0.33
0.41
0 .27
0.13
0 .37
0.21
0.39
0.23
0.29
0.50
0.22
0.28
0.42
0.48
0 . 20
0 . 16
0.12
0 .04
0 .42
0.18
0.26

f-m
f - 1d
f-1 s
f - 2d
f-3d
f-3S
f-4S
m-1 d
m-1 s
m-2d
m-3d
m-3S
m-4S
1 d - 1s
1 d-2s
1 d -3 d
1 d-3S
1 d-4S
1 s-2d
1 s-3d
1 S-3S
1 S-4S
2d-3d
2d -3s
2d-4s
3d-3S
3d-4s
3s-4s

0 .35
0 .36
0.45

m - pc
m-s
pc-s

Family 6
0.38
0.41
0.22

Family 11
0.32
0.11
0.16
0.25
0.23
0.05

f- m
f - 2s
f - 4S
m-2S
rn-4S
2s-4s

f-m
f- d
m-d

Family 7
0.33
0 .24
0.31
0 .32
0.26
0.14
0.21
0 .21
0 .30
0.18
0.39
0.31
0 .35
0 . 28
0.34

Dyad 12
0.13

0 .34

h-w

t-m
f-1 d
f - 2d
f-3d
f-4d
rn - 1 d
rn-2d
rn-3d
rn-4d
1d- 2d
1d- 3d
1d -4d
2d - 3d
2d - 4d
3d - 4d

Dyad 14
0.29

f- s

Dyad 13

Dyad 15

f- s

n/a

,_.

,_.
Ul
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another.

Higher figures, then, would indicate closer levels of

conformity between correlated pairs.

The material of the analysis is

the category code assigned to the verbal reaction given by each
respondent to each stimulus word, in the actual order in which they
were presented in the test.

Responses were classified according to the

most detailed category system used by Jung and Riklin, given in Table
2, above.
Some correlations are quite low; the children of Family 9 have a O
correlation to each other, but each shares a correlation greater than
.23 with the mother.

The mother and first daughter of Family 1

produced responses so divergent as to correlate negatively with other
members of their family.

On

the other hand, a substantial number of

the intrafamilial dyads in Families 2, 4 and 7 gave responses which
correlate at .30 and above.

Among the highest correlations in the

sample are those of the father and second son of Family 1 (0.44), the
elder daughter and third son of Family 4 (0.50), the first and third
sons of Family 4, (0.48), and the parental companion and son of Family
5 (0.45).
After this basic set of correlations had been obtained, a series
of Spearman rank order correlations were performed on all related dyads
in the sample.

This procedure operated with the same category codes as

were subjected to the preceding analysis, but sorted them in ascending
numerical order.

All coordinate responses (0111-0115) were listed

first, then subordinations (0121-0122), superordinations (0130), and so
on through the range of thirty-seven possible relational categories
(see Table 2), and the numerically ordered data for each subject was
then correlated with the data for each other member of the family.
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Spearman rank order correlations for related dyads are given in
Table 15, on the following page.

The strength of these correlations is

in general somewhat higher than that shown by means of the correlation
coefficient.

Dyads are ranked within each family in descending order

of response agreement.
The highest rank order coefficient obtained between related pairs
of individuals was 0.54, occurring in two instances in Family 4,
between the oldest daughter and the second youngest son, and the
(grand)father and grandson.

No other dyad in the sample produced a

coefficient of above 0.50, and the highest overall family average was
only .3967, the mean of Family 5's three dyadic figures.

As might be

expected, Family 1 produced the lowest coefficients and the lowest
family average, although the figures for the father and his two sons
(0.42, 0.38) continue to approximate, or even exceed, the average
levels of conformity shown by pairs of relatives in other family
groups.
Most members of Families 4 and 7 continue to show a moderately
high degree of correlation, in the 0.30-0.40 range.

In Family 6, the

father's closeness to the daughter contrasts markedly with the mother's
distance from her (0.38 as against 0. 19); perhaps not surprisingly,
this is a family in which mother and daughter have had considerable
difficulty in understanding one another.

Likewise, in Family 3, a

sizeable difference separates the correlation of father-older son from
that of mother-older son; indeed, in this family the father's
correlations overall are noticeably below the average, comparable only
to the figures for Family l's father and daughters, and the dyad of
father-1st son in Family 11, another historically difficult
relationship.

Table 15:

f-1 s
f-2S
1 S- 2S
2d-1 s
2d-2s
f-2d
f-m
m-1 d
m-1 s
m - 2d
1 d-1 s
1 d-2d
1 d - 2S
m-2S
f-1 d

0.43
0.43
0.40
0.39
0 .29
0 .09

m-d
m-dl
d-dl

f-d
m-d
f-s
f-m
m-s
d-s

0.29
0 .22
0.21
0 .18
0 .18
0 .16

0 .31
0 .29
0.07

m-d
m-s
d-s

m- 1s
m-2S
f - 2S
f- 1s
1 s-2s
f-m

Family 10

Family 9

Family 8
0.26
0 .25
0 .16

Family 3

Family 2

Family 1
0 .42
0 .38
0 .27
0.19
0 . 19
0.18
-0 . 14
0 . 13
0.11
-0.10
0 .09
-0.09
-0.08
0.03
0 .00

Spearman Rank Order Correlations of Responses of Familial Dyads

0.40
0.40
0.38
0 .37
0.25
0 .21

m-d
dh-s
m-dh
m-dhs
d-hs
d-h

Family 4
0.54
0.54
0.49
0 .47
0 .47
0.46
0 .44
0.42
0 .39
0 .39
0 .39
0.39
0 .38
0 .37
0 .37
0 .36
0.36
0.34
0 .33
0 .32
0 .32
0 .31
0 .30
0 .30
0 .29
0 .27
0 .26
0.25
0.22
0.21
0.20
0 .20
0. 19
0.11
0 .09
0.08

1 c-5c
f-gs
f-4c
m-1c
2c-5c
4c-5c
Sc- gs
2c - 4c
f- 2c
1 c - 4c
m -as
1 c - gs
1 c - 2c
f-m
f-6 C
m - Sc
4c- gs
6c-gs
f-1 C
m-2c
m -3c
5c-6c
f- Sc
1 c - 6c
2c-3c
m - 6c
2c - gs
f - 3c
2c - 6c
1 c - 3c
m-4c
4c - 6c
3c-4c
3c-6c
3c-5c
Jc-as

Family 5
0.44
0.38
0.37

pc -s
m-pc
m-s

Family 6
0.43
0 .38
0 .19

Family 11
0.36
0.27
0 .26
0 .22
0 .14
0 .11

f-m
m-2S
f-4S
m-4S
f - 2s
2s-4s

f-m
f-2d
m-2d

Family 7
0 .45
0 .44
0 .42
0.41
0.39
0 .33
0.33
0 .31
0.29
0 .29
0 .29
0 .25
0.24
0.19
0.14

Dyad 12
0 .22

0 .26

h-w

f-m
m - 4d
2d-3d
3d-4d
f - 3d
f-2d
1d - 3d
f- 1d
m-3d
1d-4d
2d - 4d
m - 2d
f- 4 d
m-1d
1d-2d

Dyad 14
0.36

f-s

Dyad 13

Dyad 15

f- s

nta

......
......
CD
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Table 16 shows average figures for the rank correlations of all
dyads within each family, and averages for the major structural dyads
occuring in the sample as a whole.

Parental dyads have an average

coeficient of 0.2886, which is slightly higher than the overall sample
average (0.2753) and higher than the averages for mothers and daughters
(0.27) or mothers and sons (0.25).

When the negative correlations

occuring in Family 1 are excluded, the sample average rises to .2923,
and the average parental rank order correlation across the sample
rises to 0.36, a figure which is higher than that of any other
interfamilial dyad and one which may suggest that the associative
patterns of married couples develop in similarity over time.

Of the

couples tested, the lowest figure (0.16) belonged to the youngest set
of parents; correlations in the 0.36-0.45 range, by contrast, were
produced by parents who had been married for thirty years or more.
Table 16
Average Rank Correlations of Families and Relational Dyads
Correlation
Dyad
Correlation
Family
.2886
1
.1053
M-F
.2700
M-D
2
.3383
.2500
.2067
M-S
3
.2600
.3383
M-Child
4
.3000
.3967
F-D
5
.3100
.3333
F-S
6
.3000
F-Child
.3180
7
Sisters
.2580
.2233
8
.2600
Brothers
.2233
9
.2450
Siblings
.3350
10
.2267
11
Average of Family Rank Order Correlations .2753
AVERAGE (excluding negative correlations) .2923
After the figure for parental dyads, the highest average
correlation belongs to father-son pairs, at 0.31, followed by the mean
coefficient for fathers and daughters (0.30).

The average father-
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child correlation, in fact, is four points higher than the motherchild figure, although when the figures for Family 1 are excluded, the
means for mother-child and father-child dyads come to within 1.5 points
of one another (0.3022 and 0.3168 respectively).

Same-gender siblings

correlate at a slightly higher rate than do brother-sister pairs (0.258
for sister dyads, 0.26 for brother dyads, and 0.228 for mixed-gender
groupings), but the coefficients for siblings are, in general, somewhat
lower than figures for parental dyads or for pairs of parents and
children.
In order to ascertain whether or not there is any significance in
the fact of family membership in these correlations, a series of 1,106
rank correlations was performed on all pairs of unrelated individuals
in the sample.6

The father of Family 1, having been situated within

the correlational matrix of his family, was now compared with all other
individuals, irrespective of their gender or position in the family,
and the same was done for t he mother, the daughters, and so on.

If an

effect of family were to emerge at this level, it was to be expected
that intrafamilial correlation figures would be higher than those
obtained from across the population at large.
The differences, however, proved to be so slight as to be almost
negligible.

The overall "family" figure of .2923, obtained by

averaging all the positively correlated dyads in the sample of related
individuals, was only four points higher than the average of all
unrelated pairs of individuals in the sample, .2583.

Although no

formal tests were performed to analyse this small difference, it seemed
worthwhile to examine the data informally to see at what level of the
factor of "family" might contribute to a higher correlation.
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Figures for rank correlations between related and unrelated pairs
are sunmarized in Table 17.
Table 17
Rank Correlations for Related and Unrelated Dyads
Level
Related % of total
0.50-0.59
2
2.08
0.40-0.49
18
18.75
above 0.40 20
20.83
0.30-0.39
26
27.08
As

Unrelated
25
138
163
291

% of total

2.24
12.38
14.63
26.12

can be seen, the 0.40 level seems to be the critical one, at which

differences between related and unrelated pairs are most apparent.

Of

the related pairs, 20.83% correlate at the level of 0.40 or above, as
compared with only 14.63% of the unrelated pairs, a difference which is
about one and one-half times greater for relatives than for individuals
in the population at large.
Below 0.39, as above 0.50, the differences seem to level off,
with essentially the same rates of correlation occurring among related
individuals as might be found in the population at large.

Differences

at the 0.40 level are such, however, as to suggest that _there may be a
slight, but effective strength of correlation among family members
which will distinguish family groups from all others in a population of
normal individuals.

The figures are not so high as to suggest that

family members can be reliably differentiated from within a population
solely on the basis of their rank correlations, but seem to suggest
that family relation may be one of the factors contributing to the
similarity between two individuals' verbal associations.

However,

further analysis with a larger sample would be needed to determine the
statistical significance of the small variances shown in the present
sample.
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Another factor contributing to similarity between individuals is
reaction-type, the specific pattern which emerges when a set of
associative responses is grouped according to the frequency of each
category of response produced.

The analysis of modal response type,

and the patterns of response types which occur within family groups,
will be the subject of discussion in the section which follows.

Reaction-type: the individual and the family.

The early word

association research at the Burgholzli Clinic divided subjects into six
reaction-types, based on an examination of a number of factors,
including the kind of response which was given most often by the
subject.

Individuals who reacted to the stimulus-words with primarily

ordinate responses--coordinates, subordinates or superordinates or
conceptually-based groupings of a more general sort--seerred to form a
class which differed marked l y in attitude, level of attention, and
educational and cultural background from the group of individuals who
habitually responded with predications, or with the facile responses of
the linguistic-motor category.
C.G. Jung's interest in the issue of family influence on reactiontype arose as result of his observation that all eight of the relatives
who were among the thirty-eight subjects of his experiment with normal
individuals shared the same reaction type.

Before Jung and his

coauthor, Franz Riklin, had the results of their experiment in print,
another psychiatrist,

Enma

Furst, had begun an experimental study of

reaction-types within families.

Her results, obtained from more than

one hundred subjects of twenty-four families, seemed to support Jung's
hypothesis that one single reaction-type tends to dominate within a
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given family.

The data she gathered on IIK)thers and daughters, of whom

there were eight pairs in her re!X)rted sample of nine families, were
the same as those of Jung and Riklin: in every instance, mother and
daughter shared the same reaction type.

Furthermore, her data seems to

suggest that predication is the dominant response in households of
lower-class or less well educated subjects.
Leaving aside the issue of educational level, which from Jung's
data appears not to have been a significant factor in an individual's
preference for predicates, the emergence of predication as the one
dominant reaction-type within a family, and the phenomenon of agreement
between IIK)thers and daughters in modal reaction-type, are both
fascinating as objects of study.

The present experiment was designed

in part to replicate the work of Furst, and in the pages which follow,
the analysis of agreement within family groups will employ her
principles of classification and computation, as well as those used by
Jung and Riklin in t heir determinati on of individual reaction-type.
Modal resp:>nse-types: t he Jung-Riklin categories.

The statistics

which best describe the overall pattern of an individual's res!X)nses
are the basic measures of central t endency, the mean, median and mode
derived from each subject's reaction data.

Figures for each individual

in the sample are given in Table 18, on the following page.
The numbers in this table are derived from the code assigned to
each of the relational categories of the response classification system
used by Jung and Rikl in in their analysis of data, as shown in Table 2,
above.

As

mentioned earlier, the lower numbers, from 111-300, describe

stimulus-res!X)nse pairs which are tightly bonded in a close conceptual
network; numbers in the 400-650 range refer to the looser semantic

Table 18
Mean, Median and Modal Figures for Family Members
Family 1
rean
redian
node

Father
393
500
500

Mother
531
612
213

Family 2
rean
median
node

Father
416
500
611

Mother
383
300
500/611

Family 4
mean
redian
IOOde

Father
414
500
500

Family 5
rean
redian
IOOde

1st D
674
800
800

2nd D
542
500
213/630

Daughter
406
300
111

Son
378
300
611

Mother
371
350
111

1st D
328
230
500

1st S
434
611
611

Mother
410
400
630

Companion
328
230
500

Son
355
230
611

Family 7
rean
redian
IOOde

Father
368
350
500

Mother
380
300
500

1st D
323
230
500

Family 8
rean
redian
IOOde

Mother
316
221
213

Daughter
360
230
111

Family 10
rean
redian
IOOde

Mother
377
230
111

Daughter
368
222
213

2nd s
376
230
500

Family 3
mean
median
mode

Father
370
230
213

Mother
439
400
111

1st S
443
300
111

2nd S
437
300
1200

3rd D
392
300
111/611

3rd s
375
350
111/611

4th S
425
300
611

Grandson
423
400
111

Father
403
315
111

Mother
379
400
500

Daughter
470
500
611

4th D
355
222
611

Husband
423
500
500

2nd D
392
400
500
Family 6
mean
redian
mode

2nd D
406
500
500

D-in-Law
374
230
611
Husband
391
300
213/611

1st S
413
500
500

Sister
378
300
611

3rd D
373
230
111/500

Family 9 Mother
rean
323
redian
250
mode
500

Daughter
359
230
213

Son
404
230
213/611

Family 11 Father
rean
412
median
400
rode
611

Mother
414
500
500

2st S
415
500
611/630

4th S
395
350
500

,_,
N

~
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coherence of associations based on contiguity, similarity and
linguistic autanation; and numbers higher than 700 indicate reactions
based on the superficial similarity of. sound, as well as the marginal
phenomena of indirect responses, repetitions and failures.
Given this arrangement of the numerical scale, a mean response
figure of 328, for example, the figure for the oldest daughter of
Family 4, would indicate a preponderance of ordinate or predicative
reactions; an average of 470, that of the daughter of Family 6, reveals
the presence of rather more linguistic or residual-type reactions.

The

highest mean figure in the sample is 674, the average of the older
daughter of Family 1, who has already been mentioned a number of times
for her deviation from the sample norms.

Her reactions were, by

conscious design, almost entirely made up of sound-based pairings, with
no attention given to the conceptual or lexical dimensions of the
stimulus-word.
The median response figure, likewise, gives an indication of the
point at which the individual's reactions, sorted in numeric order from
lowest to highest numbers, divides in half.

A low median figure, such

as that of Family 4's oldest daughter, reinforces the impression given
by her rrean that her overall response pattern is heaviest in terms of
predicates and ordinate associations.

A median of 500 or above is in

general a good indicator that the individual prefers the linguistic
superficiality of synonyms and antonyms, which cannot be considered
"associations" in the true sense of the term as used by Jung and
Riklin, in that they do not extend beyond the given of the stimulusword.

Median figures for most of the subjects are somewhat lower than

the figures for the average.
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The final measure of central tendency, the mode, begins to
describe the individual's response pattern in terms of frequency, the
statistical parameter on which the determination of reaction-type can
begin to be made.

Modal figures presented here refer to the specific

category which occurs most often among an individual's responses.

Some

of the major relational categories, such as the class of predicates,
are subdivided in such a way as to make comparisons among frequencies
at this microlevel of analysis somewhat problematic.

An

individual who

has more responses in the category of identity (500), for example, than
in any single one of the seven categories of predicates (211-230), may
appear deceptively strong in external associations; but when all forms
of predication are taken together in a single category, the same
subject may be revealed as a modal predicate type.
In nine of the 52 subjects, the mode and the median response are
identical, and in eight of these cases, the preferred response is
either 500 (identity) or 611 (contrast).

In another five subjects, the

mode and median fall into the same general relational category, as
representing differing degrees of predication.

Eight of the

respondants were bimodal, and of these, six showed preference for
antonyms in combination with some other relational category.
The distribution of response frequencies for members of each
family is given in Table 19, on the following page, in the arrangement
used by Jung and Riklin in their published case studies of the
associative behavior of normal subjects.
Table 20.

Family averages are shown in

The modal reaction-type of the individual takes its name

from the category containing the highest single percentage of
responses.7

Where two high-frequency categories differ from one
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Table 19
Individual Response Figures, Jung- Riklin categories
Subiect

1-f

1-m

25

GrolJllin!lll
Predicates
Causal Relations
eo.xiatence
ldentitv
Linauistic-Motor
Completion

12
1
8
29
24
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

Sound
Rhyme
Indirect Assoc iation

Meaninaless
Failure
Reoetition

4-f

Predicates

Causal Relations
Coexistence
ldentitv
Linauistic-Motor
Comoletion
Sound
Rhvme
Indirect Association

Meaninaless
Failure
Reoetition

7. f

Grouoinas
Predicates
Causal Relations
Coexistence

ldentitv
Linauistic-Motor

Completion
Sound
Rhvme
Indirect Association
Meaninaless
Failure
Reoetition

9
29
0
3
1
32
10

0
1
9
3
3
0

4-m

27
10
4
6
28
19
0
0
0
4
0
2
0

Grouoinas

1-1 d

33
13
4

8
17
20
0
0
1
4
0
0
0

Predicates
Causal Relations
Coexistence
Identity
Linguistic-Motor
Comoletion
Sound
Rhvme
Indirect Association
Meaninaless
Failure
Reoetition

25
22
2
5

18
29
7

22

18
14
0
0
0
5

24
31
3

4
10
20
0
0
0

8
0
0
0

4
4
25
2
36
4
10
0
0
0

8

1- 1 s

t2
23
3
5
8
21
1
5
1
16
4
1
0

27
29
2
3
28
10
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

7- 2d

24
31
6
7
17
15
0
0

0
0

0

0

1
0

0
0

0
0

14
35
6
4
9
27
0
0
0
4
0
1
0

0
1
4
0
1
2

0
2
0
0
0

4

8

0
0
0

0
0
0

4 - 3d

27
25
2
3
15

29

23

0

0
0
0
5

17
31
5

5
13
26
0
0
0
3
0
0
0

4-41

4 - 3•

29
15
7
7
12
23
0
0
0
7
0
0
0

7 - 4d

20
17
3
5
25

10- dh 10-dhs

14
40
10
2
11
15
0
1
0
7
0

0
0
3

23
23
4
6
17
22
1
0
0

7· 3d

0
0
1
0
0
0

2-s

27
12
4
5
5
44
0
1

21
21
4
6
18
28
0
0
0
2
0
0
0

48
1
0
0
3
0
0
0

2 · 1d

20
32
2
13
18
7
0

4 - 2d

5

2-m

21
18
1
6
20
31
0

0
0

25
14
1
3

2-f

1-21

0

4-1 s

7 - 1d

10- m 10 - d

Grouoinas

4
9
0

4 - 1d

7 -m

22
0
0
0
2
0
0
0

1 ·2d

26
13
1
3
7
38
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

23
26
3
5
9
24
0
1
1

4 · 01

43

21

24

1
2
6
9
28
0
1
0
3
0
7
0

26

8
25
0
0
0

8
0
3
0

7- 4dh

20
43

28

4

4

0
0
0

0
1
0

17
0
0
0
1
0
1
0

0

11-f

23
23
2
5
13
27
0
0
0
4
0
3
0

8
4
6

11 -m 1 1 -2 s 11 ·4S

31
5
2
6
26
25
0
0
0
4

0
1
0

24
17
0
5
11
41
1
0
0
0
0
1
0

25
22
3
4
15
25
0
0
0
6
0
0
0

8

26

30
0
0
1

10
0
0
0
1
0
0
0

8-d

14
29
1
3
20
0
0
0

1
7

6

3-1 s

26
14
5
7
8
26
0
0
0
12
0
0
0

5-s

27
29
2
3

0
0
0

8- m

20
33
6
5
11
19
0
0
0
6
0
0
0

5-DC

23
4
5

3- m

19
29
3
8
10
28
0
0
0
3
0
0
0

5-m

26
31
3
5
4
27
0
0
0

0
0

3-f

16
38
3
7
14
20
0
0
0
2
0
0
0

0
0
3
0
0

6

4
0
0
0

23
20
2
7
13
24
0
0
1
9
0
1
0

14-s

21
32
1
7
9
28
0
0
1
1
0
0
0

9-d

24
31
6
7
17
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0

15-1 s 15·2S

25
20
7

8
8
27
0
0
0
5
0
0
0

6-2d

27
16
5
4
21
25
0
0
0
0
0
2
0

0
1
0

6
9

26

14-f

6-m

9-m

14
22
0

20
27
12
5
9
12
0
0
0
2
0
13
0

21
29
0
6
10
27
0
0
0

21
31
3

0

27
15
9
1
3
32
0
1
0
7
3
2
0

6-f

8-dl

26
25
3
7

3-2•

29
17
4
9
18
19
0
0
0
4
0

0
0

22
12
3

8
9
36
0
0
0
9
1
0
0

9-s

21
32
4

7
10

22

21
32
0

2
8
29

0
1
1

0
0

0

2

8

0
0
0

0
0
0

Mean

22 .61
23 .39
3 .50
5 .52
13 .24
24 .61
0 .30
0 .87
0 .26
4 .4 1
0 .20
0 .83
0 .04

TABLE 20
Family Averages: Jung-Riklin Categories
l:;gt~g:Q;i;:y
Grouping
Predicate
Causal
Coexistence
Identity
Linguistic
Completion
Sound
Rhyme
Indirect
Meaningless
Failure
Repetition

FgmiJ.y l
15.17
20.50
1.17
6.50
13.33
23.33
2.17
6.83
1.17
7 .17
1.17
0.83
0.33

fgmily 2
23.00
22.50
3.50
6.00
10.30
29.50
0.25
0.50
0.25
4.25
0.00
0.00
0.00

Cat~g:Q;i:;:y
Grouping
Predicate
Causal
Coexistence
Identity
Linguistic
Completion
Sound
Rhyme
Indirect
Meaningless
Failure
Repetition

Family 8
23.00
34.00
5.50
5.50
10.00
19.50
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.00
0.00
0.50
0.00

Eamily
22.00
31.67
3.33
5.33
11. 67
22.00
0.00
0.33
0.33
3.33
0.00
0.00
0.00

~

Fgmily
23.25
22.25
8.00
4.50
7.75
22.75
0.00
0.25
0.00
6.75
0.75
3.75
0 . 00

3

Family lQ
19.00
35.50
6.50
3.00
10.50
17.50
0.00
0.50
0.00
7.50
0.00
0.00
0.00

Fgmily 4
26.38
17.38
3.37
5.13
15 . 38
26.38
0 .13
0.00
0.25
3.75
0.00
0.63
0.00
Family 11
25.75
16.75
1. 75
5.00
16.25
29.50
0.25
0.00
0.00
3.50
0.00
1.25
0.00

Fgmily 5
21.33
31. 00
2.00
5.67
16.67
20.00
0.00
0.00
0.33
3.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
~

22.14
23. 71
3.96
5.68
13. 00
23.25
0.50
1. 57
0.36
5.14
0.29
0.32
0.00

fgmily
23.33
19.00
2.67
6.00
13.33
29.33
0.00
0.00
0.00
5.00
0.33
1. 00
0.00
~

22.92
22.54
2.92
5.38
12.75
27.21
0.08
0.13
0.17
3.88
0.13
1.50
0.08

6

· fgmily 7
23.33
25.83
3.83
5.50
16.83
21.67
0.00
0.00
0.00
2.83
0.00
0.17
0.00

.Tu..t.tl.
22.61
23.39
3.50
5.52
13 .24
24.61
0.30
0.87
0.26
4.41
0.20
0.83
0.04

,__.
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another by only a few percentage points, the individual is identified
as a mixed type.
The present sample of 52 individuals divides as follows:
Table 21
Reaction-Types of Individual SUbjects
Ordinate Types
7
Predicate Types
16
Linguistic-Motor Types 11
Mixed Reaction Types
17
Other (Sound)
1

13.4%
30.8%
21.1%
32.7%
2.0%

The sample is dominated by predicate and mixed reaction types, which
each account for about a third of all respondents.

Moreover, among the

sixteen subjects counted here as mixed types, eleven, or 69%, have
predication as one of their two preferred modes of reaction.

When

these subjects are combined with those showing a true preference for
predicates--and indeed, in terms of overall proportion of predicates
there may be no difference between members of the two groups--the
composition of the sample can be sumnarized as follows:
Table 22

Individual Reaction-Types
(combined predicate and mixed-predicate types)
Ordinate Types
7
Predicate/Mixed Predicate 27
Linguistic-Motor Types
11
Mixed and Other Types
7

13.5%
52.0%
23.0%
11.5%

In this analysis, half the members in the entire sample are seen as
having predication as their distinctive reaction-style.

Since the

appearance, and redundancy, of the predicate reaction-type in a family
will be a point of departure for much of the subsequent discussion, it
might be useful to look more closely at the single category of
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predication, in order to fix a statistical definition of the predicate
type which will serve as a consistent measure throughout the remainder
of this work.
The true predicate types described by Jung and Riklin seemed to
have a response profile that included at least 30% predicative
responses~8

The highest predicate rate in their sample was 61%, held

by a woman who was the rnother of two other predicate-types, women with
49 and 32% predicates arrong their responses.
The highest percentage of predicates in the present sample was
43%, belonging to a woman whose daughter was a mixed-predicate type
with 25% predicates.

By

comparison, her daughter-in-law, at 31%

predication, might be considered a true predicate type.

The second

highest figure, 40%, also belonged to a woman surrounded by other true
predicate types: her mother (31%), her husband (35%), and her sisterin-law (31%).
Table 23, on the next page, gives a breakdown of predication rate
within family units.

Each family member is classified according to his

or her dominant response category, and in the case of birnodal types, an
indication is given as to whether or not predication is one of the two
dominating categories.
Altogether, fourteen individuals have predicate rates of rnore than
30%; all of them might be considered true predicate-types, and seven,
or half of them, occur in two families (Families 9, including rnother,
daughter and son, and Family 10, including mother, daughter, daughter's
husband, and husband's sister).

Two appear among the three members of

Family 8 (rnother and daughter-in-law), and two rnore arrong the six
members of Family 7 (the oldest and youngest daughters).

Table 23
M:>dal Response Types and Predication Rates for Family Members
Family
1

2

3

4

5
6

Role

Reaction Type

Predicates

father
mother
1st daughter
2nd daughter
1st son
2nd son
father
mother
daughter
son
father
mother
1st son
2nd son
father
mother
1st daughter
1st son
2nd daughter
3rd daughter
3rd son
4th son
grandson
mother
son
father
mother
daughter

Linguistic
Mixed Predicate
Sound
Mixed Predicate
Linguistic
Predicate
Linguistic
Mixed Predicate
Mixed Predicate
Mixed Predicate
Predicate
Mixed
Linguistic
Predicate
Mixed
Ordinate
Mixed Predicate
Linguistic
Linguistic
Ordinate
Linguistic
Mixed Predicate
Ordinate
Linguistic
Predicate
Mixed Predicate
Ordinate
Linguistic

12
29
9
23
18
32
12
23
26
29
33
14
15
27

Family
7

8
9
10

10

13
29
14
21
15
13
24
1
26
38
29
16
12

11

14

15

Role

Reaction Type

father
mother
1st daughter
2nd daughter
3rd daughter
4th daughter
son-in-law
mother
daughter
dtr-in-law
daughter
son
mother
daughter
son-in-law
"sister
father
mother
2nd son
4th son
father
son
1st sister
2nd sister

Ordinate
Predicate
Predicate
Linguistic
Mixed Predicate
Predicate
Mixed Predicate
Predicate
Mixed Predicate
Predicate
Predicate
Predicate
Predicate
Predicate
Predicate
Predicate
Linguistic
Ordinate
Linguistic
Mixed
Mixed
Predicate
Mixed
Ordinate

Predicates
22
29

31
17
25
31
29

43
25
31
32
32
31
40
35
31
23
5
17

22
20
32
20
17

(All figures are percentages.)
f--'
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Another six individuals might be included in the group as
borderline predicate types, with 29% predication.

All are classified

as mixed predicate types, and in all but one, predication is the
stronger of the two dominant responses.

Their identification as

predicate types gives the profile surrmarized in Table 24.
Table 24
Predicate Types in Families (P=.29)
Family

Members

1

6

2

4
4

3

4
5
6

7

9
3
3
7
3

P Types
2
1
1
1
2
1

9

3

10

4

4
2
3
4

11

4

0

8

Roles
mother, 2nd son
son
father
1st daughter
companion, son
father
mother, 1&4 D and SL
mother, DL
all members
all members
none

In one of the family groups, no one had at least 29% predicates among
their responses; in two other groups, all of the members qualify as
predicate types, and already with predication fixed at the rate of 29%,
three of the remaining nine groups have a majority of members who can
be classified as predicate-types.

Given Jung's results with predicate

types, none of whom were men, it is interesting that this sample
contains two families in which the fathers tested as predicate types,
and were the only members of the family to do so.
When figures are added for those individuals classified as mixed
predicate types, in whose reactions predicate responses outweigh the
the second preferred category, the following pattern emerges:
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Table 25
Predicate Types in Families (P=.23)
Family
1
2
3
4

5
6
7

Members P Types
6
4
4
9

3
3

7

8

3

9

3
4
4

10
11

3

3
2
2

3
1
5
3
3
4
0

Roles
mother, 2nd D, 2nd S
mother, daughter, son
father, 2nd son
1st daughter, 4th son
all members
father
M, lD, 3D, 4D, SL
all members
all members
all members
none

With these parameters, in nine of the thirteen groups at least half the
members tested can be identified as predicate types.

Four of the

groups (Families 5, 8, 9 and 10) are composed entirely of individuals
with predicate rates of 23% or higher.

In Family 7, only the father

and the second daughter fall below the criteria! level of predication;
likewise in Family 2, only the father deviates from the preference for
predicates shown by the rest of the family.

And still at this level,

the group that previously appeared without predicate-type members
remains without predication in its family profile.
It is interesting to note that in those families where predication
does not dominate among members, no other single reaction type
dominates to the extent that predication does in other families,
although the linguistic-motor type, the second most conmon response,
does tend to appear most regularly as the alternative modal type in a
family.

It appears twice, for example, in Family 1, in the father and

older son; and twice in Family 11, again in the dyad of father and
older son.

Three of the siblings in Family 4 share the linguistic-

motor type, making it the actual dominant mode within this group, along
with the ordinate type, also shared by three members of the family.
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In Family 6, all three members represent different types; in Family 4,
mother and older son are also of different types, and both differ from
the predicate pair of father and younger son.
The question of predication and its influence within a family
group will arise twice more in this study, first, in context of the
contingency tests performed on data from the sample, and second, in the
discussion· of predication and its relationship to deductive reasoning.
At this point, however, it is appropriate to turn to a consideration of
agreement as measured by the calculations used by Furst in her study of
family associations, the analysis on which Jung's own understanding of
familial conformity was based.
Familial agreement: Furst's categories and the coefficient of
difference.

By

the time that Furst began the process of classifying

the responses she had obtained from one hundred members of twenty-four
separate families, the Burgholzli researchers had recognized some of
the inadequacies of their classification system, and as a result, the
arrangement in which she presents her data is markedly different from
that in which Jung and Riklin had made their determinations of modal
frequencies.

Specifically, the later classification system combines

the four categories of marginal responses under one single heading,
condenses the two categories of sound ·and rhyme into one,
differentiates word-completions from the aggregate of linguistic-motor
responses, and specifies three varieties of ordination in place of the
single "grouping" category of Jung-Riklin system.

The mst important

mdification, however, is the expansion of Jung and Riklin's single
category of predication into five separate categories:

value

predication, internal and external (descriptive) predicates, subject-
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object relations, predication of place, time, means and purpose, and
definitional predication.

In all, the schema used by Furst has fifteen

categories, with a distribution which allows for a much finer
differentiation within major relational classes than was possible given
the arrangement of the earlier system.
In Tables 26 and 27, the response profiles for individuals and
families are presented in terms of the revised categorial hierarchy
used by Furst.

The modal center of gravity for most individuals shifts

somewhat in this arrangement, as can be seen.

It is rare, for example,

for any one of the five predicate categories to carry an individual's
modal reaction, yet it does happen, in the mother of Family 1, for
example, whose 19% so-called "other predicates" serve as a good
indication that her borderline identification as a predicate type is
most likely the correct one, despite her numerically higher percentage
of linguistic-motor responses.

The only other instances of this

predominance of a single type of predication among the range of
possible reactions, in fact, occur in the case of three unmistakeable
predicate-types, the mother of Family 8, and the husband and wife of
Family 10.

In the rest of the sample, however, the distribution of

predicates over five su~ategories allows for the emergence of other
modal points, and highlights in particular the occurrence of synonyms
and antonyms (identities and contrasts) in individuals' reaction
patterns.
The virtue of this finely-tuned system is not so much its
usefulness in determining a reaction-type--that function is more
adequately served by the Jung-Riklin arrangement--as the precision of
comparison it allows between the response patterns of individuals.

Table 26
Individual Response Figures, Furst categories

Subi•ct

coordination

sub/supraordinatian
con trast

value oredicat•
athar oredicat•
sub iect/obiect
place/time
deli nition/causa l
cocu:istence
identity
linguistic-motor
word formation
word comolation
sound
residual

Subioct

coordin ation
sub/1uoraordination
contrast

value predicate
othar predicate
subi•ctiobiect
Diaco/time
defin ition/causal
coexistence
identitv
linauistic-motor
word formation
word completion
sound
residual

1 •f

21
4
15
0
3
7
1
0
8
29
5
5
0
0
2

6·1

14
7
13
9
6
10
4
0
6
10
12
2
0
0
7

2 .f

1·m 1 · 1 d 1 · 2d 1 · 1 s t · 2S

4
5
2
0
19
9
1
0
3
1
17
13
10
1
15

4
0
3
0
4
4
1
0
4
4
3
18
2
40
13

6·m 6 · 2d

17
16
19
1
5
5
5
0
4
21
1
5
0
0
2

19
6
19
0
4
3
5
0
8
9

8
9
0
0
10

10
5
6
0
12
8
2
0
5
8
3
12
1
6
22

20
2
14
1
6

8
2
0
6
20
8
8
0
0
5

7.f

13
14

16
0
7
7
7
1
5
22
4
2
0
0
2

8
13
4
1
11
12
8
0
13
18
2
1
0
1
8

22
9
31
1
3
6

2
0
5
5
5
8

0
1
2

7-m 7·1d

12
13
10
2
4
12
9
2
8
18
3
1
0
0
6

13
17
7
1
11
9
10
0
7
17
4
4
0
0
0

15
12
17
5
5
9
4
0
6
17
2
3
1
0
4

16
10
9
2
10
12
2
0
5
9
3
12
0
2
8

18
4
19
4
13
8
4
0
8
10
5
4
0
0
3

7 -2d 7 •3d 7 -4d 7 -4dh

13
10
8
0
7
7
3
0
5
25
9
12
0
0
1

17
12
12
0
12
9
4
0
3
15
4
7
0
0
5

17
12
22
0
12
15
4
0
5
4
2
3
0
0
4

4 · 1 4 · m 4 · 1d 4.15 4 · 2d 4 · 3d 4 · 3S 4·4• 4·0S

3 · 1 3 · m 3 - 1 S 3·2S

2·m 2·1 d 2·•

5
10
8
0
19
9
1
0
3
20
4

16
0
0
5

12
14
10
0
13
13
7
0
5
11

24
7
15
1
4
3
6
0
7
8

4

6

5
0
0
6

7
0
0
12

6 · m 8·d

16
12
9
7
21
9
6
0
4
6
3
5
0
0
2

21
8
10
3
10
6
6
0
7
14
4
8
0
0
3

30
6
15
2
6
4
3
0
1
3
6
11
0
1
12

8 -dl

13
11
14
2
8
14
7
0
6
9
6
6

0
0
4

15
17
8
2
10
5
10
0
5
9
0
4
0
0
15

12
19
15
1
1
4
3
1
6
28
2
2
0
0
6

9-m

13
17
7
1
11
9
10
0
7
17
4
4
0
0
0

22
15
16
0
3
6
3
1
8
17
1
3
0
1
4

16
9
10
1
14
9
8

0
7
10
2
10
0
2
2

17
9
23
1
9
4
0
0
3
5
12
13
t
0
3

15
10
8
0
10
6
3
0
6
18
7
13
0
0
2

20
16
13
6
3
3
3
0
7
12
1
9
0
0
7

25
12
24
1
6
4

2
0
3
7
3
11
0
1
1

1 O· rr 1 O·d 10· d 1 O·dhs

9·S

9· d

12
17
7
2
10
9
8
0
3
28
2
1
0
0
1

7
14

15
1
15
10
5
1
2
8
7
7
0
0
8

15
9
13
1
14
6
10
3
4
10
0
7
0
0
8

6
8
9
3
20
14
3
10
2
11
1
5
0
1
7

9
15
18
2
19
10
4
6
4
9
1
8
0
0
5

12
5
21
3
14
4
10
5
5
13
1
4
0
0
3

13
14
20
0
10
9
5
0
5
8
0
5
0
0
11

5 - m 5-pc
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25
1
0
0
0
0
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8
12
0
12
10
4
0
7
8
18
0
0
1
6

6

9
2
1
0
1
10

11 · m 11 · 1

16
9
20
3
6
5
9
0
5
13
2
5
0
0
7

21
12
16
1
1
2
1
0
6
26
4
5
0
0
5

12
17
7
2
10
9
8
0
3
28
3
0
0
0
1

5·•

7
12
16
1
10
15
12
0
7
14
4
0
0
0
2

11 ·2 11 ·4S

11
13
16
0
10
5
2
0
5
11
9
16
1
0
1

15
13
8
0
10
7
5
0
4
15
4
13
0
0
6
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TABLE 21
Family Avera<Jes: Furst cate<Jories
Category
Coordinate
Sub/supraord.
Contrast
Value predicate
Other predicate
Subject/object
Place/time
Definition
Coexistence
Identity
Linguistic
Formation
Completion
Sound
Residual

Category
Coordinate
Sub/supraord.
Contrast
Value predicate
Other predicate
Subject/object
Place/time
Definition
Coeidstence
Identity
Linguistic
Formation
Completion
Sound
Residual

Eamily l
11.17
4.83
7.33
0.33
9.17
8.00
2.50
0.00
6.50
13.33
6.33
9 .50
2.17
8.00
10. 83

Eamily 8
18.50
10.00
9.50
5.00
15.50
7.50
6.00
0.00
5.50
10.00
3.50
6.50
0.00
0.00
2.50

Eamily 2
17.80
8.75
19.00
3.00
7.75
8.75
3.00
0.00
6.00
10.30
3.75
6.75
0.25
0.75
4.25

Eamily 9
12.00
13.33
10.67
1. 00
13.33
0.33
7.67
0.33
5.33
11. 67
4.33
7.00
0.00
0.67
0.33

Eamily 3
20.30
11. 00
12.00
1.25
8.25
6.25
6.50
0.00
4.50
7.75
4.00
6.75
0.00
0.25
11. 30

Eamily lQ
10 . 50
8.50
11. 00
2.00
17.00
10.00
6.50
6.50
3.00
10.50
0.50
6.00
0.00
0.50
7.50

Eamily

~

17.00
14.00
15.75
1. 38
6.50
5.88
3.38
0.25
5.13
15.38
3.50
7.13
0.13
0.25
4.38

Ea.mily 11
15.75
11. 75
15.00
1. 00
6.75
4 . 75
4.25
0 . 00
5.00
16.25
4.75
9.75
0.25
0.00
4.75

Eamily 5

Eamily 6

E/3,mily 7

11. 00
12.30
11. 70
1. 00
10.70
11. 30
8.00
0.00
5.67
16 . 70
8.33
0.00
0.00
0.33
3.00

16.67
3.67
17.00
3.33
5.00
6.00
4.67
0.00
6.00
13.33
7.00
5.33
0.00
0.00
6.33

14.17
13.00
12.50
0.50
8.83
9.83
6.17
0.50
5.50
16.83
4.33
4.83
0.00
0.00
3.00

N.om.e.n
14.97
10.41
12.07
1. 69
9.52
8.00
5.24
0. 72
5.69
12.69
4.17
6.76
0.48
1. 86
5.76

Men
15.63
10.75
16.00
1. 33
8.42
7.21
4.38
0.33
5.46
13. 46
4.42
6.67
0.08
0.29
5.58

.l'..o..t.a.l.
15.15
10.87
13. 67
1. 52
9.13
7.78
4.80
0.56
5.52
13.24
4.26
6.67
0.30
1.13
5.63

..__.
w

-.J
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Comparison can, of course, be done using the thirteen-part scale, but
since a number of its categories are aggregates, any resultant analysis
would certainly be less accurate, and less precise, than one which
operates at the level of the constituent categories.
In order to quantify the similarity, or agreement, obtaining
between any pair of classified reactions, Jung devised for his student
a simple formula yielding a coefficient of difference (D).

The

calculation is a sum of the differences between two individuals'
classified responses in each of the relational categories (the smaller
percentage of coordinates, sul:x:>rdinates, value predicates and so on
subtracted from the larger percentage), divided by the total number of
categories, fifteen.

The resultant figure describes the degree to

which one response pattern conforms to another.

Two response profiles

which are identical to one another would have a "D" value of O; the
maximum D value possible, assuming that that two individuals responded
in such a way that none of their categories coincided, would be 200/15,
or 13.3.

AD of 2.0, then, would signify an average of only two points

difference between individuals' responses in each of the fifteen
categories, and indicates a fairly close agreement in the patterns of
the individuals' reactions.
Table 28, on the following page, presents D figures for the
members of all families in the present sample.

The dyads are arranged

in order from highest degree of conformity to lowest.
parameters for each family are given in Table 29.

Statistical

Table 28
Coefficients of Difference for Familial Dyads

Family 2

Family 1
2.00
4.27
4 .93
4.93
4.93
5.33
5.60
6.13
6.53
6.93
6.93
8.00
8.47
8.47
8.93

f-1 s
m-2d
2d-1 s
2d-2s
1 s-2s
1d-2d
f- 2s
f-2d
m-1d
m-1 s
m-2s
1 d-1 s
f-m
1 d-25
f-1 d

2.53
3.33
3.33
3 .47
4.00
4.00

d-dl
m-d
m -dl

2.00
2.67
3.60
3.73
4.67
5.33

2.53
3.20
3.73

m-d
d-s
m-s

m-1 s
f- 2s
m-2s
f-m
1 s-2s
f-1 s

Family 10

Family 9

Family 8
2 .53
2.93
2 .93

m-s
m-1 d
1 d-s
f- s
f- m
f- 1 d

Family 3

2.00
2.00
2.2 7
2.27
2.53
3 .33

d-h
m-hs
m-sl
h-hs
m-d
d-hs

Family 4
2.13
2 .27
2.53
2.67
3.07
3.20
3 .33
3.33
3.33
3.33
3 .33
3 .33
3.47
3.47
3.60
3.60
3.80
3.80
3.87
3.87
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.13
4.27
4.40
4.40
4.80
4.80
4.87
5.07
5.60
5.73
6.13
6.27
6.53

m-3d
1 s-3s
f-m
f-1 d
3s -gs
f-3d
m - 3s
m-4s
m-as
1 d-2d
1 s-2d
3d-3s
m-2d
3d-4s
3d-as
3s-4s
2d-3d
2d-4s
1 s-4s
4s -as
f-4 s
1 d-45
2d-3s
m- 1 d
f-2d
f-g s
1 s-3d
m-1 s
1d -3d
1 s-as
f-35
1 d-35
f- 1 s
1 d-1 s
2d - gs
1d-as

Family 5
3 .33 IPC-5
3.73 m-s
4 .67 m-pc

Family 6
3 .20
3 .40
4.33

Family 11
2.40
2.93
3 .20
3.60
3.73
4.00

2s-4s
f-45
f- m
f-25
m-4s
m-2s

f-d
m-d
f-m

Family 7
2.27
2.27
2.27
2.27
2.40
2.40
2 .53
2.80
2.93
2.93
3.00
3.07
3.47
3.73
3 .87
4.00
4.00
4.13
4.40
4.93

Dyad 12
5.20

h-w

Dyad 14
2.53

f-m
f-1 d
m-1d
3d-4d
f- 2d
1d- 3d
f-3d
3d-sl
2d -3d
2d-sl
m-3d
1 d-2d
f-4d
m-2d
1 d-sl
m-4d
1 d-4d
f-s I
m-sl
2d-4d

Averages
3.90
8 .93
2.00
6.93
1.46

mean
max
min
ranae
st.dev.

f- s

t--'

w

\.0

140

Table 29
Statistical Parameters of Familial Coefficients of Difference
Family 1
mean 6. 1
max
8.9
min
2.0
range 6.9
As

2
3.5
4.0
2.5
1.5

3
3.7
5.3
2.0
3.3

4
4.0
6.5
3.3
3.2

5
3.9
4.7
2.1
2.6

6
3.7
4.3
3.2
1.1

7
3.3
5.2
2.3
2.9

8
2.8
2.9
2.5
0.4

9
3.1
3.7
2.5
1.2

10
2.4
3.3
2.7
0.6

11

3.3
4.0
2.4
1.6

was shown with previous measures of family agreement, some of

the families tested are very tight indeed:

Family 10, with its

collection of four predicate-type individuals, has five of its six
dyads in the 2.0-2.5 range of difference, and its most distant dyad is
still as close in conformity as is the closest dyad of Family 5.

Nine

of the eleven families have at least one dyad that falls within the
2.0-2.5 range; Family 4 has three, two of which involve the mother, and
Family 7 has a substantial seven out of fifteen.

In nearly half the

dyads of Family 7, the reaction patterns of the members have less than
2.5 points of difference between them; two thirds of the father's
relationships and half the relationships of the oldest daughter are
included in this closest of categories.

Even Family 1, with its

extravagant range, has one of the closest dyads in the entire sample:
the father and older son agree at a difference of only 2.0, more than
twice as close as the next dyad in the household, the mother and
younger daughter (4.3), and nearly three times as close as the father's
next relationship, that with his younger son (5.6).
In total, 21 dyads in the sample, or 19.4%, show conformity at a
level closer than 2.5.

Six involve mothers and their children, four

involve fathers and their children, and five involve siblings;
interestingly, the only sibling dyads at this level of agreement are
pairs of the same gender.

Three married couples, two of them parents
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of families, are included in the most closely conforming group, as are
three pairs of inlaws, all from Family 10.

The largest single group is

comprised of IOC>ther-daughter dyads, who make up some 26.7% of the
entire set of individuals with the highest level of agreement.
Another 30 pairs, or 27.7% of the sample, fall into the next
category of agreement, that defined by D at 2.6-3.5, making for a level
of conformity at 3.5 or closer for nearly half the dyads in the sample.
This group now includes all members of Families 8 and 10, 62% of the
relationships in Family 7, nearly 40% of the pairs in Family 4, four
out of six dyads in Family 2, the daughter's relationship with both
parents in Family 6, the daughter's relationship with her mother and
her brother in Family 9, and the father's relationship with his wife
and his younger son in Family 11.
Half the parental dyads in the sample are included at the 3.5
level of difference, as are nine of the fourteen mother-daughter dyads,
or about 65%.

The remainder of the mother-daughter pairs are to be

found in the vicinity, within the 3.7- 4.2 range, with the exception of
the sound-producing daughter of Family 1, who relates to her mother at
a D-figure of 6.5.

Her relation to her father, at 8.9, is the most

distant of all dyads under comparison in the entire sample.
One indication of the reliability of the D coefficient as a
measure of associative similarity might be found in a comparison of its
figures with measures based on other procedures, such as the Spearman
rank correlation.

When the rank order of dyads within a family, as

determined by the closeness of the D coefficient, is compared with the
rank order derived from a comparison of Spearman correlations, in five
of the eleven families the same dyad is listed first; that is to say,
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the degree of associative conformity between the designated pair was
considered to be the strongest in the family in both analyses.
When the dyads ranked as the three closest by Spearman and Furst
calculations are compared, seven of the families show at least one pair
in the top three common to both analyses, and in one group (Family 3),
the same three pairs comprise the top ranked dyads in both
arrangements.

Four of the closest five pairs in Family 1 are the same

on both lists, but in Family 4, only one of the top five dyads is
identified in each group. In Family 7, the situation is better, with
three dyads appearing in the closest six in both Furst and Spearman
rankings.

The pairs showing least agreement in both lists are

different in every family, with the exception of Family 1, where father
and first daughter maintain their distance at the bottom of both ranked
lists.
In terms of general trends, the figures presented in Table 30, on
the following page, are indicative of levels of associative conformity
that might be expected in a normal sample of family members.

Figures

in the first column are those obtained from the subjects of the present
study; those in the second column are averages calculated by Furst from
the sample she tested at the turn of the century.
The closest relationship in both samples is that between nothers
and daughters.

Fathers' associative patterns in the present sample are

slightly more distant with both daughters and sons, but both
relationships are closer than that between mothers and sons.

Same-

gender siblings have close agreement, and in terms of conformity fall
midway between the mother-daughter and father-daughter figures.
Brother-sister pairs, on the other hand, are the least close of all
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Table 30
Average Coefficient of Difference
Dyad
Father-M:)ther
Mother-Daughter
Mother-Son
Father-Daughter
Father-Son
Brothers
Sisters
Brother-Sister
Mother-Child
Father-Child
Related Males
Related Females
figures.

Current

Furst

4.04
3.45
4.05
3.91
3.98
3.60
3.68
4.57
3.75
3.94
3.80
3.56

4.70
3.00
4.70
4.90
3 .10
4.70
5.10
4.40
3.50
4.20
4.10

3.80

Married couples' D-coefficients are higher than the averages

for all related pairs of men and of women, and furthermore are higher
than the differences associated with parents and their children.
It is interesting to note that the mothers and daughters in
Furst's sample, who also showed the highest level of associative
conformity, were considerably closer to one another than members of the
present sample.

The same is true of the group of fathers and sons, who

were on average nearly one full point closer in Furst's sample than in
the population of this study.

On

the other hand, the roc>ther-son and

father-daughter pairs tested in the early 1900's are discernably rrore
distant from one another than the comparable dyads in the current
sample.

These variations may reflect social practices which today

allow for roc>re consistent interaction between parents and their
opposite-sex children; in fact, the fathers in the Furst sample are
rather roc>re distant from their children than are the current fathers,
and considerably roc>re distant than the roc>thers among their own
contemporaries.
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Siblings, as well, seem to have been more distant at the turn of
the century, with sisters showing less agreement than brothers, a
pattern which still obtains in the present sample, but to a much
attenuated degree.
significant.

The difference, however, is probably not

Parents, too, in the earlier study were more distant from

each other than those of the present day.

Interestingly, the pattern

of closeness between mother-father dyads and mother-son dyads, although
expressed in different numbers, is proportionally the same for dyads in
both samples.

From the figures given for related pairs of men and

women, it seems as though family members of the present sample
associate at a somewhat higher level of conformity than did those
subjects who participated in the Furst study.

An

overall average

figure for related individuals is 3.68 for the current population, as
against 3.95 for related members of the earlier sample.
It is in the context of t hese figures that the instances of close
conformity, at the level of 2 . 5 and below, ought to be examined.

The D

coefficient is intended to serve as a general measure of the degree to
which one individual's associative pattern conforms to that of another,
but since it is an average, it cannot give an indication of the
specific relational categories i n which two individual's reponses are
most alike.

This kind of information · is perhaps best shown by

composite graphing of the category figures for the individuals whose
associative profile is being analysed.

At the tightest level of

agreement, 2.0-2.5, some very striking patterns emerge.
In the twelve graphs which follow, the perpendicular axis
represents percentages of responses given in each cagetory.

The

fifteen relational categories of the Furst schema are plotted along the
horizontal axis.

The category titles are given in Table 2, above.
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Figure 1. Comparison of response profiles of father and oldest son
of Family 1 (father graphed with solid line). Coefficient of difference:
2.0.
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Figure 2. Comparison of response profiles of :rrother and older son
of Family 3 (:rrother graphed with solid line). Coefficient of difference:
2.0.
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Figure 3. Comparison of response profiles of husband and wife of
Family 10 (wife graphed with solid line). Coefficient of difference:
2.0.
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Figure 4. Comparison of response profiles of father and mother of
Family 4 (father graphed with solid line). Coefficient of difference:
2.5.
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Figure 5. Comparison of response profiles of father and mother of
Family 7 (father graphed with solid line). Coefficient of difference:
2.27.
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Figure 6. Comparison of response profiles of mother and third
daughter of Family 4 (mother graphed with solid line). Coefficient of
difference: 2.13.
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Figure 7. Comparison of response profiles of father and oldest
daughter of Family 7 (father graphed with solid line). Coefficient of
difference: 2.27.
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Figure 8. Comparison of response profiles of first and third
sons of Family 4 (older son graphed with solid line). Coefficient of
difference: 2.27.
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Figure 9. Comparison of response profiles of mother of Family 10 and
her daughter's husband's sister (mother graphed with solid line).
coefficient of difference: 2.0.
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Figure 10. Comparison of response profiles of father and rrother of
Family 1 (father graphed with solid line). Coefficient of difference:
8.4.
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Figure 11. Comparison of response profiles of oldest daughter and
oldest son of Family 4 (daughter graphed with solid line). Coefficient of
difference: 6.13.
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Figure 12. Comparison of response profiles of parents and three
oldest daughters of Family 7. Coefficient of difference for individual
dyads ranges from 2.27 to 3.73.
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Figure 1 shows the associative conformity of a father and his son,
the closest dyad from Family 1.
mother and son from Family 3.

Figure 2 is a composite profile of a
Figures 3, 4 and 5 give a picture of the

conformity of the closest married couples in the sample, the husband
and wife of Family 10, and the parents of Families 4 and 7.

The

closest mother-daughter dyad in the sample, the mother and third
daughter of Family 4, is shown in Figure 6; the father-daughter pair
with the closest conformity, the father and oldest daughter of Family
7, is compared in Figure 7.

Figure 8 shows a pair of brothers with

close agreement, from Family 4.
Most remarkable of all, perhaps, is Figure 9, which shows two
in-laws, the mother of Family 10 and the sister of her daughter's
husband.

The profiles of these two unrelated predicate-types are in

virtual point-by-point correspondence.

Except for the frequency of

contrasts, which the younger woman produced half again as often as the
older one, the patterns of the two women coincide in near-perfect
conformity.
For the sake of comparison, Figures 10 and 11 show the composite
profiles of family members whose coefficient of difference is not
carried within the 2.0 - 2.5 range of close agreement.

The quality of

the "difference" becomes inmediately apparent in these two graphs, of
related individuals whose modal response falls into entirely different
categories.

Figure 10 shows the husband and wife of Family 1, with the

husband stronger in linguistic-motor responses and the wife in
predication; Figure 11 is a brother-sister pair from Family 4, with the
same clash of reaction types, between linguistic-motor and predicative
responses.

This sort of diversity among response profiles can only
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heighten an observer's appreciation of the symmetry obtaining between
profiles of the more closely conforming individuals.
Finally, Figure 12 is composite response-profile for five of the
six related individuals tested in Family 7.

The parents and three

oldest daughters of the family show extraordinary similarity in
reaction-type; the only dissention in the family came from the youngest
daughter, who responded with antonyms in marked contrast to her
relatives' preference for synonyms.
The example of the mother and her son-in-law's sister serves as a
powerful reminder that the dimension of associative conformity measured
in terms of the D-coefficient is closely connected with the analysis of
reaction-type.

Any two unrelated individuals who share a corrmon modal

response pattern might conceivably generate composite graphs with the
same exquisite resemblance as that shown by the two predicate-type
inlaws of Family 10.

As

the analysis of Spearman rank correlations for

related and unrelated individuals demonstrated, agreement in response
patterns is not uncorrnnon in the general population, although within
certain parameters family members might be expected to show a somewhat
higher degree of similarity more regularly, or more often, than members
of the population at large.
Furst's analysis included the computation of more than 8,000 Dcoefficients for unrelated dyads in her sample, and she found evidence
to suggest that relatives show closer conformity in their associative
response patterns than do unrelated individuals.

The average of

related women in her sample was 3.8, that of related men 4.1, as
against figures of 6.0 and 5.9 for unrelated men and women.

Although

time constraints did not permit a similar analysis of the eleven
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hundred unrelated pairs in the present sample, future work is needed in
this area to ascertain the effect of family relationship on reaction
patterns.

It is to be hoped that analysis of the data on reaction

types might yield a more telling result than that of the Spearman rank
order correlations reported above, which showed only a very slight
effect of family when the categorized responses of entire sample were
subjected to analysis.
The extent to which the same reaction-type tends to redundancy
within a family becomes the point on which the difference between
related and unrelated pairs of individuals comes to rest, and in order
to explore this dimension of familial agreement, a series of chisquare (contingency) tests were performed on selected members of the
sample, in order to determine the significance attendant upon the
multiple occurrence of the same reaction-type among members of the same
household.

Reaction-type within the fami l y unit: redundancy and contingency.
Jung's first observations about associative patterns within families
derived from the accidental involvement in his sample of mothers and
daughters from three families, all of whom shared the same reaction
type.

One group, a mother and two daughters, was composed of solid

linguistic-motor types; the other two groups, a mother with two
daughters and a mother-daughter pair, reacted to the stimulus-words in
a way that identified them as predicate reaction-types.
The redundancy of a single type among these relatives led Jung and
his coauthor to hypothesize the existence of a "familial disposition,"
which shaped the responses of the daughters in the families and which
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could be traced in the children's reactions with reference to their
birth order.

The older the child, the more like the parent her

reactions were observed to be, and there was a tendency for the
associative center of gravity to shift in the direction of more
superficial reactions as the experiment proceeded from from mother to
younger daughter.
It was this phenomenon of progressive "blunting" that Jung wished
to pursue with material collected from members of other families.
Furst, who devoted a part of her analysis to this problem, found that
as a general principle it was the case only with children over the age
of sixteen,9 and only occurred with children and their mothers.

In

comparison to fathers, most children showed less superficiality in
their responses, and most wives gave more internal associations than
did their husbands.
But the issue which engaged her more directly was the phenomenon
of predication within families.

Her sample was composed of at least

54% true predicate types, and of those persons she classified as mixed
reaction types, half had predication as one of their most strongly
preferred modes.

Her analysis thus began with material from a sample

containing 72:'~ predicate types, with women--mothers, daughters and
sisters--represented at a ratio of 17:10 in comparison with men.
The nine families she selected to report were dominated by
predication: 22 of the 37 individuals were pure predicate types, and
another four were mixed predicate types, yielding a 7CJX, proportion of
the total family membership.

These figures are considerably higher

than those of the present sample, as can be seen from the following
comparison.

Mixed-predicate types are included as predicate types in
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both columns.

In each column, the figure identifies numbers of

predicate types out of the total number of family members tested.
Table 31
Predicate Reaction Types within Families
Family
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
11

Total:

Furst
2/3
3/6
3/3
3/3
3/4
6/7
2/4
5/5
0/2
n/a
n/a
26/37

Olrrent
2/6
3/4
2/4
2/9
3/3
1/3
5/7
3/3
3/3
4/4
0/4
29/50

(7()%)

(58%)

In three of the Furst families and four of the families in the present
sample, all tested members proved to be predicate types.

In one family

of each set, 75% of the members were predicate types; in two families
of each group, half were predicate types.

In both families of seven

members, the majority were predicate types, and in both samples, there
was one family in which no predicate types were to be found.

The

primary source of difference between the two samples resides with
Family 4 of the present study, seven of whose nine members preferred
non-predicative categories for their associative responses.
Both Jung and Furst seemed to accept, as fact, what observation
bore out in both their samples:

that families tend to produce members

whose associative behavior is similar.

In the specific case of the

predicate type, Furst speculated that it was linked to a subjective or
egocentric attitude which in both women and men tends to increase with
greater age.IO

The relatively high predication rate of young
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children is a somewhat different matter, and although it is not
discussed by Furst, her understanding of the phenomena is implied in
her statement that associations of children below the age of sixteen
are predominantly inner associations, a class composed almost entirely
of either ordinate or predicative responses.
Aside from these descriptive observations, however, neither Furst
nor Jung were able to examine the phenomenon of intrafamilial
predication, or the redundancy of reaction-type, from the standpoint of
its statistical significance in the IIDdern sense.

Intuition would

suggest that the appearance of so many predicate-types in the same
household is, in fact, a matter of significance, one that calls for a
closer look at the relationships of those who share the predicate
reaction type.

There is a great discrepancy between the samples in

terms of the familial relations represented; for the purpose of the
analysis which follows, therefore, comparisons will be made only in
terms of comparable family roles, and the primary focus will be on the
one intrafamilial relationship which is stable in both groups--the
parent-child dyad.
The chi-square test of contingency.

The chi-square test is one of

the methods available to IIDdern statisticians to determine the degree
of significance which can be attributed to an observed phenomenon, the
degree to which the phenomenon differs from results which might be
obtained by chance.

In order to be valid, it requires larger numbers

of subjects than were available in the present sample, such that there
is a minimum of five subjects in the smallest cell of the contingency
table.

Even the addition of Furst's subjects to the numbers of the

present sample would not reach the requisite minimum number for a valid
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chi-square analysis to be performed.

Nevertheless, a number of such

tests were undertaken, in both the 3 x 3 and 2 x 2 format, in order to
see if any trends might emerge from the data which would indicate the
need for further research.

The results presented in this section must

be seen, therefore, as descriptive, and no statistical significance can
be attached to them at this time.

The first analyses were done using data from the thirteen motherchild dyads occurring in Furst's sample.

In the 3 x 3 format, all

predicate mothers were found to have either predicate children (seven
instances) or children with mixed-predicate reaction-types (two
instances).

Mixed type mothers accounted for one predicate child, two

mixed reaction-types, and one of the rare non-predicating members of
the sample.

There were no mothers of a non-predicate type.

Although

the distribution of these frequencies seems weighted toward the
occurrence of predicate type children in the household of predicating
mothers, the numbers are too small to indicate any level of
significance.
When subjects classified as mixed predicate types were combined
with the true predicate types in a 2 x 2 format, twelve out of thirteen
children fell into the same analytic cell, that of mothers and children
sharing reaction type.

However, with · this arrangement the x2 result

was O, a figure which would lead one to the counterintuitive conclusion
that the observed phenomenon was one which could have been produced by
chance.
Part of the difficulty in working with this data is the low number
of dyads available for analysis.

In the sample of the present study,

there were 49 parent-child pairs and 26 mother-child dyads, twice the
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number of rnother-child dyads in the Furst sample.11 When chi-square
tests were performed on them, the results proved to be somewhat more
reasonable, but still fell below the criterial level of statistical
significance.
For the purposes of the first two tests reported here, the
predicate type was defined at a predication rate of 30% and above, and
mixed predication was fixed between 23 and 29%.

Children of the eleven

families were compared with either mother or father, depending on which
of the two denvnstrated the criterial levels of predication. Unlike the
Furst group, no household in the present sample had two predicate-type
parents among the members tested, although it is quite possible that if
the missing parents of children in the sample could have been tested,
this situation might have changed.
With P (predicate type) fixed at 30% predicative responses, and M
(mixed-predicate type) at 23-29%, two fathers and three mothers were
determined to be true predicate types; one father and two mothers were
mixed-predicate types, and the rest were defined as non-predicating
Although the x2 value of the 3 x 3 analysis performed on the

(N).

parent-child dyads remains far below the level of statistical
significance at the .05 level, some interesting trends can be seen in
the distribution of the data.

SUmmary figures from the original

contingency table are presented in Table 32, on the following page.
The observed figures for homogeneous dyads (parent and child
sharing the same reaction type) are about twice what would be expected
through the operation of chance for both predicate and non-predicating
types.

In other words, predicate parents tend to have predicating

children, and non-predicate parents tend to have non-predicate type
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Table 32
Chi-Square Analysis, Parent-Child Dyads
Dyad
P parent,
P parent,
P parent,
M parent,
M parent,
M parent,
N parent,
N parent,
N parent,
Total

P child
M child
N child
P child
M child
N child
P child
M child
N child

Observed Expected
4
1.88
2
1.88
1
3.23
3
2.96
3
2.96
5
5.07
0
2.15
2
2.15
6
3.69
26

children, about twice as often as might be expected.

x2
2.39
0.01
1.54
0.00
0.00

o.oo

2.15
0.01
1.45
7.55

other dyadic

combinations are quite close to the expected figures, with the
exception of the seventh category (non-predicate parents with predicate
children), where the observed is far below the expected:

when neither

parent is a predicate type, there are no predicate type children in the
household, although the workings of chance would apparently place some
of them there.

Again, because the total numbers analysed are too small

to be subjected to a valid chi-square procedure, there can be no level
of significance attached to the results of the analysis;
Within the limitations of small sample size, a refinement of the
picture presented by parent-child dyads is achieved when the dyad of
mother and child is analysed.

Here, the comparison with the Furst

sample is a rrore direct one.

Again, there are twice the number of

pairs in the present group as in her sample, and the resultant x2
figure is alrrost 2.5 times higher than hers, although it remains below
the .05 level of significance.

A summary of results from the original

3 x 3 contingency table is given in Table 33, on the following page.
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Table 33
Chi-Square Analysis, Mother-Child Dyads
Dyad
P rrother,
P rrother,
P rrother,
M mother,
M mother,
M rnother,
N mother,
N mother,
N rnother,
Total

P child
M child
N child
P child
M child
N child
P child
M child
N child

Observed Expected
3
1.07
1
1.07
0
1.85
4
2.96
3
2.96
4
5.07
0
2.96
3
2.96
8
5.07
26

x2
3.48
0.00

1.85
0.37

o.oo
0.23
2.96

o.oo
1.69
10.58

In this distribution, the occurrence of predicate-type children in
association with predicating mothers is three times what would be
expected, and the rate at which non-predicate mothers have children who
are non-predicating is about 1.5 times the expected rate.

Mixed

reaction-type mothers, with their strong penchant for predication, have
predicate children about 1~3 times more often than expected, and where
mother's predication rate is at least 23%, there are fewer nonpredicate type children in the household than might be expected.

As

was the case in the Furst sample, no non-predicate mother had a child
who was a predicate type; and when the only parent taken into account
is the mother, it seems to be the case that no predicating rnother had a
child who was a non-predicate type.
A comparison of reaction-types between mothers and daughters in
the sample nrost rely on a very small number of pairs, only fourteen,
too few for any level of significance to be determined.

However, the

pattern of distribution remains essentially the same as was seen with
the roother-child dyads.

The x2 figure improves slightly when . the

two roothers and one daughter with borderline predication figures of 29%
are mJVed from the mixed category into the category of predicate types.
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Table 34
Chi-Square Analysis, Mother-Daughter Dyads
Dyad
P rrother,
P rrother,
P rrother,
M rrother,
M mother,
M m::>ther,
N mother,
N rrother,
N mother,
Total

P daughter
M daughter
N daughter
P daughter
M daughter
N daughter
P daughter
M daughter
N daughter

Observed Expected
4
3.21
3
2.57
2
3.21
0
0.35
1
0.28
0
0.35
1
1.42
0
1.14
3

1.42

14

x2
0.19
0.07
0.46
0.35
1.85
0.35
0.12
1.14
1. 76
6.29

However, with P fixed at 29%, the pattern of distribution changes,
in that now, for the first time, a predicating daughter is to be found
in the household of a non-predicate type mother.

Oddly enough, this

individual's father is also a non-predicate type, and of her five
siblings, only one, the youngest brother, achieved a predicate rate as
high as 24%.

In the absence of rrore extensive information, one is left

to wonder at the origin of this woman's anomalous preference for
predication.
In this distribution, observations in all the dyadic categories
remain fairly close to the expected figures, except in the cells of
mixed-reaction type children of either mixed or non-predicate type
mothers, and in the final category of non-predicate type dyads.
Although the appearance of a predicate-type daughter with a nonpredicate type mother is, in this analysis, what would occur simply by
chance, it is quite remarkable given the patterns established earlier.
Contingency figures were also determined for other combinations of
parents and children, and with P fixed at other points.
are summarized as follows:

The results
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Table 35
Chi-Square Analysis of All Dyads
Dyad
Total
Parent-Child
26
Mother-Child
26
Mother-Daughter 14
Mother-Son
12
Father-Child
24
Father-Daughter 11
Father-Son
13

P=.30
7.55
10.58
5.00
4.60
2.40
1.33
3.36

P=.29
6.57
7.86
6.29
5.87
1.00
1.33
1.42

P=.23
5.07
7.23
3.80
4.67

o.oo
1.33
0.69

The figures are the result of 3 x 3 analyses, except for the last
column, where 2 x 2 analyses were performed.

Again, it nru.st be noted

that no single grouping of dyads in the sample was large enough to
produce a chi-square analysis with statistically significant results.
Although it is impossible to make any valid generalizations from
these figures, it does seem as though there is a slightly higher
correlation between the figures of rnother and child, at all values of
P, than between any other intrafarnilial dyad.

The figure for rnother-

daughter correlation is h ighest when P=.29, and the same is true for
the mother-son pair, although the actual figure is somewhat lower (6.29
for mothers and daughters, 5.87 for mothers and sons).

Figures for

fathers and their sons are higher at all three P values than the
figures for fathers and daughters, and when P=.30, the difference is in
the ratio of 2.5 to 1.
In this analysis, mothers and sons correlate somewhat higher than
do fathers and sons at all levels, suggesting that the key factor in
the appearance of predication in the children--if any exists at all-may be found in the influence of the mother in the household.

It is

interesting to note that this result differs from the comparisons of
parents and children in terms of the Spearman rank order correlation of
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their associative responses, noted earlier, in which fathers and
children correlated at a somewhat higher level than did rnothers and
children.

In the absence of any post-hoc significance tests on these

observations, however, they are put forth only as descriptions of
phenomena observed in this sample; and the reasons for the difference
between the Spearman results and the chi-square results remain, at this
time, unexplored.
The slightness of these figures prevents any positive conclusions
from being drawn as to the significance of the apparent redundancy of
reaction-type within normal families.

In a 3 x 3 analysis with an

appropriately large number of subjects, the chi-square figure would
need to reach 15.51 in order to attain a .05 level of significance.
With only 26 dyads reported, the highest level of significance attained
in this sample was 10.58, the figure achieved when rnothers and children
were compared.

In a 2 x 2 analysis, only the mother-child dyad (7.23)

approximates the 7.81 figure necessary for significance at the .05
level, but again, the numbers are too small for appropriate validity to
be attained.
However, the trends inherent in t he data might well become more
apparent if greater numbers could be added to t he sample.

Further work

with a larger population will be required to decide the question of
significance either for or against the intuition of Jung, Riklin and
Furst:

that it is no accident that the same reaction-type tends to

occur among multiple members of the same household.
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The Experiment in Deductive Reasoning

At the conclusion of the word association test, subjects were
asked, in the second part of the experiment, to complete a
standardized test in deductive logic, one of the seven sections of the
Ross Test of Higher Cognitive Processes.

The juxtaposition of the two

kinds of instruments, the one a free-flowing, oral-auditory,
subjectively-oriented, essentially open-ended experience, and the
other a serious, pencil-and-paper exercise with real right and wrong
answers, demanding reading comprehension and concentration of
attention, was one that many subjects found quite jarring; the effort
required to shift gears mentally was evidently no easy matter for
some.
As

a discipline of thought, deductive logic may be among the most

dreaded of all "higher cognitive" skills, and part of the disaffection
many individuals feel toward it, quite apart from the dry and
unrelated way in which it is so often t aught, may derive in part from
a cognitive style rooted in a pref erence for predication.

It was

Jung's belief that the "feeling function," one of the four modes which
operate in his theory of cognition, does not easily acconmodate the
process of the "thinking function."

Because there is much in his

description of the "feeling type" individual that is reminiscent of
his earlier analysis of the traits of the "predicate reaction-type,"
it seems worthwhile to examine critical thinking ability, in one of
its classical forms, against predication as an associative reaction
type.

Jung's theory would suggest an inverse correlation between

predicative reactions and logical reasoning skill.
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Experimental conditions.

Thirty-eight of the individuals who

participated in the word association task went on to complete Part II
of the Ross Test.

The parents of Families 4, 7 and 11 were not asked

by the test administrator (in each case a member of their own family)
to take the test, due to considerations of age and failing eyesight.
Logistical difficulties prevented the participation of three of the
individuals who responded to the word association test by telephone;
in three other cases, the administrator judged that the patience of
the subject would not bear a prolongation of the experimental period.
In one case, the subject failed to complete the last page of the test
before turning it in, and in the final instance--unfortunately an
individual with one of the highest predication figures in the
sample--the subject turned the test booklet back at once with the
corrment that he knew he would not do well if he tried to take it.
The group of those who did not participate in the deductive
portion of the experiment consisted of eight persons who were
classified as non-predicate types in the analysis of word association
results; three who were predicate types, at the criteria! level of 30%
predicate responses; one borderline predicate type (P=29%), and two
mixed-predicate types.

Although the loss of their contribution is

regrettable, their removal from the sample did not appreciably change
the overall distribution of response-type frequencies.
SUbjects who took the test were given ten minutes to complete its
eighteen true-false questions.
give their answers.

Most took less than five minutes to

Thirty-five subjects took the test immediately

after the word association portion was concluded, in the presence of
the administrator.

If subjects expressed difficulty in understanding
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the written directions, the administrator gave an explanation that
helped to clarify the process, prior to the beginning of the test.
Once the test had begun, subjects with expressed difficulties were
invited to write their conments directly on the test paper, but
otherwise received no support from the administrator.

The remaining

three subjects, all of whom live at some distance from their
designated administrators, received the test by mail and completed it
under their own supervision.
The instrument. According to the administrator's manual, the
deductive reasoning portion of the Ross Test of Higher Cognitive
Processes was developed to measure ability in the "Evaluation" (level
6) subgroup of Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook I:
Cognitive Domain, "Judgments in Tenns of Internal Evidence," and in
particular, "the ability to indicate logical fallacies in
arguments. 12
11

As

a whole, the seven parts of the Ross Test are

considered adequate for the assessment of "higher-level thinking
skills" in "gifted and non-gifted" individuals of at least fourthgrade level.
In formal construction, Part I I of the Ross Test is a series of
true-false questions about possible conclusions to the premises of a
formal syllogism.

It consists of six sets of premises, or predicative

statements, four cast in the classical mode of major and minor
premise, and one each containing three and four premises.

Three are

categorical syllogisms, two are conditional, and one an informal
statement of associated facts.

At the end of each series of premises,

three possible conclusions are stated, and the respondent is asked to
determine whether each of the conclusions does or does not follow from
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the given premises.

A copy of the test is included at the end of this

report, as Appendix 2.
The Ross Test was chosen from among other tests of logical
reasoning because of the peculiar nature of its predications.

Unlike

those classical syllogisms which require a movement from known (or at
least believable) premises to a conclusion which contributes to the
general state of knowledge, the premises of the Ross Test are built on
contrafactual predications, nonsense words, and substantives which are
quite startling in their sensory inmediacy.

Individuals who are

attuned to the perceptual dimensions of reality, and who are inclined
to make evaluative judgments about that reality, two characteristics
which Jung found in association with predicative verbal behavior, were
thought by the experimenter to be likely to suffer cognitive
interference in the sort of processing required to work with the Ross
premises.
Thus, any difficulty that such i ndividuals might have with
reasoning, or critical thinking, as such would be magnified by their
predicted inability to suspend t heir disbelief sufficiently to move
through the vivid, but impossible, universe of the Ross Test.

Those

whose response pattern gave no hint of a preoccupation with the
sensory and evaluative qualities of predication, on the other hand,
were expected to operate quite easily with the words of the Ross
premises.

Results of the analysis.

In Table 36, the scores of the individuals

who took the Ross Test are listed in the order of their predicative
response rating.

The figures in the "Ross" column indicate the number
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of items missed, out of a possible eighteen; the "P" figures are
percentages of predicate reactions on the word association test.
Table 36
Predication Rates Compared with Ross Test Error Rates
Subject
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

081
102
053
103
031
142
073
104
076
101
083
043
077

p

Ross

43
40
38
35
33
32
31
31
31
31
31
29
29

-5
-1
-3
-5
-2
-5
-8
-4
-6
-5
-0
-3
-5

subject
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

061
012
024
034
023
051
075
048
022
014
045
141
151

p

Ross

29
29
29
27
26
26
25
24
23
23
21
20
20

-2
-1
-1
-8
-3
-3
-7
-9
-4
-0
-0
-3
-4

subject

p

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

18
17
17
16
15
15
14
14
13
12
12
9

015
074
113
062
033
046
032
044
047
021
011
013

Ross
-4
-2
-1
-0
-2
-6
-3
-3
-3
-6
-0
-0

A cursory glance at this list gives the impression that it is
top-heavy in terms of missed items on the Ross Test; and indeed, of
the ten individuals who were highest in predication (P greater than
.31), six missed five or rrore items; seven missed four or rrore, and
eight missed at least three.

One made six mistakes, and one had the

second worst score in the entire sample, with eight incorrect answers.
At the other end of the spectrum, the ten individuals with the
lowest predicate ratings (Pless than .17) seemed to do quite a bit
better as a group:

three had no mistakes at all; five missed two or

less, eight missed three or less, and no one missed rrore than six.
The scores of the ten highest in predication accounted for a
total of 44 errors, for an average of 4.4 per individual.

The ten

lowest in predication missed 24 altogether, making an average of 2.4
errors for each individual.

The difference--with the predicate types
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erring in deduction at nearly twice the rate of those lowest in
predication--is a fairly striking result.
When the scores of the borderline predicate-types (P=.29) are
added to those whose predication rate was .31 and above, the average
error rate is lowered to 3.7, which still remains 1.5 tirces higher
than the average rate of the comparable number of individuals from the
bottom of the list, a figure which rises to 2.5 errors per person.
The inclusion of all the individuals who were identified as mixed
predicate-types in the analysis of word association results brings the
average error rate for the group of twenty-one subjects to 3.9
mistakes per individual, as against 2.5 per person for the fifteen
subjects classified as non-predicate types.

In general, then, it

seems as though individuals high in predication on the word
association test make mist akes in deductive reasoning one and onehalf to two tirces as often as individuals with a low proportion of
predicative responses.
Table 37, on the fol l owing page, gives a ranking o~ subjects in
accordance with their scores on the Ross Test; those with the most
errors are at the top of the list.

The top ten on this list have an

average predication rate of 27.5%.

The individual with the highest

percentage of predicates is among this group of ten, and only two of
the ten are individuals who gave less than 24% predicates on their
word association tests.
The average predication rate for the lowest ten subjects on the
list is 22.7%, a figure which is surprisingly close to that of the top
ten, and indeed, four of these high scorers were also high in
percentage of predicates.

Post-test interviewing of these individuals
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Table 37
Ross Errors Compared With Predication Rates
SUbject Ross
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

048
073
034
075
076
046
021
081
103
142
101
077
13. 104

-9
-8
-8
-7
-6
-6
-6
-5
-5
-5
-5
-5
-4

p

subject

24
31
27
25
31
15
12
43
35
32
31
29
31

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

022
151
015
053
043
023
051
141
032
044
047
031
061

Ross
-4
-4
-4
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-3
-2
-2

p

subject

23
20
18
38
29
26
26
20
14
14

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

13

33
29

074
033
102
012
024
113
083
014
045
062
011
013

Ross
-2
-2
-1
-1
-1
-1
-0
-0
-0
-0
-0
-0

p

17
15
40
29
29
17
31
23
21
16
12
9

revealed the fact that three had studied fonnal logic at some time in
their past, and one had previously taken the Ross Test as well.

The

fourth was quite surprised at her high score, since she had only been
guessing at the answers.

When the data for the three who had studied

logic is set aside, the average rate of predicates for the ten best
scorers on the Ross Test falls to 18.3, nearly a full ten points less
than the average for the ten who missed the most items on the test.
A further refinement of t h is picture becomes possible through an
examination of the composition of the group that forms at each level
of error.

When the sample is divided into predicate and non-predicate

types at the criterial percentage of 30%, all those who missed five
items and half of those who missed five or more were predicate-types.
When borderline predicate types are included, 58% of those who missed
five or more and half of those who missed four or more can be defined
as predicate types.
When the scores of predicate and mixed predicate types are
combined, 100% of those who missed more than six are in their company,
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as are 71.4% of those who missed six or more, and 83.3% of those who
missed at least five.
Conversely, when predication is defined at 30%, and those who
studied formal logic are excluded from the sample, there was no
predicate type individual with a perfect score.

Only 10% of those who

missed less than two are predicate types, as are only 9.1% of those
who missed three or less.

With the addition of figures for the

borderline types, the proportions remain the same:

no member of the

group had a perfect score, and only 7.1% of those who missed less than
three belonged in the predicate category.

When the mixed predicate

types join in the sample, 14.3% of those who missed less than three
have the requisite proportion of predicates, and the remainder, 85.7%,
are all individuals that can be identified as non-predicate types,
with less than 23% predicate responses on the word association test.
A final aspect of this list t hat requires examination is a
frequency distribution of scores:

2.6% of the respondents missed half

the questions on the Ross Test; 5 .3% missed eight of eighteen; 18.4%
missed more than one third of the items .

31.6% made at least five

mistakes, and 42.1% had at least four errors.

A total of 57.1% of the

sample missed three or less, with the largest single percentage, 21%,
making three mistakes; 26.3% missed less than two, and 15.7% achieved
a perfect score.
When the list is divided in half, eight individuals in the top
half had at least 30% predicates, as contrasted with only three in the
lower half, two of whom had studied deductive logic.

Seven of the

thirteen individuals in the top third of the list can be identified as
predicate types by this criteria, as against two in each of the middle
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and lower thirds.

When Pis fixed at 29%, ten of the nineteen

individuals with the most errors are included as predicate types, as
compared with three (not including the three who studied logic) in the
half with the highest Ross Test scores.

With the addition of the

mixed predicate type respondents, fifteen of the worst-scoring
nineteen individuals can be considered high in predication, with the
same three (or eight, if those who studied logic are included) holding
their own among the nineteen with the highest scores.

With the list

divided into thirds, the figures are still more telling:

eleven

predicate or mixed types appear in the worst-scoring third of the
group, five in the middle, and only two among the third with the best
scores, those who missed, at most, one item on the test.
By way of comparison, the scoring information given in the

administrators' manual to the Ross Test indicates that an error rate
of six, or 67% correct responses, is t he average score for a
non-gifted student in the sixth grade.

By contrast, a gifted student

in the sixth grade would be expected to miss no more than three
questions on the test.

On

average, non-gifted children miss three

items more than gifted children at all grade levels tested (fourth,
fifth and sixth).
When raw scores are converted into percentiles, a perfect score
falls into the 91st percentile for gifted students in the sixth grade,
and the 99th percentile for non-gifted students.

Three errors, a

corrmon score in this sample, would rank at the 48th percentile for
gifted, and the 87th percentile for the non-gifted.

With five

mistakes, an individual would fall at the 17th percentile for gifted
sixth-graders, and the 65th percentile for non-gifted students in the
sixth grade.
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None of this, of course, is to suggest that those predicate type
subjects with high error rates are less intelligent than others with
better scores; in fact, the Ross Test was found not to correlate with
standard measures of intelligence.

It may suggest that they have not

had training in deductive logic comparable to that which may have been
given to a gifted sixth-grader; yet again, it may indicate that their
concern with the sensuous quality of each predicate in the Ross Test
prevented them from putting the predicates together in a way that
would eliminate inappropriate conclusions.

There is nothing to find

fault with in the logic of these individuals' daily lives; the most
that can be said is that the artificial practice of the syllogism is
not one in which they have cared to develop a high degree of skill.
As

a final analysis, a Pearson Product Moment Correlation was

performed on the Ross error rates and predication rates of subjects in
the sample.

The result, r=.57, suggests that there is a moderately

strong correlation between high predication rates and high numbers of
errors in deductive reasoning, at least as measured by the syllogisms
of the Ross Test of Higher Cognitive Processes.

The fact that

predicate types had two times the rate of errors as those who were
non-predicate types is certainly a phenomenon that merits further
study, and additional work with other kinds of logic tests might
reveal whether the anomaly is to be found in the thinking function of
the predicate type individual, or in the peculiar predication of the
Ross Test of Higher Cognitive Processes.
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Conclusions

The experiment described in this chapter was designed to examine
two different dimensions of thinking, both related to measures of
verbal behavior.

The test of word association, administered to

fifty-two members of fifteen families was intended to highlight
similarities in associative patterns and reaction styles shared among
members of the same household.

The test of deductive reasoning, given

to thirty-eight of the subjects of the word association test, was
performed in order to show comparative facility in this critical
thinking skill among individuals of different associative reaction
styles.

In both examinations, the focus of attention was the reaction

style distinguished by a preference for predication.

Limitations of the study.

In the course of the analysis, comparisons

were made between findings in the current sample and results from the
experiments in word association performed by C.G. Jung, Franz Riklin,
and En1na Furst and the Burgholzli Clinic in Zurich between 1904 and
1904.

There are, for a modern researcher, several difficulties in

working with the published data of Jung's research team, not the least
of which is the difference in population and the vastly different
social and cultural setting in which the subjects of that time and
place raised their families and led their lives.

Furst's families, in

particular, were more extended groups of relatives and tended to be of
a greater age than the subjects of this sample, most of whom were
nuclear groups of parents with minor children.

The absence of

instruments of mass media, and the different standards of public
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education, which obtained in tum-of-the-century SWitzerland might be
am:>ng the contributing factors in the higher agreement in familial
association as against association of nonrelated individuals than was
evident in the present sample.

In any event, a direct comparison

between the two samples did not prove to be possible.
A second, and equally daunting, difficulty is presented by the
methods of the Burgholzli analysis itself.

At the time, the swiss

researchers were on the cutting edge of statistical or psychoIIEtric
investigation, not simply in the realm of verbal association as such,
but in the ancillary phenomena of reaction-time, pulmonary and galvanic
skin response, a line of research which foreshadowed the modern medical
interest in the interface between emotional and biophysical or somatic
phenomena.

In many respects, they were creating the discipline of word

association research as they worked; frequency tables and standardized
word lists had not yet been i nvented (the firs t such table was not
published until 1910), and, as we have seen, Jung went so far as to
invent a mathematical formula of his own in order to quantify some of
the qualitative differences he and his student observed in the patterns
of their data.
Working with pen and paper at t he t urn of t he century, limited to
the manual calculation of means and "mean variations," neither Jung nor
Furst had access to any of the procedures that modern statisticians
would recognize as valid.

Their word list was not subjected to any

validity test, nor were their results examined through any post-hoc
test of significance, and it is impossible to rule out entirely the
factor of subjectivity in the procedure which they followed in
assigning responses to the relational categories of their
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classification system.

As a consequence, any discussion of their

findings must remain at the level of description.
In the present work, the sane limitation as to the word list
remains, but with an added complication.

The list chosen for use with

the present sample was not the sane list used in the early Burgholzli
research; it was based on a later version of the list which had been
neutralized of emotionally-loaded stimulus-words, and had been toned
down even further for the purposes of administration to pre-adolescent
children.

As a consequence, many of the reactions to these co:rrmonplace

substitute words are also comrronplace; thus there was less opportunity
for the exhibition of significant group patterns that may have emerged
if Jung's highly-charged s t imuli had been used, and emotional themes on
which family members might have shown agreement, and which might have
differentiated fami l y members from nonrelated i ndividuals, were not
subject to examinat ion.
As part of t he determinat i on of agreement, Jung and Furst examined

the dimension of verbal content --what i t was that the respondent said
to the stimulus, not s imply the way, or category , in which he
responded.

Qualitative similarities between and among family members

have not been analysed in t h is study , although t he data remains for
further work; nor were the close int rafamilial alliances, those between
some fathers and sons, for example, further examined.

Those areas,

where the evidence of "familial agreement" showed most clearly, are
reserved to an analytic realm wh ich is alt ogether outside the scope of
this research.
In addition, this experiment stopped after only one hundred words
had been administered.

Jung's original research involved a test of at
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least two hundred words, as did Furst's; some of their subjects were
asked to associate to four hundred stirrruli.

The determination of

reaction-type, therefore, is somewhat less than secure in this work,
since Jung found that it was often not until the end of the longer test
that an individual's true "style" would emerge.
The composition of the families in this sample, though no less
heterogeneous in this sample than in Furst's, posed difficulties for
statistical work that were not as problematic with the descriptive
approach she adopted.

F.qual n's in families would have made direct

comparisons amJng them IIX)re possible, and would allow for the
establishment of IIX)re reliable ranges within which the associative
behavior of normal families can be expected to take place.

Although

the logistics proved to be impossible, it would have strengthened the
sample if intact families could have been tested.

The parent or

children who were missing from the sample families might have held the
key to significance in pattern redundancy in their household, but
unfortunately, the truth of the matter will never be known.
The small sample size made a number of statistical tests which
might have been performed impracticable, including the chi-square,
which was designed to examine the significance of pattern redundancy.
The results may be suggestive in terms of trends, but within such
slight tolerances as to forbid discussion.

The same is true of the

comparison of average family rank order correlations with the average
rank order correlations of nonrelated individuals.

No post-hoc

significance tests were performed on the results of any of the
statistical analyses, so the figures rrrust stand without the assignment
of any degree of significance.
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outcome of hypotheses.

With the foregoing limitations in mind, any

conclusions based on this work must be held as preliminary and
tentative in the highest degree; prior . to validity and significance
testing, it would be premature to make any positive claims based on the
work reported in this chapter.

Nonetheless, the data gathered in this

study seems at least suggestive with respect to three of the
hypotheses, and somewhat more strong in the case of the fourth.
The first hypothesis, that pattern redundancy in families occurs
at statistically significant levels, could not be proven because the
sample size was too small for a reliable chi-square test to be
performed.

However, even with the small number of dyads subjected to

each test, the dyad of mother and daughter, when analysed in a 2 x 2
format as either predicate or non-predicate type, did come to within a
few points of the 7.51 chi-square result necessary for significance at
the .OS level.

A larger sample size might serve to strengthen this

trend.
The second hypothesis, that predication is the dominant
reaction-style in any family in which it occurs in one of the parents,
was also suggested by the evidence.

In all but one case, predicating

parents were shown to have at least one predicate-type child, and in
that exceptional case, if all the children could have been tested, it
is possible that it also would conform to the pattern of the other
families.

Furthermore, in households where neither parent was a

predicate type, there were no predicate types found among the children.
In the absence of acceptable significance tests, this result must
remain, like the similar results obtained by Furst, descriptive only.
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Mothers and daughters, the objects of the third hypothesis, were
seen to have the closest degree of conformity of any familial dyad when
reaction-patterns were tested by the formula devised by C.G. Jung to
show associative similarity.

However, Spearman correlations performed

on a different set of data, the classified responses, showed mothers
and daughters to be close, but not as close as fathers and sons, or as
close as parents are with one another.

When category choice was

examined, children were found to be more similar to their fathers than
to their mothers, but to a degree which is probably not significant.
The final hypothesis, on the interference between predication and
deduction as modes of thought, seems to be supported by the evidence of
this experiment.

subjects identified as high in predication on the

word association test made nearly twice as many mistakes on a test of
deductive logic as did those subjects with few predicative responses,
when only these two factors were examined.

A Pearson Product Moment

correlation between percentage of predicates on the word association
test and number of errors on the deductive logic section of the Ross
Test of Higher Cognitive Processes yielded a result of r=.57,
indicating a moderately strong correlation between high predication
rates and high numbers of mistakes in deductive reasoning.
A further intention of this work, above and beyond the testing of
the four initial hypotheses, was to establish a set of parameters
within which members of normal families might be expected to agree with
one another in associative response.

In this sample, any two members

of a family were found to produce the same word to a given stimulus, on
average, just under 20% of the time; any given individual member's
response was matched by a response by any other family member about 30%
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of the time.

When the dimension of response category was examined,

these figures rose by a factor of two, with responses of any two
members coinciding between 34-38% of the time, and any member sharing
responses with any other member on 50-60'% of the stimulus words.
The degree of difference between "family" and non-family
associations, although not among the original hypotheses of this work,
was a dimension examined by Furst in her population of more than one
hundred subjects.

Her 8,000 manual calculations according to Jung's

formula for the quantification of difference yielded figures suggestive
of a small but discernible closeness in family associations as compared
with the associations of unrelated people.

In the present work, an

analysis of variance might have been a useful procedure for bringing
any effect of "family" to light.

The comparisons of related and

non-related individuals' Spearman correlations gave an average result
of .29 for family members and .25 for unrelated individuals overall.
Although this small difference was not tested for levels of
significance, it was analysed further to reveal the fact that
individuals related to each other had correlations on their word
association tests at the level of 0. 40 and above about one and one half
times more frequently than did non-related individuals in the
population at large (20.8% for related individuals, 14.8% for
non-related individuals).
Although the significance of this phenomenon has yet to be
determined, and indeed it may prove not to be significant on further
analysis, it does seem at least suggestive of a "family factor" which
may involve individuals in patterns of verbal reaction specific to the
family as a group, and may serve as one of a number of launching-points
for further research in the area of family associative behavior.
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Directions for further research.

This work, as mentioned earlier, is

the fourth in a series of theoretical explorations of the material
contained in the first article of Volume 1 of C.G. Jung's Diagnostic
Association Studies, "The Associations of Normal SUbjects," coauthored
with Franz Riklin; nor is it likely to be the last.

Previous studies

by this writer have focused on Jung's complex theory, in light of
modern cognitive and structuralist ideas of associative clustering and
semantic fields; on Jung's view of repression, as evidenced in the data
of his word association experiments, and in comparison with the
Freudian clinical model of repression and the various defense
mechanisms, including the controversial phenomenon of "perceptual
defense," which have been tested to greater or lesser effect in
experimental laboratories by a number of cognitive psychologists; on
his classification schema, in which an incipient "levels of processing"
approach to associative encoding and retrieval can be seen; and
finally, on a criterion-based approach to his associative typology,
using a statistical perspective to reinterpret the "types" assigned by
Jung to the participants in the first Burgholzli experiment on the
associations of normal subjects.
The family dimension, expl ored in the present study, is certainly
not the final theme worthy of exploration in Jung's earliest
publication on verbal associative behavior.

The interface between

verbal association and visual imagery, which underlies his article like
a structural support, is one element which lends itself to experimental
investigation.

Longitudinal work, such as that done by Jung with

subjects 19 and 24 of his initial experiment, might serve to
demonstrate the stability of reaction-type over time, thus opening
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toward a study of personality in which the word association test might
conceivably be correlated with such tests as the Myers-Briggs Type
Indicator.
But even within the bounds of the family research begun in this
study, much more remains to be done to establish reliable and
statistically valid baselines for the associative behavior of family
members.

This work is, in essence, preliminary; it was intended to

provide the experimenter with experience in techniques of
administration and analysis of the word association test that can be
used in subsequent work with larger populations and a more adequate
statistical design.

Perhaps the most valuable result of the present

work is the quantification of the Jung-Riklin classification system, in
its hierarchical arrangement reflecting decreasing tension in logical
relatedness between stimulus and response; the coding scale presented
in this chapter can be used in computer-assisted analysis of response
patterns, although it must await validity and reliability testing
before its use can be too widely generalized.
In terms of the response patterns evidenced in this study, an
analysis of variance should still be done in order to isolate the
meaning of the small differences which appeared in this sample between
related and unrelated individuals.

Significance tests should be

performed on the correlational averages to determine whether a
difference of four points between related and unrelated individuals is
meaningful, assuming that correlational averages themselves represent a
meaningful way of ascertaining levels of difference.

And comparison of

sample response frequencies with normative associative frequencies
ought also to be done.
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Assuming, for the rroment, that the difference between family and
the general population proves to be insignificant from a strictly
statistical perspective, the establishment of that fact in itself might
be of tremendous importance in the future work to which this study is
only a prologue.

As

mentioned in the introduction, this project was

conceived to follow in the tradition of the Burgholzli doctors, who
looked first at psychometric patterns of normal subjects before
beginning clinical work with pathologically disturbed individuals.

In

this paradigm, the small--and perhaps statistically insignificant-difference between related and nonrelated individuals in this sample
might be indicative of the level at which a "family factor" operates
within a normal population.

The difference might be found to increase,

perhaps, in dysfunctional family groups whose thought and behavior are
distinguished by pathological enmeshment, to the point that "family
resemblance" becomes a problem.
SUch a new hypothesis, however, belongs rrore properly to a
subseqent phase of research.

What renEins to be examined here,

however, are the implications of the rrost striking result to emerge
from the present findings:

that there is a rroderately strong

correlation between preference for predication on the word association
test, and greater numbers of errors on a test of deductive reasoning.
This finding seems to support Jung's theory, described in Chapter 3,
that there is interference between the two cognitive functions he
called "thinking" and "feeling."

The metacognitive implications of

this finding will be discussed in the chapter which follows.

CHAPTER

V

IMPLICATIONS FOR METACOGNITIVE PRAXIS

When Aristotle taught his course on reasoning, which became
codified from his lecture notes in the five books of the Organon, his
point of departure was predication:

the categories of being, quality,

attribute and action which may be asserted of any object.

With the

mastery of categorical assertion, the student of his method would have
all the tools necessary to construct propositions, predicative
statements with truth value, and would be ready to combine propositions
in such a way as to deduce from what was stated some other, ungiven
truth.

Clearly, it was his experience that thinkers could move on from

one stage to the next, although the step may have seemed neither
natural nor easy at first; but indeed, as the evidence of this study
suggests, it is just this movement, the transcendence of the static
proposition with its truthful given, that the individual who prefers
predication seems less inclined than others to make.
There is much in Aristotle's approach to language and logic that
would inform a modern discussion of "critical thinking skills;" but
unfortunately, the rigorous beauty of his system has been undervalued
in recent times, perhaps because of the historical overemphasis on
method which has rendered the deductive syllogism an empty exercise
(Baron, 1985, Ennis, 1987), perhaps because of an intellectual bias
within American education which values innovation over continuity.
Nevertheless, the practice of deduction, and of judging deductive
conclusions, is a major component of what Robert Ennis, of the Illinois
Critical Thinking Project, has termed "critical thinking ability;" and
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many of those who are currently part of the educational IIX)Vement in
critical thinking might be somewhat surprised to learn that their new
approach to thinking has very old antecedents indeed.
"Critical thinking," as Ennis defines it, is "a practical
reflective activity that has reasonable belief or action as its goal"
(1987, p. 10).

It implies not only the operation of a set of methods,

but also a particular disposition toward reason and reflection, a
personal attitude which values clarity, order, flexibility, openmindedness, and an analytical approach to information.

The result of

this alliance between method and disposition is reasonable belief, an
opinion which can stand the test of argument to the contrary, and which
serves as the basis for reasonable decisions and actions.
Ennis' criteria for the critical attitude bear striking
resemblance to the characteristics attributed by C.G. Jung to the
thinking disposition in his 1921 IIX)nograph Psychological Types.

But

Jung's discussion of the positive aspects associated with the thinking
function was balanced by an assessment of those qualities which might
militate against the development of critical thinking ability in an
individual; these qualities are the foundation of what he called the
"feeling" disposition, an approach to information which is rooted in
the inmediacy of predication.
Vygotsky's developmental work (1986) has provided a theoretical
framework within which predication can be seen as the permanent residue
of childhood's egocentric speech patterns, and the natural IIX)de of an
individual's "inner speech."

He suggests that it becomes externalized

as a IIX)de of corrmunication with others only within closed systems whose
members are all engaged in a single frame of reference.

Brown (1958b)
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speaks tellingly of the shaping influence a parent's predications may
have on the world-view of a child, leading to the formation of
attitudes or prejudices which may seem appropriate in context of the
family system, but may clash with the values of the collective society.
Laing (1972) goes so far as to suggest that a habit of evaluative
predication within a household can have disastrous longterm effects on
the child's self-concept and ability to think.
An

individual who has been overnourished on predicates, then, may

come to a course in critical thinking skills with a background which
predisposes him to fail.

All the hallmarks of what Jonathan Baron

calls "poor thinking" (Baron, 1985) are in evidence in the predicative
attitude:

a need for certainty, an overconfidence in the irrmediacy of

sensory data, a preference for delimited possibility, an unwillingness
to examine opinion, a belief that "t hinking" is difficult or useless.
Predication is, by its nature , a hedge aga i nst ambiguity, a form of
categorical and determinate negation; it rules out multiple
possibilities and alternatives , and i t s concrete specificity is the
very opposite of t he abstraction which is required for reflective
thought.
Baron's work on rationa l i ty and intell i gence has included a study
of factors which might inhib i t the processes of critical thought.
Paramount among these forces are personal attitudes and values which
are developed in the home and reinforced by the socio-cultural norms
which operate in an individual's environment; he is explicit in his
recognition of the potential for family attitudes to sabotage a
teacher's efforts to cultivate rational thinking skills.

A child who

exhibits what may appear to be resistance or "mental laziness" when
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given sorre critical thinking task in a classroom might actually be
manifesting the dynamic of a vast alternative system of thought, a
rationality with rules and methods of its own which may violate the
rules of academic rationality, but are no less adapted to the
circumstances of that child's world than formal logic might be to the
world of the academician.
Sensitivity to such background paradigms is an essential component
in any attempt to make logical methods attractive to individuals whose
rationality runs by other rules.

The opinions and attitudes

characteristic of the predicative, or to use Jung's term, the feeling,
disposition, are not evidence of "irrmature" thinking, which can be
developed through casual instruction in method.

They may rather be the

products of a fully-developed form of thought which operates by
criteria equally "critical" as those by which "critical thinking"
proceeds, and as such, may require a massive transformation in order
for the rules of academic rationality to begin to operate.
Not without cause did Jung designate feeling as a "rational"
function, since reason, ratio, is, in its essence, the predication of
relationship.

Thinking operates with the relationships between

concepts, with the coordination of abstractions; feeling operates with
relationships between values, through an association of attributes
which are grasped at the level of concrete reality.

As

preferred ways

of relating to the data of the environment, both deserve understanding
and tolerance, but only the former is accepted within the educational
corrmunity, and the latter is often made to suffer unnecessarily through
teaching and testing methods which assume that there is, by definition,
only one right way to think.
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Luria's series of "anti-cartesian experiments" in Soviet Central
Asia (1979) revealed the fundamental ethnocentrism inherent in such an
attitude toward thinking.

He connected the ability to "reason," in the

critical sense, with prior experience of systematic instruction in
grammar.

Simple premises and predications which reflect the known

world are, he found, quite adequate in primary socio-cultural
conditions.

It is only when external circumstances require the

movement l:leyond the concrete that abstract reasoning l:lecomes at all
useful.
One need not go abroad to discover that critical thinking may l:le
neither useful nor desirable within certain communities, but Luria's
point as to the interconnection l:letween language and logic is profound,
and in some respects, subversive of the established educational order
in this society.

Seen in its light, the current movement in teaching

"critical thinking skills" may l:le little more than an elaborate form of
damage control for the failure of the educational establishment to
maintain appropriate standards of instruction in the fonna.lities of
language at the primary and secondary leve1.l
Put another way, the laudable goals of critical thinking programs
would l:lenefit from a systematic approach to language, of the kind that
Aristotle himself outlined in his methods course.

It is significant

that he chose to devote so much attention--two complete books--to the
process of predication and the construction of well-formed
propositions, l:lefore moving to the more arcane matters of deduction,
dialectic and paradox.

The same sequence might l:le helpful to the

individual of feeling disposition, when he is faced with the necessity
of learning to think critically.

It is an approach which values the
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predicate, which establishes itself firmly in the known universe, which
allows for the statement of a truth, and permits a moment of rest in
the security of the given.

It is just this safety and groundedness

that a predicate type individual may need, before he is launched into
the troubled waters of critical thinking.

But program.sin "critical

thinking" often begin with the premise that relativity is better than
certainty, that authority must be repudiated, that judgrnent--the
guiding faculty of the feeling function - - must be suspended, demands
which may well be too abrupt and too dislocating for the predicative
disposition.
A negative experience of the process of "learning to think" may
guarantee the foreclosure of an individual's option to develop the
thinking function.

But if such damage at the hands of undoubtedly

well-rneaning instructors can be avoided, however, the natural dynamics
of psychological equilibrium can assist the feeling individual in the
development of his thinking function.

The opposing, or as Jung terms

it, the inferior, function of thinking holds an enormous fascination
for the person of feeling disposition, precisely because it is
underdeveloped.

It is the missing piece of his cognitive puzzle, and

represents all the undiscovered potential of his future development.
But because the operational criteria of thinking and feeling are
mutually opposed, they cannot be forced to coexist, and Jung warns
against any attempt to approach the inferior function directly.

He

suggests instead a method of development which will enlist the support
of one of the perceptual functions, sensation or intuition, in helping
the individual learn to shift safely and comfortably from one
information-processing mode to the other.
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Even so handled, however, the transition is not an easy one to
make.

The cognitive habits of a lifetime are difficult to alter, and

even if the process begins in childhood, it may be forced to work
against the linguistic and cognitive preferences of the family system,
the distillation of cumulative lifetimes, generations of cognitive
habit.

SUch work may of necessity go beyond the limits of formal

education, and into the ultimate realm of metacognitive praxis,
psychological analysis.
Rather than recognizing its own appropriate boundaries, however,
education has tended to take upon itself the role that properly belongs
to analysis.

Classical psychoanalytic theory, with all its doctrinal

overtones, underlies the "critical thinking" approach to a remarkable
degree.2

Richard Paul, of the Center for Critical Thinking at Sonoma

State University, for example, makes an argument for the development of
thinking skills which stems directly from the Freudian paradigm.
People have a primary and secondary nature, he declares, the former
egocentric, irrational, opinionated and defensive, the latter "an
implicit capacity to function as rational persons" (Paul, 1987, p.
130), an innate tendency which requires diligent and systematic
practice in order to succeed in its task of recognizing and correcting
the inadequacies of the primary nature.

The goal of this work is the

development of "a passion to seek reasons and evidence," Paul says, and
any instruction which does not foster this evidentiary and
discriminative rationality does not, in his view, deserve the name of
education.
Although Paul's argument stresses the importance of dialectical
(his term is "dialogical") process in breaking down the irrationality
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of "egocentric identifications," his solution to the problem of one
form of rronolithic thinking is the substitution of another, equally
monolithic form, just as Freud's answer to the vitality of the primary
process was the repression of the secondary process.

Given such a

framework, the praise Paul bestows on the ability to enter
sympathetically into the "mind set" of another has a somewhat hollow
ring; such cognitive rapprochement can only take place on the
playing-field of systematic rationality, a field on which not everyone
may be equally suited to play.
While Paul, Baron, Ennis and others in the critical thinking world
have stressed the superiority of rational thinking and the critical
point of view, a second stream of cognitive theory recognizes the
existence, and value, of "multiple intelligences," operating with modes
of perception and information-processing which are quite distinct from
the bipolar rational/irrational dichotomy of mainline critical thinking
theory.

The diversity with which human beings approach the data of the

world is celebrated in Howard Gardner's Frames of Mind (Gardner, 1983),
in a way which is compatable with Jung's theory of functional typology.
Drawing on research in the neurophysiological and biological
fields which had earlier established the theory of hemispheric
dominance in cognition, Gardner suggests that every individual has
access to seven independent forms of information processing, and that
each individual's cognitive profile is a result of the specific
combination he makes of these distinct "intelligences."

Logico-

mathematical intelligence is one of the possible modes in which an
individual may prefer to function; linguistic intelligence is another.
Historically, the assessment of "intelligence" has depended on measures
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of skill in these two areas, yet five other domains, equal in
importance, which Gardner identifies as musical, spatial, kinesthetic,
interpersonal, and intrapersonal intelligences, have been neglected and
devalued by the educational establishment, and individuals whose
natural combination of functions inclines them to one of these
unrecognized intelligences have been ill-served by an overemphasis on
the systematic rationality of linguistic and logical ability.
Gardner's sensitivity to alternative modes of cognition is
reminiscent of Jung's theoretical challenge to the Freudian concept of
unidimensional rationality.3

Both theories emphasize the variability

of perception, the relative importance of sensation and abstraction, of
matter and of form, of pattern and relationship; both stress that the
cognitive system depends on the interplay of a number of different
functions, each attuned to a different dimension of reality, each
operating with its own rules of analysis and synthesis.

Jung's feeling

disposition might find its home i n Gardner's "spatial intelligence,"
with its concern for the visual world ; or again, in the "interpersonal
intelligence" of Gardner's theory, with its caring discernment of mood
and atmosphere.
A child of feeling disposition , i f offered such options to develop
his natural inclinations in his early years, might then be able to
approach the tasks of logical thought from a position of strength, and
come with an open mind to the beauty and clarity of systematic
thinking.

SUch an individual, forced prematurely or without adequate

preparation into the strait-jacket of logico-linguistic structure, on
the other hand, is certain to develop an aversion for rational thought
from which he may never recover.
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The key to discovering the mode of one's natural inclination, as
Jung suggests, lies in the patterning of everyday language, in the
preference for a particular kind of associative relationship, and in
the clusters of ideas that constellate around the sounds and rneanings
of words.

But a question arises as to the origin of that "natural"

disposition:

that which has become so automatized and habituated as to

seem natural may in fact, he suggests, be the product of speech
patterns instilled in childhood by the language habits of parents; and
far from serving the purposes of natural development, may hinder the
development of one or more of his four "intelligences," to use
Gardner's elegant expression.
The effect of language on attitude has been recognized by scholars
and practitioners of the art of rhetoric at least since the days of
Aristotle.

But its influence on an individual's nental health and

stability may be somewhat less obvious.

Whorf was among those who have

pointed out the etiological role of language in the compulsion of
neurotic behavior.

Bateson's work with schizophrenogenic families

suggests that cognitive processes can actually break down under
repeated violation of the metalogical and metalinguistic rules of
conmunication, when interaction among family members creates a context
in which the formal aspect of the message is at variance with its
verbal content.
Language abused may lead to cognitive dysfunction, and provides
the means through which symptoms of the dysfunction are conveyed as
well.

The distinctive speech patterns of schizophrenia, for example,

as Bateson suggests, can be compared to a conflation of predicates in a
syllogism:

where normal thought rroves through the predicates to a
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conclusion, the schizophrenic will draw a relationship of equality
between the predicates and remain trapped in his own fictitious

identification, unable to rrove beyond his distorted recombination of
the given.
While the overt symptoms of cognitive dysfunction may be
manifested by a single individual, both Bateson and Laing agree that
the entire family, the system itself, is the living source of the
dysfunction.

This was Jung's view as well, as can be seen from his

early writings on the family, and although his own therapeutic career
was spent in working with individuals on the end-results of their
attempts to adapt to the experience of family interaction, a number of
innovative clinical psychologists working in South Africa and in London
have recently l::egun to take the Jungian concept of collective
patterning directly into t herapeutic work with dysfunctional families
(Papadopoulos and Saayman, 1989).
It is not to be expected that examples of pathological conformity,
such as the one discussed by Jung (see Chapter 3), would have been
found in the sample population of the present study of verbal
associative behavior in normal families.

It would be equally mistaken,

however, to deny on the basis of the present sample that such cases
exist.

Future investigation may indeed discover that evaluative

predication is at the heart of such systemic dysfunction, as Jung's
clinical work indicated, and as Laing of the Tavistock Clinic also
seems to suggest.
In the clinical setting, the word association test may take on new
significance and open new avenues of approach to systemic dysfunction,
and the maladaptation of personal "types" to one another.

No longer of
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"merely theoretical importance," as Jung himself had described it in
his Clark University lecture of 1909, verbal association within
families may serve as a practical technique for revealing cognitive
similarities at the systemic level which exert an influence on
individual thought and behavior.
Further experimental work with normal families, building on the
work begun in this study, may succeed in establishing reliable
parameters within which normal associations may be expected to
coincide, parameters which can serve as a baseline against which
abnormal processes may be contrasted.

One might speculate that, given

an appropriately designed instrument,4 pathologies of identification,
the paralyzing possession of unconscious role-playing, the destructive
dynamics of the dysfunctional family drama, all might come to light,
and be shown to differ from the patterns and levels of agreement found
in normal families such as those of the present study.

The themes and

images which emerge from a group association test in the clinical
setting may offer powerful evidence of the collective patterns which
structure the interactions of the group, indeed perhaps the most
compelling evidence that can be brought to light, for as Jung himself
found, beneath the phenomenon of the association is the gramnar of
thought itself, the deep-lying structure of relationship to which the
word is a most eloquent and honest witness.
The exposure of patterns--of language, of thought, of behavior--is
the essence of any rnetacognitive work, and the precondition for any
process of conceptual change, whether it take place in the context of
education, as in Bateson's vision of "secondary learning," "learning to
learn," or in the realm of therapeutic analysis.

Both approaches are
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transformative of the quality of thought itself; both have recourse to
the trerrendous restorative power that is released through clarity of
thought and insight into underlying order.

Jung's theory of cognitive

functions suggests that an individual's mental health requires a
balance between the thinking and feeling functions, but the development
of the ideal state of cognitive harrrony can only be achieved by a
struggle against the tension of these two opposing forces.
For many people, the struggle may seem too difficult to engage;
for others, the educational system itself may serve as an impediment to
the struggle.

The individual who prefers "thinking," who is encouraged

to explore the world through logical rationality and who excels in the
tasks of academia, may find himself lost at some point in his life,
isolated by an impoverished feeling function.

The predicative

personality, who may begin life with a disadvantage as regards
thinking, may be confirmed in his intuition that he "can't" think
rationally by unfeeling teachers, and go through life without once
experiencing the satisfying clarity of systematic thought.

And

unfortunately, for the development of the whole personality, the
feeling individual, who is the one most critically in need of
developing the thinking function, may be the one most resistant to it
as well.
For the student who comes from a family whose thought is
overdetermined by evaluative judgments, or worse, from a dysfunctional
household where nothing is clear or secure, critical rationality may
not be an irrmediately acceptable alternative.

On

the other hand, the

cultivation of the thinking function may be such a child's best defense
against becoming overwhelmed by the emotional chaos of the household.
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Strengthening the thinking function may be seen as literally a matter
of life and death, requiring the utrnost sensitivity and professionalism
on the part of the teacher, or therapist, into whose presence such a
child may come.
As

Baron and others have suggested, prior to critical skill is

critical attitude, a sense of security with rational analysis, the
questioning of assumptions, the sequence of cause and effect, which
cannot be effectively transmitted by a teacher who is insecure within
the framework of his own system of thought.

If, on the other hand, he

is too rigid, too much under the domination of his own "thinking"
function, his lack of feeling may alienate those who have the rnost to
learn from him.

What is needed is a process of mutual interchange,

mutual influence and mutual development; for while the predicative
student is at the task of learning to think, t he thinking pedagogue
might learn something about values and sensory realities from the
feeling individual.
Genuine human development requires more of education than that
everyone should become a systematic logician.

But by the same token,

everyone should be allowed to have a positive experience of reasoning,
to enjoy the refreshing clarity of formal logical thought, which, even
when it enters the "critical thinking" curriculum, is preceded by
abject apology and left behind with great relief by teachers and
students alike.

It is no wonder, given its historical treatment, that

logic is looked upon as anxiety-provoking by the vast majority.

It is

too often introduced without adequate preparation, without groundwork
of the kind--to return to the Aristotelian metaphor with which this
chapter opened--that Aristotle so carefully laid in his courses.
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The predicament involved in developing the thinking function of
the predicative personality is not one which can be addressed easily.
It is not a matter for some new prescriptive pedagogy or curriculum
unit.

It cannot be achieved by the formulation of more slogans,

acronyms and devices to assist students to remember discrete critical
procedures or operations of thought.

The differentiation of a critical

consciousness out of the matrix of an unexamined life can hardly be
scripted, since it is, in and of itself, the creation of a unique human
individual, one who comes to the process with a unique set of
experiences, understandings, values and patterns of reaction to both
language and the environment.
Any true educational process--and under this rubric psychoanalysis
is also to be included--must take into account the tremendous variety
of cognitive habit or disposition in which individuals present
themselves, and rather than imposing a strict template on everyone,
must begin with the strength of the individual--the preferred
"intelligence," in Gardner's sense, the personal learning style, the
personal typology discovered by C.G. Jung.
The capacity for critical consciousness exists to some degree in
everyone, no matter how primitive, or how damaged, his background, as
Luria's fieldwork and Jung's psychiatric research so tellingly
revealed.

The challenge for educators is to cultivate the thinking

faculty in a sensitive, positive and non-threatening way, related to
the patterns of development each individual has brought from his own
background, keeping in mind the fact that those backgrounds may be
overdetermined with predicative value judgments and an aversion to the
labor required for "thinking."

Individuals from those backgrounds may
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not be ready to move on in "critical thinking" as quickly as someone
from a more objective, thinking-oriented household--but the educator
who abandons the slow one or the resistant one with a poor grade in
"reasoning skill" has failed in his own mission, and compounded the
problem as well.
The operation needed in this work is a gentle and compassionate
leading out from the limitations of the habit of judging--not a
judgmental or dismissive confrontation of them, or a slick and facile
exposure of their inadequacy, their "incorrectness."

It moves with the

laws of logic, not through dictation in an unrelated and rigid fashion,
or through meaningless and nonsensical exercises, but in a living,
organic way.

Most people never see a syllogism in the entire course of

their lives--but they live with them on a continuous basis.

It is

perfectly legitimate, therefore, to wonder "why" one should study logic
as long as its ultimate use remains a mystery, as it almost invariably
does in the course of formal ins truction, even instruction in "critical
thinking."
But the fact is that logic is as much about revealing premises as
it is about drawing conclusions.

The process of forward motion through

the terms of a deductive syllogism may be next to useless for the
purposes of most people's daily lives.

But beneath every predication,

every value judgment, every prejudice, may lurk a universal premise, an
archetypal patterning of the individual's conceptual universe which
will exercise its ruthless power until it can be exposed, through a
"reversal" of the normal direction through which logic is conducted.
such a forward-and-backward running approach meets the learner on
his own ground, as Plato and his student Aristotle would have done, and
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works with his language, his conceptual world, the patterns of reaction
that are evidenced in the interchange of language between two people,
the one revealing, the other discerning, listening, questioning, then
himself revealing, in a dynamic and living rhythm which allows the
other to discern, and learn to discern, for himself.

The rnoment in

which pattern is discovered between them--pattern in behavior, in
language, in thought--is the moment of liberation from its tyranny.
The only tool the work requires is language:

the material in which the

dysfunction is revealed is also the source of its transcendence.

The

method is the dialectic.5
Aristotle's focus on the language of predication may be--as he
himself no doubt realized--the best starting point for the development
of skill in reasoning.

His extraordinary care for the precision of

language served as the foundation on which the critical consciousness
of Western civilization for the following two thousand years was
constructed.

Perhaps he understood, better than we do today, that

imprecise formulations of thought, clothed in inadequate terminology,
can impede the operation of clear and coherent reason.

But he knew as

well that in dialogue, through speech--dialexis--language can be
reshaped to a more adequate representation of reality, fostering a more
adequate adaptation to the necessity of circumstance.

And perhaps he

might have glimpsed its healing power as well, its power to constellate
order out of chaos, to channel the force of emotion along networks of
associations arranged and rearranged in such a way as to mitigate harm.
we could do worse, at the end of our rnillenium, than take another
look at the fundamental approach to thinking bequeathed to us from a
past that valued reason as the quintessential attribute of the free
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individual, a reason tempered with feeling and with sense, devoted to
the task of individual and social development.

Perhaps through the

ancient approach to human reason, we might rediscover in language the
mediating principle between individual and system, mind and society.
change in language, as Wharf said, can transform our appreciation of
the CosmJs; it may serve as well as the source of both psychological
and ecological harmony.

A

NOTES
Introduction.
lsir Francis Galton's work with composite portraiture was reported in
his Inquiries into Human Faculty and its JJevelopment (1907) , and is
discussed by Brown (1958b, p. 87-88), and Anglin (1977, p. 11), where
it is cited as an argument for the existence of conceptual
"prototypes." Jung (1971) uses Galton's work as an analogy for his
sketches of the psychological types; Vygotsky (1986) also mentions it,
and says it cannot serve as an adequate model for the process of
concept formation.
2Jung's initial experiment is reported in "The Associations of Normal
subjects," coauthored by Franz Riklin (Jung, 1973). Furst's work was
translated as "Statistical Investigations on Word Association and on
Familial Agreement in Reaction Type Among Uneducated SUbjects" (Jung,
1918). Jung's lectures at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts,
were published as "The Association Method" and "The Family
Constellation" (Jung, 1973). By modem statistical standards, these
works would be considered qualitative in nature, since they do not go
beyond work with means and standard deviations. This is not a
criticism of the level of analysis pursued in these texts; more
advanced statistical methodology was not available at the time.
3The theory of multiple intelligences is the work of Howard Gardner
(1983). Primary and secondary process thinking were first proposed by
Freud (1950) in 1900. Piaget's theories of the development of logic
are discussed in Gardner's history of the structuralist movement
(1973). Dispositional bias is discussed in Baron (1985). The
predicative nature of inner speech is described by both Vygotsky (1978,
1986) and Luria (1982).
4This is not, of course, to suggest t hat conformity represents the
only form of pathology, or that conformity is in and of itself
pathological. Jung's psychiatric focus, however , was on the pathology
of conformity, imitation and identification (see Chapter 3), and it is
my personal interest as well.
5The work of Sabina Spielrein has been studied by Carotenuto (1982)
and Bettelheirn (1983), and is also discussed in the Freud-Jung
correspondence (1974). Alexander Luria began his psychological career
with a fervent devotion to the ideas contained in Jung's word
association articles, as he attests in his memoirs (1979).
Chapter I.
lM.D. Eder suggested, in the introduction to his translation of the
Burgholzli Studies in Word Association (1918), that Jung had derived
the insights leading to his conceptions of the persona and the
collective unconscious from his work with the word associations of
families. The linguistic dimension of the collective unconscious has
been explored in depth by Papadopoulos (1980, 1984) and Kugler (1982).
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2The controversy between Platonic and Aristotelian viewpoints is
apparently still raging in the fields of psycholinguistics and
cognitive psychology, as can be seen from a number of articles in Simon
and Scholes (1982).
3Freud is actually discussing the "abnormal" process of condensation
in this passage, but it may be seen as merely an intensification of the
normal process of concept formation.
4There may be variations in the process which might be accounted for
by the concept of "labelling" with reference to the links of an
associative network.
5These bits of information are, of course, the categories of
Aristotelian logic. The term "predication" itself comes from Boethius'
sixth-century Latin translation of Aristotle's categories, a treatise
on the formation and analysis of simple propositions. There is much in
Anderson's approach that is reminiscent of the Aristotelian system; the
"cognitive revolution," in fact, seems to have gone to great
intellectual and technical lengths to restore a mode of analysis that
would have been perfectly accessible, despite its inelegant computerinspired expression, to the logically trained minds of the classical
age.
6cognitive psychologist carol Smith suggests that infants, as well as
children of the age discussed by Brown, are capable of conceptual
abstraction.
7carey (1988) argues that this process involves not only
differentiations, but also "coalescences," which lead to the formation
of superordinate category conceptions in young children.
8These "late syntagrnatic" responses may be characteristic of the
"predicate type" respondent observed by Jung, Riklin and Furst in their
work with the associations of adults; see below, Chapter 4. It seems
as though the developmental sequence is not a strict one; young
children can evidence "mature" ordinate, subordinate and superordinate
responses, and adults can persist in the predication which is
characteristic of children. The process may be one of a successive
relocation of emphasis, rather than an evolution of the capacity to
associate in specific categories.
Chapter. II.
lrt is significant that Saussure's associative complexes are not
hierarchically arranged, as are those of the later structuralist
psychologists, such as Deese and Pollio (see Chapter I). Further on
the construction of Saussure's complexes, see Kugler (1982).
2The therapeutic implications of this theory were not lost on Whorf;
see, for example, the passage in one of his late essays, "Language,
Mind and Reality (Whorf, 1956, p. 269): "neuroses are simply the
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compulsive working over of word systems, from which the patient can be
freed by showing him the process and the pattern." Wharf's writing
abounds with references to the theoretical work of Jung, which must
have had a profound effect on his own psychological vie-wpoint.
3saussure's influence on the Russian formalists, who in turn
influenced both Vygotsky and Luria, is traced by Jameson (1972).
Vygotsky makes explicit reference to the work of Sapir in at least one
of his books (1986). Luria (1982) mentions a critique of the
Sapir-Whorf theory, but does not develop it at length. The position
taken by Vygotsky on the social origin of language is, of course, the
opposite to that espoused by Piaget.
4Both Vygotsky and Luria emphasize a great deal in their writings; I
have chosen not to replicate all their underlinings, in the belief that
they would rather distract attention than enhance it.
5For a ITXJre recent view of this process, see carey (1988).
Chapter III.
lThis connection was explored in a previous study, "C.G. Jung's
Diagnostic Association Studies: A Cognitive Perspective," (unpublished,
1990). The levels of processing theory was first enunciated in an
article by Craik and Lockhart (1972) and is unique aITXJng cognitive
models in that it does not rely on a computer analogy to explain the
functioning of the human mind.
2Jung and Riklin proposed t he existence of six reaction types in all,
of which three were varieties of t he complex type.
3Jung's adult subjects who were found t o prefer predication might
possibly be described by Entwisle (1966) as those who have made a shift
back to "late syntagmatics."
4Educational level seems to have been t he distinguishing factor
between these two objective types. uneducated people responded with
value-neutral ordinates and definitions; educated objective types
responded with more linguistically-advanced reactions. Jung's
subsequent research suggests that the preference for a reaction type is
stable over time; see for example, his longitudinal study of Subjects
19 and 23. However, it is at least implied that formal education may
play a role in changing a reaction type, and that emotional disturbance
may temporarily transform an otherwise objective individual into a
"complex" type.
5That Jung used his writing as a method of resolving his complexes
was suggested by his wife Ermna, in a letter to Freud of Nov. 6, 1911
(Freud and Jung, 1974, p. 456); the application of the term
"self-analysis" is that of Papadopoulos (1980, p. 244).
6Transformations and Symbols of the Libido was later substantially
rewritten and appears in the collected works of Jung as Symbols of
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Transformation (1956). In the interest of historical consistency, I
have used the 1912 version in this work. Vygotsky (1986) traces the
polarity between "directed" and "non-directed" thinking to
psychoanalytic theory by way of Eugen Bleuler's theory of "autistic
thinking;" Bleuler was the director of the Burgholzli Hospital at the
time of Jung's psychiatric research. Ultimately, the distinction may
go back to the psychology of Plato (Republic, Book 4, 439D).
7Jung singles out the training in dialectical logic fostered by the
scholastic philosophers during the medieval period of Western
civilization as particularly noteworthy in this historical evolution of
directed thinking.
8rn the later version of this work, Jung expanded this section to
include an argument to the effect that both world-views, that of the
rational and of the fantasy process, were equally grounded in
psychological reality, and thus were equally valid.
9An example of this irrational process of conceptual coordination
might be the "bisociation" process of creativity discussed by Koestler
(1964). Much of the current "right/left brain" literature might also
find a place in this discussion.
lOrhe differentiation between what is to be accepted and what is to
be rejected is the criterion in the operation of ancient Stoic logic,
which arose as a challenge to the methods of the Aristotelian school.
Jung does not discuss the body of Stoic literature, but it would be
interesting to trace his analysis of thinking and feeling through the
fundamental philosophical opposition showed by the Stoics to the
Peripatetics. On Stoic logic, see Mates (1973 ) and Rist (1978).
Jung's theory of the four functions has classical antecedents as well,
in the four stages of cognition presented in the Platonic "allegory of
the line" (Republic, Book 6, 509D and following), which influenced
Western philosophy both directly and through the works of the
Neoplatonists, including Porphyry and Boethius.
llThis is a point that has been made by James Hillman (von Franz and
Hillman, 1971).
12Jung attributes this statement to his director, Dr. Eugen Bleuler.
13prior to publication, Jung sent Dr. Furst's manuscript to Freud; it
is clear from his remarks in his letter that he was rrK)re interested in
the adaptation of statistical methodology to his complex theory than in
any particular aspect of family behavior. Freud's reply focuses
entirely on Furst's analysis of individual psychology, and says nothing
about the family dimension (Freud and Jung, p. 66ff). Although
Papadopoulos and Saayman (1989) make an eloquent case for the depth of
Jung's interest in the family, it does not seem to be in evidence in
this correspondence. En1na Furst remained with the Freudians after
Jung's split in 1913.
14rhe coefficient of difference between this pair was 0.5,
considerably lower than any of the pairs tested in the present
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experiment, and almost certainly pathological. Further on the
contaminating effect of the predicate type, see Jung, "The Significance
of the Father in the Destiny of the Individual" (1961). Freud
discusses cases of such close psychological engagement as examples of
telepathy in his lecture on "Dreams and Occultism" (Freud, 1965).
15Further on this concept, see Bateson on the phenomenology of
analogic communication (1972), and Vygotsky's analysis of animal
corrmunication: "a frightened goose . . . does not tell the others what it
has seen but rather contaminates them with its fear" (1986, p. 7).
Such is the mechanism of empathetic engagement. It is the absolute
antithesis of thinking: rational, fantasy, critical, creative, or
otherwise, and belongs with the phenomena of participation mystique
studied by Jung in their psychotic manifestations. The ancients
recognized its danger: they called it bewitchment, or possession by a
god, and did not dare to invoke its effects casually. We with our
lofty theories of creativity are not nearly so wise as were they.
Chapter

rv.

lQuite a number of individuals asked if they could participate, in
fact, including friends and roommates of adult children living out of
town. One participant in the study suggested that the word association
test would make a wonderful parlour game for families and friends
alike, and ought to be marketed as such. The sheer fun people had with
it was an unexpected outcome of the experiment.
2Specific familial intersections are as follows: Family 4's first
daughter is the parental companion (pc) of Family 5; Family 4's oldest
son is the father of Dyad 13. Family 7's first daughter is the mother
of Family 9; the fourth daughter is the wife of Dyad 12. Families 8
and 9 are, in point of fact, collections of related dyads rather than
families; however, their long-term social closeness seemed to justify
the inclusion of inlaws as family rrembers in some aspects of the
analysis. in the analysis of related against unrelated individuals,
these members of extended families were excluded from the calculation.
3Reaction-tirne data is not part of the analysis presented in this
report, but was taken in 21 cases and is available for future study.
Reaction-time is a significant factor· in the analysis of individual
responses, but was not considered by Furst in her work with the
associations of families.
4A1terations of the Brill version of Jung's stimulus list are as
follows. One represents a choice of Jung's original word over Brill's
substitution (no.78, frernd, strange, given as "friend" in the Brill
list). Four instances (no. 32, 43, 52, and 81) are alternative
translations of the German original, and two others (no. 62, 94) are
words which represent a related, although not identical, concept. In
the case of the five remaining alterations, (no. 36, "play," no. 40,
"ride," no. 85, "dog," no. 89, "fire," and no. 100, "talk," instead of
"die," "pray," "stork," "bride," and "abuse," respectively), substitute
words were chosen from the original Jung-Riklin list and inserted at
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points where the pattern of stimulus-words might be likely to touch on
or exacerbate an emotional complex. If it were the purpose of the test
to explore individual psychology, then any complexes associated with
each of the deleted words could adequately be revealed by responses to
other related words on the list. Since this was not the purpose,
however, it was decided to lighten the list in the areas of religion,
sex, birth, death and violence represented by those five stimulus
words, and to offer more neutral terms instead. In particular, it was
thought to be highly inappropriate in context of the present experiment
to end a list of terms to be read to children with the stimulus-word
"abuse."
5These principles of classification are as follows:
1. All opposites and antonyms, substantive or adjectival, are
classified as contrasts (external responses).
2. All implied opposites which are substantive (where no true
opposite is possible, e.g. "brother-sister") are classified as
ordinates (internal responses).
3. All potential coordinate responses which seemed intended as
synonyms are classified as such (external responses).
4. All part-whole relat i onships are classified as subordinatesuperordinate, and vice versa.
5. All clearly egocentric responses (those in which the
association is "me," "I," "mine" and the like) are classified as
indirect responses.
6. All substantive attributes (e.g. "fur-animal," "birdfeathers") are included as indefinite grouping responses.
7. All paralinguistics and kinesics are classified as failures,
even though they may have been intended to serve as a "meaningful"
response.
It should be noted that no formal computation of the statistical
validity or reliability of the Jung-Riklin classification system has
yet been done.
6This analysis was performed on fifty individuals, before the data
from Dyad 15 were obtained; it is doubtful t hat they would have
significantly influenced the results.
7The individuals in Jung and Riklin 's sample divide fairly evenly
into four main groups, three of which reflected a specific reaction
category, the ordinate, the predicate, and the linguistic-motor
response. A fourth group gave associations which reflected no specific
categorial approach to the stimulus word, but rather bespoke some inner
emotional reflection on the stimulus; their mixed production was
described as being organized around "complexes," or affectively-charged
clusters of associations with highly personal content. The
identification of a "complex type," of which Jung and Riklin offered
examples of three degrees of subdivision, requires a consideration of
factors which go beyond the simple classification of response words
into their appropriate relational categories, and for that reason,
although the present discussion will refer to a "mixed reaction type"
in instances when no single relational category is found to
predominate, this designation is not in any way meant to be interpreted
as referring to the presence of complexes. And even though nearly all
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of Jung and Riklin's "complex type" subjects show the diffuse figures
of a mixed reaction style, the mixed type, as discussed here, is not to
be taken as identical to the Jung-Riklin complex type.
BJung and Riklin's use of the term "predicate type" has psychological
implications beyond the identification of a tendency to produce
predicates IOC>re than a third of the time on a word association test.
Their "predicate type" individuals were distinguished by an ability to
produce vivid internal imagery in response to the stirrrulus-word, and
proved incapable of dividing their attention in the distraction portion
of the Burgholzli experiment. Because these two factors were not
investigated in the present experiment, it may not be entirely
appropriate to refer to those with high predication rates as "predicate
types" in the technical sense of the term. For lack of a better term,
they are so designated in this text, but with the understanding that
they may not share the other characteristics distinguishing Jung and
Riklin's "predicate types."
9Th.is would, in fact, be the case if the children conformed to the
pattern observed by Entwisle (1966) in young children. Children too
young to have made the "paradigmatic shift" would have responded with
syntagrnatic (predicative) reactions, classified as "internal"
responses, and would thus not show the "blunting" associated with an
increasing number of external reactions.
10Furst (1918, p. 441) attributed this increase to the tendency of
older people to allow themselves more access to their em::>tions. She
also found predication to be inversely correlated with educational
level, in contradiction to the observation made by Jung and Riklin, 60%
of whose predicate-type respondents were among their well educated
subjects.
llrn the present sample, there were twelve m::>ther-son dyads, eleven
father-daughter dyads, twelve father-son dyads, and fourteen
mother-daughter dyads, for a total of 49 parent-child dyads altogether.
Mothers were present in all eleven analysed families, fathers in only
eight of them.
12 11 Ross Test of Higher Cognitive Processes: Manual," p. 5.
has been in use since 1976.

The test

Chapter v.
lvygotsky (1986) credits Piaget with the insight that granunar rrrust
precede logic in a child's cognitive development. An educational
system which bypasses the fundamentals leaves little for later
instruction to build upon.
2This fact becomes all the more surprising in light of the evident
absence of a critical attitude on the part of some critical thinking
theorists toward the work of their own unacknowledged and unnamed
authorities. The popularity of these secondary thinkers is in direct
proportion to their failure to identify their sources, and
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unfortunately, their clientele is not intellectually well-enough versed
to be able to identify the sources on their own. There may well be
those who, in good faith, believe that the primary and secondary nature
expounded by Paul is an insight which originated with him, or that
"dialogical process" is something new under the sun.
3Gardner (1983) imagines that Freud would have been appreciative of
his theory of :multiple intelligences. It is unclear what would have
led him to this conclusion. Jung, on the other hand, would certainly
have welcomed the insight Gardner has brought to the problem of
personality and cognition.
4such work would most certainly require the construction of a
different word list than the one used in the present study;
furthermore, the test would need to run to a minirm.un of 200 words. The
procedure of adapting the word list to the specific situation presented
by the client was one Jung frequently employed.
5This is dialectic in the specifically Platonic sense, not the
dialectic of Hegel, Marx, Sartre or any of the modern philosophical or
political dialecticians. Jung referred to his own therapeutic method
as dialectical, and may have had in mind some passage like this one
from Plato's Republic (Book VII, p. 254): " • • • the method of dialectic
is the only one . . . doing away with assumptions and travelling up to
the first principle of all, so as to make sure of confirmation there.
When the eye of the soul is sunk in a veritable slough of barbarous
ignorance, this method gently draws it forth and guides it upwards,
assisted in this work of conversion by the arts we have enumerated."
Plato believed, however, that a true dialectical exploration could not
be done with individuals prior to the age of thirty, and that a
rigorous course of instruction in music and mathematics should precede
any inquiry pursued by means of dialectic. Anicius Boethius (see
Chapter 1, note 5, above), the sixth-century Roman public
administrator, :musicologist, and avid student of the interface between
language and logic, whose great project of translation literally
bequeathed the texts of Aristotle to a Roman empire on the very brink
of the Dark Ages (a slough of barbarous ignorance indeed) made an
impassioned plea for the study of logic as a means of staving off
social and cultural disaster. His career ended in disaster, with an
unjust imprisonment and execution, but prior to his death he was able
to complete a brief manuscript, The Consolation of Philosophy, which
may contain the first recorded use of the dialectic for
psychotherapeutic purposes. In an earlier essay, I described this
small masterpiece as a complete course in the methodology of critical-and creative--thinking.
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APPENDIX
1
List of Stirrnilus l'k>rds, Word Association Experi:rrent

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
25.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

41.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

head
green
water
sing
death
long
ship
pay
window
friendly
table
ask
cold
stem
dance
village
lake
sick
pride
cook
ink
angry
needle
swim
journey
blue
lamp
sin
bread
rich
tree
stab
pity
yellow
mountain
play
salt
new
custom
ride
money
stupid
notebook
despise
finger
dear
bird
fall
book
unjust

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

frog
separate
hunger
white
child
pay attention
pencil
sad
plum
marry
house
love
glass
quarrel
fur
big
carrot
paint
part
old
flower
beat
box

wild
family
wash
cow
strange
happiness
lie
conduct
narrow
brother
fear
dog
false
anxiety
kiss
fire
pure
door
choose
hay
quiet
ridicule
sleep
month
nice
woman

talk

APPENDIX
2
Part II, Ross Test of Higher Cognitive Processes

Section II, Deductive Reasoning
In this part of the test, you will be asked to read some statements and then decide
what conclusions could logically follow from what the statements say.
Read the following statements:
Alf quarks are purple.
All purple things melt in the sun.
If you assume these statements to be true, which of the following conclusions would
logically follow from them?
Therefore,
Quarks melt in the sun.
All purple things are quarks.
All things which melt in the sun are purple.
The first conclusion, "Quarks melt in the sun," does follow from the statements
above. The other two do not follow, since other things besides quarks can be purple
(such as grapes), and other things will melt in the sun (such as snow). You would
mark your answer sheet this way:
Quarks melt in the sun.
A. conclusion follows .. ............... (A) r81
B. conclusion does not follow .... .. .... . (B) 0
All purple things are quarks.
A. conclusion follows .......... . .... . . (A) 0
B. conclusion does not follow . ......... . (8) ~
All things which melt in the sun are quarks.
A. conclusion follows .. . . . ......... . . . (A) 0
B. conclusion does not follow ..... . ... . . (B) C3l
You will be given some statements like the ones above. Do not be concerned about
the truth of the statements-Just assume that the statements are true. You must
decide whether the conclusions beneath them do or do not follow from the information gjven in the statements. More than one conclusion ,nay folloW; or none of the
conclusions may follow.
When you are told to do so, turn to the following page.
Read the statements carefully. Then read each conclusion.
Mark your answer sheet (A) if the conclusion follows.
Mark your answer sheet (B) if the conclusion does not follow.
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If spiders can fly, then spiders have wings.
Spiden do not have wings but they all have feathers.
Therefore,

15. Either spiden fly or they have wings.
A. conclusion follows .. . . . ........ . ... (Al
B. conclusion does not follow . . ...... .. (Bl

D
D

16. If spiders have feathers, then they fly.
A. conclusion follows ................. (Al
8. conclusion does not follow ...... . ... (Bl

0
D

17. Some spiders have no feathers.
A. conclusion follows .. .. ........... . . (Al
B. conclusion does not follow . .. .. . .... (Bl

D
D

All palimons are known to be fish eaters.
Palimons are also migratory creatures.
Therefore,
18. All fish eaters are palimons.
A. conclusion follows ... . . .. . . ... .. . . . (Al
B. conclusion does not follow . . . .. .. . .. (B)
19. All fish eaters are migratory.
A. conclusion follows ..... . ... .. .. .. . . (Al
B. conclusion does not follow .......... (Bl
20. All migratory creatures are palimons.
A. conclusion follows . ..... . .. .. .. . .. . (Al
B. conclusion does not follow .... .. .... (Bl

D
0

0
D

D
0

l
~

All of Joyce's pets have four legs, but none of them have tails.
No gremlies have four legs and no greml ies have tails.
Therefore,
21. Some gremlies have tails, but none have four legs.
A. conclusion follows ..... . .. .. . . .. . .. (Al
B. conclusion does not follow . . . .. ... . . (Bl

D
D

22. If a gremlie has a tail, it will have four legs.
A. conclusion follows ... . .. ... .. . . . ... (Al 0
8. conclusion does not follow . .... .. ... (Bl 0
23. None of Joyce's pets are gremlies.
A conclusion follows .. . . .. . . . . ... . .. . (Al
B. conclusion does not follow .......... (Bl

0

D

Ten Arabs left the town of Sahib and went into the desert with eight camels.
One week later, five of these Arabs arrived at the first oasis.
Each one was riding on a camel.
The camels were very thirsty and immediately began drinking water from the oasis.

6

(Go on to th• n.xt p•.J

224

Therefore,
24. The three camels who did not arrive at the oasis returned to Sahib.
A. conclusion follows .... . . . ..... . . .. . (A)
B. conclusion does not follow .......... (B)

0
0

25. Arabs can travel from Sahib to the first oasis in less than nine days.
A. conclusion follows . . ..... . . . ....... (A) 0
8. conclusion does not follow ...... . ... (B) 0

26. The three camels who did not arrive at the oasis are not being ridden
by Arabs.
A. conclusion follows . ..... . . . ... .. .. . (A) 0
B. conclusion does not follow .. .. ...... (B) 0

If a person is a Caledonian, he is a pragmatist.
Persons who are Simians are also pragmatists.
Therefore,
27. Simians are pragmatists.
A. conclusion follows ........... .. .... (A) D
B. conclusion does not follow .. . ..... . . (8) D
28. Caledonians are Sim ians.
A. conclusion fol lows .......... . . . ... . (A) D
B. conc lusion does not follow .. ....... . (B)O
29. If you are a pragmatist you are a Simian.
A. conclusion follows .. .... ........... (A) D
B. conclusion does not follow . . ........ (B) D
All Frenchmen eat meat.
Frenchmen from Normandy eat only beef and Frenchmen from Brittany eat
only mutton.
Some Frenchmen are blond.
Therefore,
30. Some mutton eaters are from Brittany.
A. conclusion follows .......... ... .... (A) D
B. conclusion does not follow .. . . . . ... . (B)(']
31. All Frenchmen eat beef.
A. conclusion follows . .. . . . ........... (A)O
8. conclusion does not follow ...... . .. . (B)O
32. Blond Frenchmen from Normandy eat only beef.
A. conclusion follows ........... . . . ... (A) D
8 . conclusion does not follow ......... . (8)0

(This is rfl• end of S«tion II.) STOP! Please close your test booklet.

Section II

Do not open it again until your teacher tells you to do so.

Score:
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AP P E NDI X 3
LEXICON OF RESPONSES
(First 50 respondents only. Number in parenthesis indicates
frequency of response)
toe (9), foot (8), shoulders (6), feet (3), body (2), brain
(2), hair (2), eyes (2), games (2), neck, shoulder, Ed, brains, cold,
tail, tails, heart, family, me, ear, dick, butt, (*)
green: blue (20), grass (7), yellow (4), red (3), purple (2), nail,
pink, foot, money, black, water, tree, plant, head, white, peppers,
orange, Irish
water: wet (6), drink (4), blue (3), ocean (3), swim (3), cold (2),
fire (2), sand (2), H20 (2), sea (2), air (2), ice (2), rnayim, pure,
water, land, beach, clear, fall, falls, sled, brook, tea, snow, wash,
snake, salt, steam, pink
sing: song (20), dance (5), music (4), voice (2), bottled, rupture,
opera, loud, note, choir, chorus, church, hymns, notes, tune, choral
union, songs, whistle, object,--, rap, yell, cry
death: life (21), birth (2), wish (2), funeral (2), me (2), end (2),
dentist, black, cold, grim reaper, heaven, sadness, alive, Poe,
misery, Woody Allen, live, eternity, grief, dirt, undertaker, die,
napalm, peace, sorrow
lcmg: short (43), life (3), tall, string, line, winding
ship: sail (14), boat (13), ocean (4), sea (3), sailing (2), water
(2), wreck (2), awash, ahoy, anchor, cruise, float, shore, oil,
shape, fool, fools
pay: money (25), work (4), day (2), toll, peg, hair, cash, scale,
good, rent, spend, party, wages, debt, remit, later, not, not enough,
broke,--, paymaster, shit
window: pane (12), glass (10), door (6), sill (3), light (3), view
( 2) , broken ( 2) , frame ( 2) , clear ( 2) , shade, "pain" , Quincy, look,
see, box, look, wash
friendly: nice (9), happy (5), mean (4), hostile (3), ice cream (3),
unfriendly (2), dog, waitress, smile, courteous, pleasant, monkey,
people, neighbor, short, helpful, ghost, Quaker, cheerful, warm,
amicable, me, sad, hate, frank, stubbornness, mad, loving, family,
table: chair (31), cloth (4), top (3), chairs (3), dirty, tennis,
silverware, spoon, eat, legs, house, manners, network
ask: question (14), receive (8), tell (6), why (4), answer (3), seek
(2), reply (2), care, say, (phrase), speak, please, demand, help,
told, offer, given, give
cold: hot (34), warm (5), ice (2), nose, coal, hope, soft, hand,
freezing, heat, snow, grip
stem: flower (20), rose (7), stern (2), plant (2), leaf (2), blossom
(2), petal, from, stamina, root, branch, turn, piece, glass,--,
thorn, base, peas, trees, apple, greens
dance: sing (13), music (6), walk (4), waltz (3), hop (3), move (3),
ballet (2), song (2), fast (2), twist (2), club, jitterbug, dancing,
floor, happy, around, polka, play, shoes, sit
village: town (14), people (13), city (4), house (4), country (2),
Indians (2), pretty, hut, shepherd, houses, villain, small, green,
hot, cottage, blacksmith, idiot
head:
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lake: pond (11), water (9), ocean (5), river (4), sea (3), swim (3),
placid (2), fish (2), glassy, lace, clear, shore, Champaign, green,
tree, restful, cold, cool, swan boats
sick: well (13), ill (9), healthy (4), health (3), medicine (2),
mind, dog, old, dying, fever, dead, bed, weak, thermometer, me,
better, poor, not well, ail, tired, puppy, cold, humor, flu
pride: joy (12), prejudice (4), proud (3), lion (3), -- (3), honor
(2), self-esteem (2), courage (2), card, country, punishment, "goeth
before a fall," (2), fall (2), people, humility, passion, honesty,
loyal, happy, lie, accomplishment, invention, anger, pompous, sorrow
cook: food (12), clean (10), eat (5), burn (2), raw (2), meat, done,
house, spaghetti, hook, winter, heat, fishing, pan, often, job, make,
ship, meal, roast, fry, good, never, hungry
ink: pen (17), well (6), blot (4), write (3), blue (3), black (3),
red (2), blotter (2), paper (2), damage, foot, business, spot, paint,
mess, pencil, lead
angry: mad (13), sad (11), happy (8), upset (2), joy (2), --, IIE,
squid, frustrated, anger, mean, cry, red, temper, shout, hate, nice,
irate, sin
needle: thread (19), sew (11), point (3), sewing (3), haystack (3),
pin (2), extraction, pins, lion, tattoo, medicine, stick, nose, pain,
sharp
swim: water (10), sink (7), drown (3), dive (3), lake (3), float (3),
ocean (2), sea (2), pool (2), fun (2), swam, pleasure, wet, sport,
murky, suit, jog, can't, sun, exercise, paddle, beach, tide
journey: trip (14), travel ( 10), adventure (3), long (2), far (2),
thousand miles, earth, bad rock bands, center of the earth, dot, life,
mountains, path, backpack, end, unknown, roads, Ohio, London,
vacation, voyage, forward, me, tour
blue: green (9), sky (7), red (6), black (3), white (3), water (2),
purple (2), ocean (2), pink, color, lagoon, flag, ink, gold, cold,
moon, Frank Sinatra, sad, grass, coat, eyes, velvet, clear, door
lalll): light (30), shade (11), post (3), table, bulb, illumination,
candle, see, on
sin: evil (6), bad (5), hell (3), wrong (2), church (2), mortal (2),
confession (2), mean, none, fun, religion, pale, God, how, repentance,
confess, redemption, dirt, -cerely, Kristen, hook, daily, offense,
death, joy, good, embarrasment, kill, deed, lie, enemy, fall, burn,
blessing, -bread: butter (18), water (14), food (5), wine (2), dough (2), glare,
blood, eat, milk, wheat, peanut butter, chew, jelly, crumbs
rich: poor (43), money (3), food, mousse, rest, wish
tree: leaves (7), green (6), wood (4), plant (3), flower (3), leave
(3), fall (3), top (2), house (2), shade (2), trunk (2), limb (2),
leaf (2), leafs, grass, bark, chop chop, shrub, spring, bush, timber,
branch, bird
stab: knife (16), wound (7), kill (7), cut (2), hit, blood, hurt,
no!, stick, stale, heart, Puerto Rican, gore, back, dagger, death,
dead, fight, bleed, shoot, bad, sharp
pity: sorrow (12), sad (7), sorry (4), poor (4), -- (3), compassion
(2), don't, pittance, help, (*), ending, jealousy, tears, scorn,
people, bullshit, shame, pathetic, sympathy, happy, pain, empathy,
crook, blessing
yellow: green (9), orange (5), flower (5), blue (4), rose (3), brown
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(2), white (2), sun (2), buttercups (2), fever (2), ribbon (2), banana
(2), --, rope, bright, dandelion, bus, gold, purple, black, coward,
vegetable
mountain: top (9), climb (6), hill (5), snow (4), high (3), height
(2), molehill (2), stream (2), valley (2), peak, sky, dew, mound, ice,
landscape, mountains, range, woods, pretty, lake, ski, higher, forest,
walks
play: game (7), fun (7), theater (3), work (3), enjoy (2),
Shakespeare (2), happy (2), children (2), L'il Abner, play set,
ground, friends, theater, jump, hopscotch, around, recess, good, room,
act, hard, run, frolic, stay, fall, sports, show, games, toys, pen
salt: pepper (39), water (4), food (2), battery, salt, shaker, swing,
earth
new: old (44), expensive, clothes, nu?, basic, needle, new
custan: tradition (9), ritual (3), habit (3), house (3), -made (3),
-- (2), design (2), old (2), radio, fit, customer, culture, mores,
religion, song, won't, custard, foreign, hassle, dance, travel,
airport, lore, trait, built, car, cars, usage, task, ethnic, nothing
ride: horse (8), car (7), walk (6), bike (4), travel (2), joy (2),
drive (2), fair,--, trip, train, fun, carnival, amusement park,
(phrase), bull, rob, rode, fast, bus, ferris wheel, rollercoaster,
merry-go-round, journey, free, sit
im:mey: cash (10), spend (4), dollar (2), green (2), none (2), wealth,
dough, (phrase), rob, exchange, dollars, need, rich, checks, wealthy,
avarice, sin, people, good, work, a lot, bills, paper, security, tree,
shop, hungry, power, freedom, pay, bucks, never, wish, broke
stupid: smart (18), dumb (12), silly (3), idiot (2), pet tricks,
stupidity, inane, unintelligent, bright, dull, poor, fool, idiotic,
unhappy, goofy, handicap, me, L., -notebook: paper (11), pencil (6), pen (5), notes (5), write (3),
school (3), pad (3), writing (2 ), class (2), homework (2), spiral,
memos, papers, cover, study, Hasefer, looseleaf, reading book
despise: hate (36), love (3), -- (2), Julienne, despondent, despite,
enemy, deceit, dislike, admire, sad, like
finger: hand (10), thumb (8), nail (7), point (5), ring (3), toe (2),
tip, jam, hands, touch, plan, death, punch, 1:x)ne, pull, print, digit,
middle, -licking, lake, writing
dear: doe (5), animal (4), love (4), hunter (3), honey (3), sweet
(3), antelope (2), John (2), antler, antlers, dog, liar, nice, bear,
sweetheart, darling, fond, hunt, heart, Marie, Mom, endearment, elk,
shot, none, friend, close, valuable, chain, Bambi, leather, rabbit
bird: fly (16), sing (4), song (3), cage (2), tweet (2), house (2),
feathers (2), feather, (visual), flower, horse, parrot, Auntie, in the
sky, cardinal, wing, of, paradise, jay, fly away, bath, avian,
sparrow, flight, birdseed, dog
fall: winter (7), drop (4), hurt (4), down (3), trip (3), water (3),
foliage (2), spring (2), get up (2), autumn (2), free, Niagara, guy,
crash, fast, air, cold, cool, pretty, plunge, leaves, (phrase), thump,
ouch, jump, stand, stand up
book: read (22), paper (4), cover (3), mark (3), reading (2), end
(2), open (2), bag, -ish, story, knowledge, pen, magazine, page,
pages, shelf, worm, learning, candle
unjust: unfair (16), wrong (4), fair (4), justice (3), just (3),
cruel (3), -- (2), court (2), evil, jail, corrupt, illegal, jury,
Angelica, ugly, bad, travesty, liar, law, unequal, loose
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frog: toad (13), leap (8), green (7), pond (5), jump (4), reptile
(2), tadpole (2), twitch, fraud, croak, ribit, turtle, hop, fantasy,
genus, fly
separate: together (9), apart (8), divorce (4), divide (4), part (2),
equal (2), eggs, severance, despise, care, in between, put together,
not together, pull, love, combine, rrove, marriage, congeal, split,
alone, pull apart, broken, depart, sad, departed, take apart
hl.Dlger: thirst (10), pain (9), food (4), eat (4), starve (3),
starving (3), pang (2), poor (2), starvation, hungry, stomach, yearn,
bad, pains, illness, skinny, despair, famished, strike, full
white: black (33), snow (2), man, trash, glare, apron, pure, bride,
brown, jealous, sheet, flat, cloud, flag, blue, red, dove
child: play (6), adult (6), kid (6), baby (5), mother (3), little
(3), boy (2), love (2), son (2), grown-up (2), joy (2), tot (2), cute,
-hood, whining, smile, Jamie, me, man, children, body
pay attenticm: listen (12), ignore (3), -- (2), school (2), strict
(2), span (2), concentrate, think, daydream, distracted, short
attention span, acknowledge, alert, yes ma'am, not me, forget,
thought, teacher, observe, me, stop it, heed, to what, huh, attend,
never, concentration, fall asleep, learn, fool around, see, hear,
wander
pencil: pen (26), paper (10), write (3), lead (2), eraser (2),
writing, sharpener, neck, notebook, holder, pad
sad: happy (32), glad (4), cry (3), unhappy (3), face, mad,
melancholy, cheerful, pensive, blue, sorrow, sorry
plum: fruit (10), purple (9), peach (7), cherry (3), pudding (3),
tree (3), apple (2), pear, red, eat, fall, apricot, nectarine, pit,
grape, sloe, tart, juicy, Jack, granite
marry: wed (8), divorce (5), dead (2), quite contrary, John, narrate,
engage, Paul, wife, death, Robin Hood, woman, ring, family, see,
happiness, unwed, ball and chain, love, with children, church, happy,
separate, commitment, haste, single, mistake, unhappy, repent, ring,
bachelor, lover, spouse, join, lamb, divorced, why, no
house: home (16), live (4), car (2), apartment (2), building,
(visual), hold, maison, work, brick, rooms, cat, dwelling, lot, cold,
live in, big, family, buy, barn, shoe, camping, white, rrortgage,
fence, Police Academy, bills, light, security, shack
·
love: hate (24), cherish (2), marriage (2), heart (2), husband (2),
care, oh--Lynn, (phrase), lords, bump, goddess, people, person,
happiness, good, caring, mate, peace, joy, death, yuk, fulfillment,
romance
glass: break (9), window (4), water (4), clear (3), broken (3), drink
(3), cup (2), bottle (2), house (2), --, figurines, tumbler, tinker,
shiny, stone, transparent, tree, wine, dish, drinking glass, table,
ice, sand, mirror, houses, cup, plastic
quarrel: fight (24), argue (4), angry (4), spat (3), -- (2), argument
(2), yell, rabbit, disagree, sad, ocean, reef, beautiful, unhappiness,
make up, water, talk
fur: coat (15), soft (7), animal (6), mink (2), dog (2), ball (2),
hair (2), cat, animals, skin, tree, sable, stole, fuzzy, critter,
wall, -ry, animal killer, smooth, beaver, bunny, brown
big: small (26), little (17), large (3), monstrous, tall, boat,
better
carrot: orange (12), stick (6), rabbit (4), cake (4), vegetable (4),
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Bugs Bunny (3), potato (2), food (2), cucumber, rabbits, the thing,
red-orange, top, cook, carol, eat, long, peas, bugs, dick, peas
paint: brush (13), house (8), thinner (3), red (2), paper (2), picture
(2), colors (2), wall (2), walls, purple, paintbrush, easel, draw,
painter, color, never, art, work, weather-beaten, pretty, enamel,
flower, pictures, marker
part: separate (8), whole (6), hair (6), piece (3), play (3), car
(2), --, some, all, section, divide, leave, arm, sever, cut, parking,
break, time, broken, tear, fraction, combine, transplant, goodbye,
fix, small, middle, body
old: new (34), young (11), decrepit, man, older, used, car
flower: rose (5), petal (4), bloom (4), stem (3), bud (3), pot (2),
blossom (2), tree (2), pretty (2), daisy (2), seed (2), lovely (2),
child (2), arrangement, flour, grow, tulip, smell, vase, Mom, bee,
spring, white, bunny, beauty, sex, cactus, sweet
beat: red (8), drum (6), hit (6), fight (4), vegetable (2), best,
heart, dance, tired, egg, juice, whip, wife, sugar, club, win, won,
carrot, hurt, up, eggs, rhythm, sour, nasty, cane, music, free, loss,
cardboard (9), square (5), car (4), fight (3), present (3),
carton (3), spar (2), bag (2), (visual), boxer, hold, can, in, round,
storage, black, store, crate, container, big, package, money, pack,
brown, string, gift, circle
wild: tame (15), wooly (3), animal (3), free (3), calm (3), flower
(2), tiger (2), crazy (2), young, stallions, horse, unruly, self,
tamed, friendly, thing, streets, play, Trodges, Eric, wire, west,
flowers, woman, me
family: love (5), home (5), friends (4), together (3), ties (2),
close (2), tree (2), parents, small, people, five, brother, unity, us,
group, three, furnishing, children, clan, good, happy?, friend, loved
ones, room, many, happiness, crazy, divorce, gathering, household,
circle, house, unit, cousins
wash: dry (16), clean (11), clothes (11), rinse (3), dishes (2),
laundry (2), washer, care, fold, cloth, -cow: milk (22), moo (6), horse (6), calf (3), pasture (2), Ron,
cower, cud, big, mule, spotted, me, fat, Holstein, chicken, farm
strange: odd (14), wierd (11), familiar (3), unusual (3), different
(2), pickle, potato, friendly, everything, string, sure, fellow,
unnormal, normal, ex-wife, me, family, you, people, queer, Bobby,
custom, concern
happiness: sadness (9), love (3), sad (3), glad (2), joy (2),
contentment (2), good (2), gladness, teddy bears, hardness, pig,
vacation, white, rare, elusive, travel, unhappiness, people, smile,
pleasant, tranquility, nintendo, prosperity, child, wife, warm puppy,
goodness, unhappy, elate, (phrase), sorrow, laughing, gaiety, wealthy
lie: truth (10), down (4), untruth (3), steal (3), fib (3), deceit
(3), deceive (3), deception (2), cheat (2), don't (2), -- (2), lime,
evil, fabricate, tale, wrong!, still, dishonest, prevaricate, tell,
treachery, Benedict Arnold, you, see
conduct: behavior (12), effort (2), action (2), good (2), bad (2),
exemplary (2), correct (2), lead (2), corrigate, perform, actions,
order, propriety,--, poor, gross, -ivity, yes, behave, electric,
lead, demeanor, language, attach, direct, music, orchestra,
orchestration, manifest, disconduct, teach, grade
box:
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narrow: wide (21), thin (7), small (4), slim (3), margin (3), -minded
(2), road (2), normal, pass, myopic, lx>rder, shoes, thick, inlet, lx>ne
brother: sister (40), son (2), -hood (2), mother, friend, little,
lx>rder, relative, kind
fear: scared (9), afraid (4), brave (4), anxiety (2), light (2),
courage, (2), -some, forward, monster, old, death, bravery, no,
unknown, excitement, fright, agony, horror, frightning, loathing,
just, egg, ok, sad, shy, timid, fearless, hate, worry, anger, climate,
no fear, scary
dog: cat (43), -gone (2), Bandit, Katy, mouse, fur, puppy
false: true (24), lie (6), untrue (3), truth (2), teeth (2), lies, not
right, heart, real, -ies, answer, not, furrow, fake, hope,
perspective, -hood, wrong
anxiety: attack (13), fear (6), -- (4), nervous (3), stress (2),
happiness (2), now!, uncomfortable, Arbus, wierd, hope, separation,
upset, rushing into, worry, anger, caffeine, unrest, daily, tension,
nerves, sad, pain, stillness, depression, anxiousness
kiss: hug (12), love (11), lips (5), affection (2), death (2), tell
(2), smooch (2), peck, goodbye, coarse, good, foreplay, hickey,
chocolate, make up, yuk, passion, back, 108 FM, hate, -fire: hot (9), burn (9), water (7), heat (2), house (2), plug (2),
hose, wire, sun, alarm, smoke, ice, salt, bug, reject, place, hurt,
starter, calm, unemployed, rain, wild, bacon, man, burning
pure: white (7), clean (3), unadulterated (3), snow (3), natural (2),
dirty (2), good (2), water (2), wholesome, essence, -ify, porous,
rich, salt, juice, virgin, hot, true, love, --, tainted, just, and
just, coke, gold, new, strange, innocence, rain, soiled, unpure,
simple, innocent, fake
door: knob (13), open (12), window (9), close (2), entrance (2),
nail, drawer, hinge, gate, lock, out, closet, group, house, egress,
opening, handle
ch<x>se: pick (15), select (5), choice (2), decide (2), change (2),
food, shoes, constrain, choices, passage, correctly, pepsi, to, not,
see, opt,--, guess, family, spits, song, shirt, avoid, options,
special, socks, one, elect, take
hay: grass (6), horse (6), horses (4), needle (4), ride (3), straw
(3), yellow (3), what? (2), stack (2), mow (2), cow (2), market (2),
farm (2), food, sun, field, barn,--, love, harrow, eat, alfalfa
quiet: loud (18), noisy (6), peace (3), peaceful (3), solitude (2),
time (2), calm (2), room, soothing, good, silent, outspoken, -tude,
quarantine, sad, field, still, noise, soft, storm, short
ridicu1e: laugh (5), taunt (3), tease (3), -- (3), make fun (3), joke
(2), stupid, Saturday Evening Post, righteous, ridiculous, funny,
unjust, unjustly, put down, shame, deception, no, making fun of, make
a fool of, fool, persecute, scorn, deride, make fun of, compliment,
degrade, pick on, mistreat, nasty, fun, embarrassed, comnent, sad,
dislike, insult, love, hate
sleep: awake (12), tired (6), peace (3), nap (2), night (2), sound
(2), dream (2), now!, fleas, wild, wake, long, unusual, comfortable,
good night, pillow, good, wake up, weary, snore, day, deprivation,
restless, quiet, eight hours, peaceful, up, sigh
month: year (18), day (8), week (3), teeth (2), days, day/year,
montage, calendar, May, 30, 30th, years, four weeks, IOC>On, birthday,
eat, September, January, February, December, August, July, end
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nice: gcxxl (6), bad (5), sweet (4), easy (3), happy (3), person (2),
mean (2), pleasant (2), kind (2), false, cat, nights, looking, stars,
unjust, nice, spice, great, last, pretty, day, loving, weather, yes,
friendly, ok, kiss, quiet, naughty, lousy
wcam: man (35), men, -hcxxl, worm, hold, marry, love, child,
daughters, babe, pretty, good, Mom, flower, fat, complain
talk: speak (10), loud (4), quiet (4), conversation (3), chatter (3),
silence (2), chat (2), yell (2), cheap (2), discuss (2), voice, walk,
speech, yes, slow, openly, listen, say, show, happy talk, work, soft,
see, torrent, not, laugh

(*) subject asked that the response not be reported.
failure

APPENDIX 4
INTERNAL FAMILY GROUPINGS, VERBAL RESPONSES IN
FAMILY 1
4 Responses in conmen
sad/happy

brother/sister
month/year

big/small
3 Responses in Conmen

head/toe
sing/song
long/short
bread/water
rich/poor
mountain/top
child/play
child/kid
PA/listen
pencil/paper
quarrel/fight
beat/red
brother/sister
dog/cat
false/true
quiet/loud
month/day
woman/man
FAMILY 2
4 Responses in Conman
cold/hot
needle/thread
rich/poor
salt/pepper
new/old
dog/cat
3 Responses in Corrmon
death/life
long/short
ship/sail ( ing)
table/chair
dance/sing
pride/joy
journey/travel
lamp/light
bread/water
ride/horse
notebook/paper
white/black
sad/happy
lave/hate
big/small

old/new
narrow/wide

FAMILY 3
Responses in Corrmon
new/old
despise/hate
4

3 Responses in Common
green/blue
long/short
dance/sing
swim/water
rich/poor
stupid/smart
frog/pond
white/black
sad/happy
paint/brush
old/ne
broth!:
· ster
dog/cai:.
false/true
woman/man
FAMILY 4

9 Responses in Common
long/short
rich/poor
new/old
dog/cat
8 Responses in Common
lamp/light
salt/pepper
brother/sister
woman/man ·
7 Responses in Corrmon
table/chair
cold/hot
love/hate
white/black
old/new
6 Responses in Common
sad/happy
cow/milk
false/true
sleep/awake

Cct,1MON

5 Responses in Common
green/blue
book/read
pencil/pen
house/home
wild/tame
wash/dry
narrow/wide
choose/pick

Responses in Common
sing/song
death/life
ship/boat
ask/question
village/people
cook/clean
pity/sorrow
unjust/unfair
frog/toad
marry/wed
love/hate
fur/coat
big/little
hay/grass
quiet/loud
month/year
4

FAMILY 5
3 Responses in Corrmon
long/short
cold/hot
rich/poor
new/old
despise/hate
strange/odd
brother/sister
dog/cat
false/true
fire/hot
FAMILY 6
3 Responses in Common
long/short
village/town
sick/well
journey/trip
rich/poor
salt/pepper
new/old
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FAMILY 5 (con't)
3 Responses in Conmon
white/black
sad/happy
old/new
brother/sister
dog/cat
woman/man
FAMILY 7
6 Responses in Corrmon
long/short
pay/nonney
salt/pepper
brother/sister
woman/man
5 Responses in Corrmon
table/chair(s)
cold/hot
rich/poor
new/old
despise/hate
book/read
love/hate

Responses in Conmen
stem/flower
needle/thread
bread/water
stab/knife
stupid/smart
big/small
old/new
beat/hit
cow/milk
strange/odd
dog/cat
nice/good
4

3 Responses in Corrmon
19 pairs
FAMILY 9
3 Responses in Corrmon
long/short
pay/rroney
table/chair(s)
quarrel/fight
old/new

FAMILY 11
4 Responses

in Common
long/short
table/chair(s)
salt/pepper
new/old
woman/man
3 Responses in Common
head/foot
village/town
lake/pond
bread/butter
rich/poor
despise/hate
white/black
love/hate
big/little
wild/tame
narrow/wide
brother/sister
dog/cat
rronth/year

APPENDIX
5
INTERNAL FAMILY GROUPINGS, CATEGORIAL RESPONSES IN COMMON
FAMILY 1
5 ResJX)nses in Conmen
F & 4 children
3
M & 4 children
1
F,M,ld,ls,2s
1
F ,M, 2d, ls, 2s
1
4 Responses in Common
F,2d,ls,2s
7
F ,M, 2d, ls
1
F,M,ls,2s
1
M,ld,2d,ls
1
M,2d,ls,2s
1
F, ld, 2d, ls
1
F,M,ld,ls
1
3 Responses in Common
F ,M, ls
8
F,ls,2s
7
2d,ls,2s
5
4
F,ld,ls
F,2d,2s
3
M, ld, ls
3
2
F, 2d, ls
M, ld, 2d
2
M, 2d, ls
2
F ,M, ld
2
M,2d,2s
1
ld,2d,ls
1
1
F, ld, 2s
M, ld, 2s
1
ld,ls,2s
1
1
F ,M, 2s
M,ls,2s
1
1
F ,M, 2d
FAMILY 2
3 Res~nses in Corrmon
12
F,M,s
7
F,d,s
6
M,d,s
4
F,M,d
FAMILY 3
3 Responses in Cormnon
9
F ,M, 2s
8
F ,M, ls
7
F, ls, 2s
7
M, ls, 2s

FAMILY 4
8 Res~nses in Common
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,9
3
2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9
1
1,2,3,4,6,7,8,9
1
1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9
1
1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9
1
7 Responses in Common
1,4,5,6,7,8,9
2
1,2,3,4,6,7,9
1
1,2,3,4,5,6,8
1
1,2,3,5,6,8,9
1
1,2,3,5,6,7,9
1
1,2,4,5,7,8,9
1
1,3,4,5,7,8,9
1
2,3,4,5,6,7,9
1
2,3,4,6,7,8,9
1
2,3,4,5,6,7,8
1
6 Responses in Common
1,2,4,7,8,9
3
1,2,3,5,6,8
2
1,3,4,6,7,9
1
1,4,5,6,8,9
1
1,2,4,6,7,9
1
1,2,3,6,7,8
1
1
1,4,6,7,8,9
1,2,3,4,5,7
1
2,3,6,7,8,9
1
2,3,4,5,6,8
1
5 Responses in Common
1
1,4,7,8,9
1
1,2,3,5,8
1
1,2,3,7,8
1
1,2,3,5,6
1,2,4,5,6
1
1
1,2,3,5,7
1
1,3,5,7,9
1
1,2,5,7,9
1
1,2,3,5,9
1
1,3,6,7,8
1
1,2,4,6,9
1
1,4,6,7,9
1
2,3,4,7,9
1
2,5,7,8,9
1
2,3,4,6,7
1
2,4,5,6,7
1
3,4,5,6,7
1
3,4,6,7,9
1
4,5,6,7,9

4 ResJX)nses in Cormnon
1,2,3,5
3
4,7,8,9
2
4,5,6,8
2
2,3,5,8
2
1,6,7,9
1
2,4,5,8
1
4,5,6,7
1
2,7,8,9
1
2,5,6,8
1
3,4,7,9
1
2,6,7,9
1
1,2,8,9
1
1,3,5,8
1
1,3,4,5
1
4,5,8,9
1
2,4,7,9
1
1
1,3,6,8
1,3,8,9
1
2,3,7,9
1
1
4,6,7,8
4,6,7,9
1
1,4,7,8
1
1
1,2,3,8
3 Responses in Common
4
2,7,9
3
1,3,5
4,7,9
3
3
2 4 5·
4,5,7
3
2
1,6,9
2
1, 8,9
2
3,5,8
2
3,4,6
2
1,2,3
2
1,5,6
2
1,7,9
1
1,4,5
1
2,3,9
1
2,5,6
1
1,2,8
1
6,7,8
1
3,7,8
1
5,7,9
1
1,3,9
1
2,7,8
1
4,8,9
1
2,5,8
1
1,4,7
1
2,8,9
I

I
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FAMILY 4 (con't)
3 Responses in Conmon
1,2,9
1
2,7,8
1
4,5,6
1
2,5,7
1
2,3,8
1
4,6,7
1
3,8,9
1
l=Father
2=Mother
3=1st daughter
4=1st son
5=2nd daughter
6=3rd daughter
7=3rd son
8=4th son
9=grandson
FAMILY 7
5 Responses in CoII!IlOn
F ,M, ld, 3d,4d
4
F, ld, 2d, 3d, 4d
4
F,M,ld,2d,3d
4
F,M,2d,3d,4d
2
F ,M, ld, 2d,4d
1
4 Responses in Corrmon
F,ld,2d,3d
5
F ,M, 2d ,4d
4
M, 2d, 3d ,4d
3
M, ld, 2d, 3d
3
F ,M, 2d, 3d
3
F,2d,3d,4d
2
M,ld,3d,4d
2
F ,M, ld, 2d
2
F ,M, ld,4d
2
F ,M, ld, 2d
1
F,M,3d,4d
1
3 Responses in Conmon
F,M,2d
M, 3d,4d
M, ld,4d

6
4
3

F,ld,4d
F,M,4d
F, ld, 2d
ld,3d,4d

3
3
3
3

F,M,3d

2

F,2d,3d
F ,M, ld
ld,2d,3d
M,ld,2d

2
2
2

2

2d,3d,4d
ld,3d,4d
M,ld,3d
F,3d,4d
M, 2d ,3d

1
1
1
1

1

FAMILY 11
3 Responses in Common
F ,M, 2s
12
M, 2s,4s
6
F ,M,4s
4
F,2s,4s
4

